



ELSEVIER

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

SCIENCE @ DIRECT®

Communist and
Post-Communist
Studies

Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37 (2004) 281–318

www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud

Russian geopolitical storylines and public opinion in the wake of 9–11: a critical geopolitical analysis and national survey

John O'Loughlin^{a,*}, Gearoid Ó Tuathail^b, Vladimir Kolossov^c

^a *Department of Geography and Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Campus Box 487, Boulder, CO 80309-0487, USA*

^b *Government and International Affairs, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Alexandria Center, VA 22314–2979, USA*

^c *Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia*

Abstract

Examination of the speeches, writings and editorials by the Putin Administration in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks showed a consistent storyline that equated Russia's war against Chechen terrorists with the subsequent US attack on the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The storyline made a strong case for a Russian alliance with the US and the West against those who were attacking the 'civilized world'. Two alternative storylines also emerged. The centrist-liberal storyline was skeptical of the benefits accruing to Russia from its support of the Bush Administration's policy, while the national patriotic-Communist storyline concentrated on the 'imperialist' drive of the United States to control the resources of Eurasia. The resonance of the dominant Putin storyline and its skeptical and suspicious alternatives among the Russian public is tested by analysis of the responses to a representative national survey of 1800 adults conducted in April 2002. Significant socio-demographic differences appear in responses to eight questions. The Putin storyline is accepted by the rich supporters of the Edinstvo party, males, 'Westernizers', residents of Siberia, singles and young adults, while the oppositional storylines are supported by Communist party supporters, the elderly, Muslims, women, the poor, and residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

© 2004 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Russia; Geopolitics; Discourse; Putin; September 11; Public opinion

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-303-492-1619; fax: +1-303-492-3609.

E-mail address: johno@colorado.edu (J. O'Loughlin).

Introduction

The coordinated terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, that brought down the World Trade Center in New York City and left the Pentagon smoldering, dramatically transformed the fledgling presidency of George W. Bush and re-defined America's mission in world affairs. These terrorist attacks were also global media events that unfolded in media-centric cities with the technological capacity to project their drama to the rest of the world. Many networks, including Russia's, broadcast live transmission of the dramatic events using satellite feed from CNN and other American media outlets. Footage of the large civilian aircraft loaded with jet fuel crashing into the towers of the World Trade Center, and images of fire and black smoke spewing from the very heart of America's defense establishment, were compelling spectacles that reached worldwide audiences, already used to Hollywood pyrotechnics. The 'exogenous shock' of the attacks propelled terrorism to the forefront of world politics and transformed the discursive environment within which competing political elites within states defined their positions, articulated their differences, and elaborated clashing visions of state identity and national security. In short, the terrorist spectacle of September 11, 2001 provided a transformed discursive 'plot' for geopolitical reasoning.

How this process worked in the Russian Federation is of particular interest given certain features of political life there. First, until a decade before, Russia was a serious great power rival of the United States, with missiles targeting American cities and the Pentagon. The majority of Russians were socialized under a system that represented the United States as the enemy of their state and identity. Second, since the end of the Cold War, Russia had collapsed as a superpower and has experienced severe economic and social difficulties. That Russia is still a 'great power' is now in question and the subject of considerable political polemics within Russian political life. Third, in a world increasingly concerned about 'Islamic terrorism', the Russian Federation is a state with a growing Muslim population. According to the 1989 Soviet census, Muslims comprised 8.3% of the population. Since 1989, the Muslim percentage has grown considerably and is now estimated at 12–15% of the total population (Aksyanova, 2001; Trenin, 2002b). Fourth, Russian political elites have long considered themselves at war with terrorism. The state has been engaged in a civil war with Chechen rebels since the Yeltsin administration's ill-fated decision in 1994 to attempt to resolve the disputed status of Chechnya within the Russian Federation militarily. Chechen rebels have long been represented as 'bandits', and 'terrorists' within Russia. President Vladimir Putin partially owed his success in the Presidential election of 2000 to his 'strong man' response to urban terrorism in Russian cities in 1999. Fifth, one of the reasons Putin thrived politically was his ability to appeal to Russian national-patriot sentiments using Chechnya as his foil while simultaneously pursuing a Westernizing economic reform strategy. The events of 9–11 altered the political landscape in Russia and forced Putin to make a choice between these two orientations. It also created opportunities for those opposed to Putin to re-define their differences with him.

This paper is an examination of the geopolitical storylines that developed amongst the Russian political class in the first 6 months after the September 11 attacks, and the attitudes of various socio-demographic groups in Russia to aspects of these storylines. We first gathered the statements and opinions of the Russian political class and intelligentsia on the meaning of 9–11. We used three types of sources. First, we analyzed the official Russian response to the events of 9–11, namely the declarations and speeches of President Putin, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. These documents were taken from the official site of the President of Russia (<http://www.president.ru>) and of the Foreign Ministry (<http://www.mid.ru>). Second, we analyzed the positions of various political party leaders from the *Vestnik Gosudarstvennoi Dumi* (*Herald of the State Duma*), Russian newspaper archives, FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) and Lexis Nexis databases, and select websites from political consultancies and public opinion agencies. Third, we examined several federal and regional newspapers to get a representation of the spectrum of national and regional opinion across the country.¹ Of the major national newspapers, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Independent) has a daily circulation of about 50,000 copies and is considered a 'quality daily newspaper' read by intellectuals and the economic and political elite. It circulates mainly in Moscow, St. Petersburg and few other large cities. This daily traditionally pays much more attention to foreign policy than most other newspapers and carries serious analytical articles. The daily *Komsomolskaya Pravda* has a centrist-liberal orientation and has a much larger circulation (about 800,000 copies) across Russia and many CIS countries. The daily *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* (482,000 copies) is printed in 31 cities of Russia and is the official government daily. We also consulted two daily newspapers representing the views of the left and the so-called 'national-patriotic' wing of the political spectrum: *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Soviet Russia), an officially independent daily with close ties to the Communist party, with a circulation of 300,000 copies but an audience estimated at a million; and *Zavtra* (Tomorrow), a national-patriotic daily known for its irreconcilable opposition to the post-Soviet regime.

To examine Russian public opinion in the wake of 9–11, we administered a national public opinion survey. Our goal was to examine how ordinary Russians were making sense of geopolitics in the wake of September 11 and which features of the competing Russian storylines attracted support from various socio-demographic groups. After a pilot survey in Moscow in March 2002, our poll was

¹ We considered the possibility that regional newspapers, especially in the republics with a considerable Muslim population would cover the events of 9–11 in a different way and selected for our analysis two regions with the predominantly pro-governmental and liberal orientation of the electorate (Samara and Yaroslavl), two regions with a pro-governmental and left orientation (Arkhangelsk and Omsk, respectively) and one republic with a large number of Muslims (Tatarstan). Altogether, electronic versions of eight regional newspapers were examined. However, all of these newspapers publish few foreign news stories and, when they do, they tend to rely upon federal and foreign news agencies wire services. Consequently, no substantial differences in the coverage of the events were found. The regional newspapers we examined were *Samara Segodnia*, *Samarskie Izvestia*, *Samarskii Portal* and *Novosti Togliatti*; *Omskaya Gazeta*, *Severnyi Krai* (Yaroslavl); *Pravda Severa* (Arkhangelsk) and *Respublika Tatarstan*.

conducted between April 11 and 22, 2002 at 202 polling sites across Russia by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM—*Fond Obshchestvennoye Mnenie*). The sample is representative of the Russian population across the usual socio-demographic categories, regions, and size of settlement. The margin of error is 3.5%; the full survey was conducted in 202 sampling points across Russia by a doorstep interview. In this survey, we were particularly interested in the opinions of Russia's Muslims so we deliberately over-sampled in traditional Muslim regions. The same survey questions were posed to all respondents and the interviews were completed at the residence of the respondent. Selection of respondents was carried out by a routing method for polling districts with the use of quotas for gender, age and education, with the residential population over the age of 18 as the target set. Of the 1500 Russian territorial sample respondents, 1098 were from urban areas and 402 were rural respondents. The interviews were conducted in 64 subject territories (oblasts and republics) of the Russian Federation, with 202 settlements included in the sample. The average time to complete the questionnaire was 25 minutes. In the Islamic region sub-samples surveys were administered in four national republics of Russia where representatives of titular nationalities (Kabardinians, Balkarians, Karachevians, Circassians, Tatars and Bashkirs) were interviewed; 300 respondents (150 in both urban and rural regions) were interviewed in 29 cities and rural villages in the ethnic republics. A total of 10,700 contacts were attempted to achieve the completed sample of 1800. The effective response rate therefore was 16.8%, but the response rate for actual contacts that met the survey socio-demographic specifications was over 70%.

Since the topic we are examining is complex, the conclusions of our research are necessarily condensed and concisely stated here. We do not examine political communication in the sense of how the elites' messages were promoted and received by the public. Instead, in part one of the paper, we argue that Russian political elites developed three competing storylines in response to 9–11: (a) a mainstream Putin-sponsored 'common enemy' storyline that represented 9–11 as a global variant of what Russia faced in Chechnya, (b) a reformist storyline that saw 9–11 as a geo-economic opportunity for Russia but was skeptical of Putin's apparently close embrace of America, and (c) a red-brown neo-nationalist/neo-Communist storyline that represented 9–11 and the US response as episodes in a larger story of 'American imperialism'. These storylines grew into specific policies proclaimed and pursued in international affairs by competing power groups in the Russian Federation. Part two of this paper addresses our survey and identifies the socio-demographic groups that were most and least supportive of Putin's storyline.

Russian geopolitical storylines on the meaning of 9–11

A fundamental unit in the critical analysis of geopolitical discourse is a 'storyline'.² A storyline can be defined as the way in which geopolitical events, locations,

² The methods of critical geopolitics are reviewed in Ó Tuathail (2002).

protagonists, processes and interests are organized into a relatively coherent narrative of explanation and meaning. Unlike the scripts that political leaders draw upon to respond to everyday events or publicly articulate policy before the media, storylines are arguments that gradually cohere and congeal around persistent public policy challenges and dilemmas. The geopolitical culture of a state is normally characterized by a series of antagonistic and competing geopolitical traditions that are drawn upon to help write similarly contending geopolitical storylines around foreign policy developments and dramas (Ó Tuathail, 2002). Dimitri Trenin, for example, has argued that Russian geopolitical culture at the dawn of the new millennium is characterized by three competing geopolitical traditions and orientations: a great Russia tradition, an anti-Western tradition, and a European tradition (Trenin, 2002a).³ While there is never a strict one-to-one correlation between geopolitical traditions and geopolitical storylines, each of these traditions, as ready-made narratives of geopolitical meaning, identity and orientation, were drawn upon in the assemblage of Russian storylines responding to 9–11 and its aftermath. These storylines sought to explain the event itself and its immediate causes, to explain its implications for Russia and to articulate a vision of Russia's national interest amidst the unfolding of an attack on the Taliban and a more ambitious 'war against terror' led by the United States and its allies. Trenin argues that until September 2001, Vladimir Putin had not made a choice between the three geopolitical traditions he describes, proving himself to be a master of tactical temporizing rather than long-term strategic choice (Trenin, 2002a). Mobilizing an uneasy hybrid of modern Western and traditional Russian strong state discourse, and playing on occasion to suspicion of foreigners, Putin had already begun to re-assert centralizing state power and curtail some liberal democratic practices (O'Loughlin, 2001; Shlapentokh, 2001). Authoritarian governance and strong state governmentality are central to Putin's worldview, yet he was inconsistent in his expression of these sentiments. On foreign policy, he negotiated a balance between developing good relations with the West while catering to the needs of the military establishment and the FSB, especially over Chechnya (Shlapentokh, 2001: p. 389). But after September 11, Trenin argues, Putin made a 'strategic choice' in favor of the West motivated by his underlying desire to lead Russia towards Europe.

Putin's 'common enemy' storyline

The basis of the Putin administration's storyline on 9–11 was formed in the hours immediately after the attack when Putin was the first foreign leader to reach President Bush and offer his support to America. Addressing the Russian nation later that day, he described the 9–11 attacks as "an unprecedented act of aggression on

³ Other typologies of the traditions characterizing Russian geopolitical culture are more precise. Tsygankov (2003) lists five traditions (expansionists, civilizationists, stabilizers, geo-economists and Westernizers) while Smith (1999: Chapter 3) lists four (liberal westernists-European Western, neo-nationalists, neo-Soviet and democratic statist). For further typologies, see O'Loughlin (2001) and Kolossov (2001: Chapter 1).

the part of international terrorism” that “goes beyond national borders”. Terrorism, he pronounced, is the ‘plague of the 21st century’ and “Russia knows at first hand what terrorism is. So, we understand as well as anyone the feelings of the American people.” Broadening his identification with America into a common community, he described 9–11 as “a brazen challenge to the whole humanity, at least to civilized humanity”. This common identity led Putin to declare that “we entirely and fully share and experience your pain. We support you”.⁴

It took some time, however, for Putin’s initial and instinctive reaction to 9–11 to be molded into a coherent storyline and ‘strategic choice’. A few days after the attack, for example, Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, told reporters that he saw “absolutely no basis for even hypothetical suppositions about the possibility of NATO military operations on the territory of Central Asian nations.” (Glasser, 2001: p. A6). Other generals expressed their skepticism about an active US presence in Central Asia and Russian support for any US-led war against the Taliban in Afghanistan (Cottrell, 2001). However, after a weekend of meeting with his advisors in Sochi and a 40 minute phone call with Bush, Putin developed a ‘common enemy’ geopolitical storyline for the post-9–11 world that placed Russia decisively on the side of the West in the coming war against the Taliban.⁵ Addressing the nation in a television address, he pointed out that the Russian Federation “has been fighting international terrorism for a long time” and “has repeatedly urged the international community to join efforts”. While the forum for those efforts are “international agencies and institutions”, most especially “the UN and the UN Security Council”, Putin outlined a series of specific measures Russia would adopt to aid the emergent American-led coalition against the Taliban government of Afghanistan. Russia would supply intelligence about “the infrastructure and locations of international terrorists” and would “make the Russian Federation’s air space available for the flights-through of planes carrying humanitarian cargo to the area of that anti-terrorist operation”. In a significant rupture from traditional Russian geopolitics, he accepted the establishment of bases by America and its allies in Central Asia for operations against ‘international terrorism’. This latter position marked the triumph of Ministry of Foreign Affairs reasoning over that of the Ministry of Defense.⁶ Putin had calculated that Russia’s priorities were economic and state-building reforms at home. A stable, predictable

⁴ “Statement by President Putin of Russia on the Terrorist Acts in the US, Moscow, September 11, 2001.” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, <http://www.ln.mid.ru>

⁵ According to Russian journalists, this team included Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense, Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Voloshin, Head of the Presidential Administration, Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff, and Vladimir Rushailo, former Minister of Internal Affairs (Volkova, 2001).

⁶ The positions of the foreign ministry can be qualified as pro-Western, unlike the defense ministry, a point emphasized by Alexei Salmin (2001) a former member of the Presidential Council of Boris Yeltsin. According to Russian journalists, Putin’s team of advisors included Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense, Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Voloshin, Head of the Presidential Administration, Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff, and Vladimir Rushailo. See Volkova (2001).

and friendly set of relations with the West, particularly the European Union, was vital to advance the greater integration of its economy into world markets.

The elements of the 'common enemy' storyline were developed and articulated by members of the Putin administration over the following months as the war in Afghanistan got underway and the Taliban regime was driven from power. Following the 'grammar of geopolitics' schema developed by Ó Tuathail (2002), this storyline is summarized in Table 1. Central to its construction were key analogies, similes, and metaphors. 9–11 was terrorism analogous to that experienced by Moscow in 1999 and thus, the American war against terrorism in Afghanistan was like the Russian war against terrorism in Chechnya. "Chechnya and Afghanistan are branches of one tree, whose roots are in Afghanistan" declared Foreign Minister Ivanov.⁷ The West and Russia faced a common enemy whose deeds "can be compared to what the Nazis did".⁸ TV channels directly or indirectly controlled by the administration and the mainstream and popular printed media adopted this official government discourse from the outset.

The Putin administration justified its pro-American orientation by evoking geo-economic and civilizational arguments. Centrist and liberal newspapers carried articles that generally supported such articulations of Russia's national interest and orientation. Asking whether the new friendship with America will make Russia stronger, an article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* reasoned that Russia's "rapprochement with the USA and Europe" is a historically correct choice with many positive implications. Improved relations with the USA:

will allow us... to perfect our market infrastructure. As a result, Western technologies will move to us, and Russian exports to Western markets will be facilitated. Finally, our economy will profit from it, and this inevitably will diminish prices and the fiscal burden... political integration (with the West) means liberalization of legislation, a more attentive attitude to respect of human rights and freedoms (Chugaev, 2001).

The notion of an alliance of 'civilized powers' was a theme articulated by many. In *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, a veteran of Soviet and Russian diplomacy, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anatoly Adamishin, wrote that "[d]espite all Russia's particularity (which should not only be celebrated but consciously cultivated), the place of our country is in the West. It is not only a civilizational but, first of all, a pragmatic choice based on fundamental national interests" (Adamishin, 2002).

Gleb Pavlovsky, head of the Foundation for Effective Policy (*Fond effektivnoi politiki*) and leading Kremlin advisor, wrote in *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* that the

⁷ "Ivanov says Chechnya, Afghanistan 'are branches of one tree,'" Moscow Interfax, September 24, 2001 (FBIS transcribed text).

⁸ "Putin compares terrorist attacks in US to Nazi crimes", *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, September 15, 2001. For a fuller documentation and discussion of the Putin administration's discourse in the wake of 9–11 see O'Loughlin et al. (2004).

Table 1
Russian geopolitical storylines on 9–11 and its consequences

Grammar of geopolitics	Common enemy storyline	Skeptical storyline	American imperialism storyline
<p><i>Situation description:</i> What was 9–11 and the plot of geopolitics in its aftermath? What analogical reasoning is used to classify and particularize events?</p> <p><i>Location specification:</i> Where are the threats and how are these threats imagined?</p> <p><i>Protagonist specification:</i> Who are our enemies and what are their characteristics?</p> <p><i>Attribution of causality:</i> What explains 9–11 and geopolitics in its wake?</p>	<p>9–11 was like Chechen terrorism against Moscow. Fanatical Islamic terrorists threaten civilized states. Russia and the US face a 'common enemy' whose crimes are like those of the Nazis. Afghan war like Chechen war. The threat is worldwide but especially from 'terrorist havens' like Chechnya, Afghanistan and Georgia. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan aid terrorists. International terrorists; Al Qaeda, headed by Bin Laden; and based in Taliban Afghanistan and other pariah countries.</p> <p>Individualized explanation: evil actors. An attempt by religious fanatics and bandits to terrorize civilized states and create a new caliphate.</p>	<p>9–11 was a singular act of terrorism. The West and Russia face terrorist threats but Russia also faces pressing domestic reform challenges. 9–11 different from Chechnya and Afghan war different from Chechen war. Russia faces threat from Islamic terrorists but also from its own military, the mafia, traditional neo-imperialists, opponents of market reforms. International terrorists; Al Qaeda; the Taliban. Also American hegemonists and unilateralists.</p>	<p>American state terrorism and imperialism against the world provoked 9–11. America is using 9–11 to impose its supremacy on the world, and make it provide the US with raw materials and resources. Russia encircled by American bases. The Afghan war like Kosovo, Panama, Vietnam, other wars of imperialism. Threat is within Russia's traditional sphere of influence, at Russia's borders in the South (Islam) and West (NATO). American bases in Central Asia are part of a plot by it to control the energy resources of the Caspian Sea. The enemies of Russia are Islamic fundamentalist forces, Chechen bandits and Western imperialists. The strategy of the West is evident in the geopolitical writings of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.</p> <p><i>Structural explanation:</i> American imperialism and geopolitical strategies. The 'South' is exploited by America and other Western countries^a and culturally dominated by them^b; Al Qaeda and others are 'imperial blowback', created and supported by the US. To struggle against the capitulation of the Putin's administration under the pressure of the West; restoration of Russia as a great power and an independent pole of influence, against the enlargement of NATO eastward and new US military bases in former Soviet republics.^c <i>Eurasian and Statist:</i> Russia as a separate great power.</p>
<p><i>The Russian national interest</i></p>	<p>To join the antiterrorist coalition and to become a close ally of the US; to struggle against terrorism in Chechnya by all possible means, including military force; to advance geoeconomic goals. Pragmatic soft authoritarian westernization.</p>	<p>To Westernize, cooperate and claim a geoeconomic payoff; solve Soviet debts, join WTO, keep oil prices high; to negotiate end to Chechen war. Multilateralist foreign policy. Pragmatic liberal westernization.</p>	<p>To struggle against the capitulation of the Putin's administration under the pressure of the West; restoration of Russia as a great power and an independent pole of influence, against the enlargement of NATO eastward and new US military bases in former Soviet republics.^c <i>Eurasian and Statist:</i> Russia as a separate great power.</p>
<p><i>Overall geopolitical orientation</i></p>	<p>Pragmatic soft authoritarian westernization.</p>	<p>Pragmatic liberal westernization.</p>	<p><i>Eurasian and Statist:</i> Russia as a separate great power.</p>

^a “The answer is clear already now. What has happened in the US is a reply from billions of people in the Third World who have experienced, during the past 50 years, the destructive economic, political and military pressure of the USA. The inevitability of reply actions from the international community to the shameless carnage of the US was obvious. The very selection of targets testifies it. This is the World Trade Center, a symbol of American economic power and the Pentagon, a symbol of American military might.” The quote is from [Tetkin \(2001\)](#).

^b “Humanity poisoned with drugs, AIDS, pedophilia, Hollywood movies of horror and violence, that fly out over the world from the poisoned center of Manhattan as from a huge Sodom, hates America.” Quote is from [Prokhanov \(2001\)](#).

^c Alexei Mitrofanov, a Duma deputy since 1993 from Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and one of his most faithful adherents, even stated that Russia should support the Taliban because otherwise Americans would remain in Central Asia forever and encircle the country also from the south-east. See [Prussakov \(2001\)](#).

rapprochement between the US and Russia facilitated solving many questions “on the basis of good will” and in a more rational way. All of the issues he raised were geo-economic: Russia’s entry into the WTO, the question of Kaliningrad, and the problem of Russian foreign debts. He approved of Putin’s strategy not to place preliminary conditions for cooperation and asking his Western counterparts for a pay-off (Pavlovsky, 2001). Former USSR President, Mikhail Gorbachev, who regularly comments on international events for *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, called Putin’s Russian–American policies “correct” and expressed his belief that Russia would be a serious partner of the US in the struggle against international terrorism (Gorbachev, 2001). At the same time, he warned “not everybody in both the political elite and among ordinary citizens perceived it in the same way”. Many people in Russia, he argued, were asking whether Russia would receive reciprocity, a favorable attitude from the US to the problems important to Russia.

The ‘skeptical’ storyline

Gorbachev’s comments were prescient and would become more relevant as America’s global war against terrorism seemed to unfold in an increasingly unilateralist manner during autumn 2001 and into 2002. While Putin’s strategic choice on September 24, 2001 to side with the West was generally applauded by the loose coalition of liberal democrats associated with the Union of Right Forces (SPS—*Soyuz Pravykh Sil*) and by centrist political parties, these groups gradually developed their own distinctive storyline on 9–11 and its meaning for Russia over the subsequent months. That storyline accepted the President’s description of 9–11, his policy decisions on September 24, and his support for the US war against the Taliban but, as time passed, expressed skepticism of the results and of the implication of the ‘common enemy’ storyline. Two critiques of the government became the basis for an alternative skeptical storyline that saw ‘geo-economic opportunity’, yet also ‘geopolitical danger’, in the administration’s policies. The first developed out of an interpretation of the West’s new preoccupation with international terrorism and Afghanistan as a ‘geo-economic opportunity’ for Russia to make significant advances in its relationship with the international community, most especially international economic institutions. Russia should get a ‘pay-off’ from the West for its active cooperation with the Americans and its acceptance of American forces in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. The second line of critique developed out of an interpretation of Russia’s cooperation with the West as containing geopolitical dangers, particularly the risk that Russia’s cooperation with the West becomes effective support for American global hegemony in practice. While some accepted Putin’s appeal to ‘civilizational’ rhetoric as the basis for unity of purpose and identity, others did not. Russia needs to retain its independent ‘great power’ status and promote a ‘multipolar’ and ‘multilateralist’ rather than ‘unipolar’ world order organized around American unilateralism.

Both these lines of argumentation worked in tandem and could be found in the comments and articulations of a variety of political figures. The liberal right opposition represented mainly by the Union of Right Forces, chaired by former

Vice-Prime Minister and former Governor of Nizhny Novgorod oblast, Boris Nemtsov, supported Putin's strategic choice but questioned the lack of tangible economic benefits. He did not accept the analogy between Chechnya and Afghanistan, calling for a ceasefire and negotiations with separatists in Chechnya while supporting the US military action against the Taliban. Grigory Yavlinsky and his party *Yabloko* had been more critical of Putin but after September 11 articulated positions similar to those of Nemtsov. As Russia and America cooperated to topple the Taliban without any obvious *quid pro quo* for Russia, even centrist and liberal newspapers close to governmental circles began to express dissatisfaction with the absence of any immediate pay-off to Russia. An article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* stressed that the Russian leadership "did not put acute questions to Washington" and that Putin "opened a credit of trust to President Bush, who would have to cover it". The Russian President "was taking a risk in giving the US an advance which she did not merit" (Kabannikov, 2001).

Central to the geopolitical dimension of the skeptical storyline was the argument that Putin's strategic decisions in September 2001 were a *de facto* deviation from the "Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" adopted in July 2000. Articulated and developed by former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov, this document held that the purpose of Russian foreign policy was the transformation of the country into an autonomous center of power in the 'multipolar world'.⁹ This concept argued for multipolarity in opposition to the unilateral hegemony of the United States and drew support across the political spectrum (Sheinis, 2002). Primakov subsequently worked with the mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov to form *Otechestvo* (Fatherland), a party representing federal and regional elite. Together with the generally pro-presidential party *Edinstvo*, they developed a detailed statement on multipolarity. Significantly, they stressed the importance of economic cooperation with Western Europe, Japan, and China but interpreted relations with the US and NATO as competitive rivalry. *Yabloko* also endorsed the concept of multipolarity, stating that Russia cannot pretend to be a competing center of power to the US but that checking overarching American power was important.

The notion of multipolarity is a flexible foreign policy concept available for appropriation by a wide variety of political projects. What defined its use in the post-September 11 period was its function as an alternative geopolitical vision to that put forth by the Bush administration. The Bush doctrine articulated a clear Manichean world where "[e]ither you are with us or you are with the terrorists".¹⁰ President Putin effectively promoted and endorsed such Manicheanism in his own rhetoric about the threats faced by 'civilized humanity' and 'civilized states' from 'terrorists', 'bandits', and 'religious fanatics'. This creation of a common

⁹ The full text of the concept is available from "'Kontsepszia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii' (The Concept of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy)", *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, July 11 (2000).

¹⁰ President Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, United States Capitol Washington, DC, September 20, 2001 (available from www.whitehouse.gov).

civilizational identity defined by a global terrorist ‘Other’—the ‘common enemy’ storyline—depluralized the world political map and overwrote its geographical complexity with geopolitical abstractions and slogans. This strategy served Putin well because he could represent the conflict that defined his presidency, the second war against Chechnya, as part of a global struggle against terrorism—Russia’s war against Al Qaeda and radical Islam—and therefore discount the historical legacy of Russian imperialism and post-Soviet military brutality in fermenting the conflict. But it also left Putin vulnerable to the charge that he was effectively endorsing a geopolitical vision and strategy for American global hegemony.

Articles in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* gave voice to the growing critique of Putin’s apparent closeness to the Bush administration, evident in his November 2001 trip to Washington, Texas and New York.¹¹ On the same day when Putin was in Texas, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* ran an article arguing that “Washington has long been preparing to reshape the world with the help of a global anti-terrorist strategy”. Bush was using military planning begun under the Democrats and the opportunity created by 9–11 to reshape world order and assert American predominance. Afghanistan is only the beginning and experience there will be used in other regions of the world. “America will not thank Russia for its loyalty” (Kalashnikova, 2001).

After the Bush administration’s formal withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* carried an article on the limits of the rapprochement in US—Russian relations. American unilateralism was alive and well. September 11 had changed very little. The withdrawal, the author noted:

should have a sobering effect on some of our enthusiasts for any coalition with America. The essence of these coalitions consists of the United States ensuring itself a free hand and continuing its course, not departing one iota from its intentions, and we are permitted to support America with any degree of enthusiasm we wish.

The article asks the central question defining the skeptical storyline: “What do we get in exchange?” The reasoning is worth quoting at length:

When they [the Americans] talk to us about some historical opportunity to leap into the Western world, they forget to add that for now the West very cautiously regards such a leap. For now they want to see us in highly limited doses, and basically only when it is essential. Russia was needed for the destruction of the Taliban; in America they talked about a union with us. The operation is almost finished, and we are no longer needed so much. Perhaps, they even withdrew from the ABM Treaty so demonstratively in order to remind us who is who in the contemporary world (Pushkov, 2001: p. 1).

President Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech in January 2002 and his call for ‘regime change’ in Iraq further strengthened the skeptical storyline of the moderate

¹¹ Among numerous articles on this topic see, for instance, Kalashnikova (2001, 2002), Airapetova (2001) and Kuranov (2002).

opposition. In March 2002, Alexei Arbatov, member of Yabloko and vice-chair of the Duma Committee on Defence declared in an interview that the US showed '*chernaya neblagodarnost*' ('black ingratitude') for Russian support in Afghanistan, and that America suffers from the arrogance of force (Arbatov, 2002: p. 3). Mounting criticism of Putin by the right (liberal) semi-opposition argued that the US cannot be a reliable ally since its foreign policy is based on the arrogance of force and cynical calculations. According to this position, America will never take Russian interests into account and will forget about promises made the day after receiving what it wants.

By the end of 2001, a skeptical storyline in opposition to the official storyline of the Putin administration was in place and being used by various elements of the moderate opposition—both left and right—to Putin. This storyline was partly a function of political opportunism as opposition figures and commentators identified openings for effective political critique of those in power. It was also potentially contradictory in that it both criticized Putin for not getting any substantial pay-off from his coalition with the Americans while also criticizing the coalition itself for diluting multipolarity. While its proponents generally supported Putin's tilt towards the West in fighting terrorism and violent Islamic fundamentalism, they remained critical of the degree to which his policies, particularly his domestic 'reforms' (including Chechnya), were really leading Russia towards the West. Furman (2001) argued that the decisiveness of Putin's foreign policy choice in favor of the West has been exaggerated. Like the anti-Hitler coalition, the post-September 11 coalition is a situational alliance that will not last. He further argued that Russia's post-Soviet development is based on completely different, non-Western foundations, and no alliance with the West can change that. "Our integration with the West is not a problem of foreign policy choice. It is a problem of our internal development, which within the framework of our current regime distances us from the West" (Furman, 2001: p. 8). It may appear that the skeptical storyline is a bit inconsistent but storylines are not about consistency but about political sense-making.

The 'American imperialism' storyline

Putin's 'strategic choice' in favor of the West changed his field of maneuver in Russian politics. Before September 11, he could reckon on the certain support of left (Communist) and national-patriotic forces, whose electorates were impressed by his slogans calling for the strengthening of the state. Once he publicly backed the West, however, Putin opened himself up for criticism and became, in their eyes, a 'Westernizer' not only in economic but also in foreign policy terms. "Putin and Kasianov are simply young Yeltsinists", said Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov on September 16, 2001 (Nikiforenko, 2001). For these groups, alternative perspectives and geopolitical narratives rendering meaning and coherence to the events of September 11 were readily available in Communist-backed newspapers like '*Sovetskaya Rossiya*' and the national-patriotic paper, '*Zavtra*'. Unlike the skeptical storyline of the moderate semi-opposition that took time to develop its contingent critique of his policies, these groups turned to an old Soviet-era

narrative that placed American imperialism at the center of geopolitics.¹² A *Zavtra* editorial represented Putin's 'strategic choice' as:

The two-years schizophrenia, which saw the bifurcation of Putin's personality, is over. The liberal economy of tycoons and of international thieves was covered with patriotic varnish and a gilding of great powerness. The great power project of Putin—words about sovereignty, repulsion, the revival of strong and independent Russia—all this decayed jewelry is thrown away, and now globalism, Americanism, the involvement in the cosmopolitan mud becomes the ideology of Putin's Russia and will definitively suck in the unhappy country which has elected for itself three president-destroyers, one after another (*Zavtra*, November 20, 2001).

Both the left (Communist) and the national-patriotic oppositions were explicitly against the military involvement of Russia in the US war against international terrorism. "Russia must not take part in a joint revenge action" against Afghanistan, pronounced Gennady Zyuganov, since "[w]e're barely even able to cope with Chechnya" ("Russian Communists oppose involvement in US revenge operation". *Agence France Presse* September 18, 2001). Suspecting the 'pro-Western' Russian leadership of secretly preparing Russia's participation in the war against the Taliban, Alexander Prokhanov, editor-in-chief of *Zavtra*, wrote in his paper: "And now liberals, with the same aging faces carved with vices, dancing to the American tune, want to send to Afghani villages (*kishlaks*) and gorges the weakened, slandered Russian army, exhausted by the Chechen war, in making guys from Ryazan' and Vologda fight for Oklahoma"(Prokhanov, 2001). Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, vice-speaker of the Duma from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, known for his hyperbolic statements and clownish behavior, stated that the US anti-terrorist campaign (supported by Russia) was in fact directed against Russia and purposefully planned by America to direct Muslim terrorism against Russia. He called upon Russia to take a neutral position toward the Taliban, "Muslims probably will have mercy upon Russia, and the world will avoid a nuclear war"(Andrushenko, 2001).

In the newspapers of the left and national-patriot opposition, the 9–11 attacks were explained in Marxist materialist terms as the consequence of the economic exploitation of developing countries by the US and the West. According to this storyline, the intolerable gap in income and well-being between rich and poor countries, the dominance of America in world affairs, and the lack of respect for the national cultures, traditions, and identities of non-Western peoples led to a

¹² It should be noted that the left opposition to Putin also used the arguments characteristic of the skeptical storyline but from the outset. For example, Gennady Zyuganov declared on television in early October that "I look at how Putin very energetically supports the American line...quite recently they spoke about a multipolar world, now they offer only one pole and if you don't accept this, you are terrorists" (*Federal News Service*, 2001). In November as Putin visited the US he stated that "[t]he West secured maximum concessions but made no steps in return. Our country's strategic position continues to decline" (*Morning Star* [China] "Communist leader warns on concessions" November 10, 2001). Their critique was not limited to these points but placed them within a more encompassing 'American imperialism' storyline.

buildup of resentments that found expression on 9–11. Further, the American state helped create the very terrorists that had attacked it by supporting the mujahideen in the years of the war with the USSR in Afghanistan. Communists accused the US of 'state terrorism' against political regimes, movements and peoples that did not accept American economic and cultural expansion, the bombing of Yugoslavia, military intervention in Bosnia and in other regions of the world, and of hypocrisy and double standards applied to 'good' (Israeli extremists, Kosovars, and Chechen separatists) and 'bad' (other Muslim) terrorists. Gennady Zyuganov in the interview to *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, given a few days after 9–11, declared:

Today, America aspires to govern not simply the technosphere and global financial flows but history itself. The results of American global victories are destroyed continents, lost sovereignties, demonized peoples, and confessions. The Boeings that smashed into the Pentagon and World Trade Center symbolize a new radical turn in these battles (Zyuganov, 2001d).

In interviews, speeches and an 'open letter' over the subsequent months, he elaborated these views arguing that a pyramid of unipolarity is being built in world politics, with the United States giving orders and telling everyone what to do while "we are at the foot of it playing the role of truckers and suppliers of human resources for the next military operation" (Aldoshina, 2001).

For the left opposition and national-patriots, the phenomenon of terrorism is explained not in terms of 'evil doers' but in terms of global structures of inequality and imperialism. "The true source of contemporary terrorism is international imperialism, which divides humanity into an over-exploited majority and a small handful of monopolies, whose financial oligarchy swim in luxury and feed their citizens and the 'elite' of satellite countries by the exploitation of the majority. This world order inevitably leads to terrorism from both sides" argued Oleg Shenin, formerly secretary of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Central Committee and now Chair of "the Council of the Union of Communist Parties" in the pages of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Shenin, 2002). Zyuganov's television interviews echoed such sentiments:

There are seven billion people on the planet. One billion lives prosperously, consuming three-fourths of what the others produce. Four billion have neither clothes to wear nor food to eat. This humiliation and poverty is the main cause of extremism and terrorism (Federal News Service, 2001).

While Zyuganov argued that Russia must fight 'bandits' in Chechnya, he and others persistently interpreted terrorism in structural terms (a few expressed support for the Taliban and Bin Laden).¹³ The emergence of terrorism is a symptom of

¹³ The anniversary of the October revolution on November 7, 2001 saw thousands of Communists marching in Moscow and other parts of the country, most supporters of the Russian Communist Party but some supporters of the more hardline Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Demonstrators shouted slogans of support for the Taliban and Bin Laden. NTV television news broadcast, 'Segodnya', November 7, 2001 (FBIS translated text).

contradictions of imperialism and an emergent general legitimacy crisis of capitalism. Terrorism is viewed as a reaction to the promotion of US values. “The West tries to legitimize this order through the idea of globalization, in imposing ‘liberal-democratic’ values”, noted Leonid Ivashov (2002b), a former three star General and now Vice-President of the “Academy of Geopolitical Sciences”, an independent association of individuals close to the military with an interest in geopolitics.¹⁴

The American imperialism storyline sprang not only from classical Marxist-Leninist reasoning but also from the discourse of classical geopolitics that is popular among the left and extreme right in Russia as a foundation for understanding world politics. International events and affairs are made meaningful when considered as part of an eternal and inevitable struggle over territory, strategic locations, and natural resources by imperialist states. This narrative form easily lends itself to conspiratorial thinking and visions of grand geopolitical plots by American imperialism to further its own interests at the expense of the Russian state. Thus, for example, the meaning of 9–11 for this opposition in Russia is not the attacks themselves but the geopolitical offensive by the American state they unleashed and legitimated. 9–11 led directly to the United States establishing itself in Russia’s traditional territorial sphere of influence. At the same time, Russia was engaging in a geopolitical retreat, closing bases in Cuba and Vietnam. Zyuganov and the Russian Communist Party condemned Putin’s support for the American war against the Taliban, arguing that Putin’s policies go against Russia’s “fundamental national-state interests”. Gorbachev had betrayed Russian national-state interests out of foolishness, Yeltsin out of drunkenness, and now Putin was doing the same out of a desire to:

get on the bandwagon of American power politics. . . The unconditional support of the American war in Afghanistan, the decision to allow U.S. aviation through our air space, the agreement on the siting of American military bases in CIS countries, and Russia’s departure from its last strategic bases of operation in Cuba and Vietnam contradict these interests (Zyuganov, 2001a).

Writing as the US military campaign unfolded, Zyuganov (2001b) argued that:

The main task of the present [American] military operation is to consolidate its positions in Central Asia and to establish control over energy resources of this region and of the region of the Caspian sea. If all pipelines to Europe go to the South, via areas under American geopolitical control, European countries will definitively be dependent on Americans.

Elsewhere Zyuganov declared that Russia is now “a mere purveyor of cheap resources” and, echoing Prokhanov’s heated bio-imperialist fantasy, that tomorrow it will become “an ‘American commando’ supplying cannon fodder for new inter-

¹⁴ This association of academics, active and retired military officers often meets in the building of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces.

national adventures” (*Morning Star* [China] November 10, 2001). Viktor Ilukhin, one of the leading members of the Communist Duma faction and Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Security, supplemented this reasoning by suggesting that the American military needs new bases in Central Asia because these strategic locations allowed it to control with electronic means what happens in the south of Russia, Central Asia, and in a large part of China. Geopolitics in the wake of 9–11 is contextualized within a larger litany of reversals, humiliations and retreats that are a consequence of American geopolitical strategy or culture. For Ilukhin:

[t]he broadening American presence in Central Asia, the ‘preoccupation’ of Americans with the situation in the Pankisi gorge in Georgia and their readiness to locate a military contingent on her territory, the rise of anti-Russian tendencies in European media, ...the humiliation of our team at the (2002) Winter Olympics, and the diffusion of the activity of the Catholic Church on the territory of Russia—all these developments are links of the same chain, which is being logically inserted into the U.S. geopolitical doctrine, whose essence is the establishment of world dominance and dismissal of Russia as her continental rival (Andriyakina, 2001).

Interestingly, the writings of veteran American geopoliticians like Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger helped oppositional intellectuals to justify their interpretations. Both figures are widely translated and quoted in left and national-patriotic newspapers and remain very well known in Russia. For Communists and national-patriots, their nightmare scenario is that American-led globalization, accelerated by the US military and political presence in Central Asia and emerging in Kazakhstan and Georgia, will provoke the disintegration of the Russian Federation and its total disappearance as a sovereign state: “Siberia and the Far East, the Kuril islands, the Caucasus and the south of Russia, and Kaliningrad oblast—these are unfortunate ‘candidates’ for the implantation of our lands into foreign ‘integration systems’ (Kuvaev, 2002). Citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, General Ivashov (2002a) speculated that US involvement in Russia’s southern borderlands would ultimately “cut Russian territory into two parts, and then the idea of General de Gaulle about Europe as far as the Urals will become a reality in the worst sense for Russia, as Mr. Brzezinski cynically declared in the interview to *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* on December 21, 2001”.

Politically, geopolitics in the wake of 9–11 led the CPRF to toughen its opposition to Putin. In spring 2002, Zyuganov forced his Central Committee to withdraw all members of the Communist faction from all official posts in the Duma. When the Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznev and chairs of two committees did not comply, they were excluded from the party. Post-9–11 geopolitical analysis also led to a renewed emphasis on one of the oldest Russian geopolitical traditions, Eurasianism. Zyuganov’s (2001c) ‘Open Letter’ of November declared that events only confirm again and again that “Russia has always been, remains and will always be a Eurasian country”. According to Zyuganov, though “Communists do not call for confrontation with the West, and they want to live with it in peace and

friendship as equal and respected partners”, Russia’s potential allies would be found in the East. While the official program of the CPRF indicates that the party should struggle against Russophobia, Westernization, and American hegemony, Ilukhin (quoted in [Andryakina, 2001](#)) makes the concrete proposal of opposing unilateral Westernization with “a union of three—Russia, India, and China, plus the Arab world, which understands what’s happening”.

The Liberal-Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (LDPR) is the best-known party in the unstable national-patriotic camp, though it has lost electoral support over the past decade. Zhirinovskiy constantly modified his position in relation to the events of 9–11. First, in the days immediately after the attacks, he called for an increase in the Russian army to 3 million troops, a restoration of all KGB networks, and the banning of activities of all religious communities not approved by Patriarch Alexei II of Moscow.¹⁵ A few days later, he pronounced the events of 9–11 favorable to the US “because it was a shock to Russia”. He objected to Putin’s pro-Western tilt by declaring that Russia should not be dragged ‘into World War Three’ and into an alliance with NATO that could transform it into “a huge border post of the West”. The American version of the war against terrorism would allow the US “to bomb any country at any time” and “to look for Bin Laden, then for his deputies and then to appoint somebody to replace them” ([Zakatnova, 2001](#)). Later in October 2001, Zhirinovskiy stated that the American reply to the terrorist attack would provoke a wave of Muslim terrorism against the white race, and nuclear weapons would be inevitably used. In one interview, he said that it would be done by Pakistan and India, in another by Russia. Therefore, Russia should refuse to cooperate with the US and take a neutral position toward Muslim countries, which would permit her to get mercy from terrorists ([Andrushenko, 2001](#)). Zhirinovskiy’s position, in sum, was consistently demagogic and firmly anti-American and anti-Western.

The attitudes of ordinary Russians

How much support did the competing Russian storylines attract from the various socio-demographic groups that make up the Russian population? Which group was most likely to support which storyline? In the rest of this paper, we present some responses to particular questions we posed in a national public opinion survey in April 2002, almost 8 months after September 11. Our survey comprised 49 questions in total but we only discuss eight questions in detail here, while noting other aspects of the survey where relevant. We test and track the storylines discussed above, categories we term geopolitical support, geopolitical skepticism and geopolitical suspicion. Also, we want to compare the socio-demographic groups in their receptivity of the main Putin storyline and its competitors.

¹⁵ Quoted in a series of interviews by the editorial staff “Rossia dolzhna uchest oshibki Ameriki (Russia Must Take into Account the Errors of America)” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, September 13, 2001.

We organized our survey sample into a series of key demographic groups, according to gender, age (18–30, 31–45, 46–60 and over 60), marital status (single, divorced, married and widowed), religious affiliation (Orthodox, Muslim, atheist), residence (small town/village, oblast capital, and Moscow/St. Petersburg), regions of Russia (West, Center/Volga, Siberia), education (high education), standard of living (high, medium, low), and political party preference (*Edinstvo*, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, other parties). Because previous research on post-Soviet opinion has indicated a large gap between ethnic Russians and the Islamic population of Russia, as well as significant regional differences within the Muslim population (Lehmann, 1997), we also report the ratios for these sub-groups. Also, previous surveys have indicated that the group least favorable towards Putin are female supporters of the Communist party. Thus, we separately identify this group and its opposite on most questions, the so-called '*zapadniki*' (Westernizers) who want to develop close economic and political contacts between Russia and Western institutions, including the European Union. Smith (1999) terms this geopolitical orientation as 'liberal-Westernist' and classifies their ideological belief system as predicated on the notion that Russia's future lies firmly in the West. In our survey, we identify '*zapadniki*' as those who chose 'Western' in response to a question that asked whether Russia's identity was Western, Asian, or Eurasian. It should be noted that we are not trying to identify the most or least supportive sub-populations but to track major socio-demographic groups.

Most of these comparative socio-demographic groups show significant differences (at the 0.05 level of significance) on the individual questions. For example, the three religious groups (Orthodox, Muslim and atheist) hold significantly different opinions on the question of whether the US should extend the 'war on terrorism' to Iraq. The summary statistics for the questions analyzed in this paper are presented in Table 2. A glance at the graphics for this question (Fig. 7) indicates that atheists showed much higher approval of this possibility than either Orthodox believers (near the mean of 15.4% approval) or Muslims (near the bottom of the approval scale). The respective differences between religious groups are 3% and 6%—large values when the widest range of approval is from 22% (richest people) to 8% (Muslims of the North Caucasus). Of course, differences across socio-demographic groups are not always significant. Thus, also seen in Fig. 7, the approval of the extension of the war on terrorism to Iraq is the same for Orthodox believers and married people. The only group comparisons in all eight questions that are not significantly different are Westernizers/non-Westernizers on the question of attacking Iraq, regions of Russia on the same question, and types of settlement on the question about the balance of power in the US–Russian alliance against terrorism. Five comparisons on the motive for US actions in Central Asia do not show significant difference, namely religious groups, Westernizers/non-Westernizers, party preference, income groups, region, and Muslims of the Volga–Urals region. The question about support for President Putin's foreign policy was unlike the others because few demographic comparisons showed significant differences. The categories of age groups, gender, marital status, general regional loca-

Table 2

Summary of public opinion about Putin and oppositional storylines^a

Overall, do you approve of President Putin's foreign policy decisions?	
Definitely approve	34.2%
Mostly approve	45.5%
Mostly disapprove	6.5%
Definitely disapprove	3.1%
Do not know	10.7%
Do you think that the creation of a close union between the USA and Russia in the struggle against international terrorism is a positive or negative development?	
Definitely positive	35.4%
Mostly positive	37.0%
Mostly negative	9.8%
Definitely negative	6.0%
Do not know	11.7%
Russia and the USA declare that they are allies in the struggle against international terrorism. What do you think of this union?	
Russia is an equal partner to the USA	24.6%
USA imposes its policies on Russia	35.3%
Russia imposes its policies on the USA	1.4%
It is the artificial and short-term union	28.1%
Any from above	1.2%
Do not know	9.4%
Do you personally approve of USA military action on countries found to be in support of international terrorism (Iraq, Somalia, Libya)?	
Definitely approve	7.6%
Mostly approve	12.9%
Mostly disapprove	27.4%
Definitely disapprove	39.9%
Do not know	12.2%
Some say that the USA operated correctly in striking against the Taliban of Afghanistan, others say that the USA acted incorrectly. With which do you concur?	
Unconditionally correct	19.3%
Mostly correct	21.7%
Mostly incorrect	20.6%
Unconditionally incorrect	23.2%
Do not know	15.2%
George Bush named Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the 'axis of evil', for supporting terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction. Would you personally approve of USA military actions against Iraq?	
Definitely approve	5.0%
Mostly approve	10.4%
Mostly disapprove	22.8%
Definitely disapprove	46.4%
Do not know	15.4%
Do you agree or disagree that the attacks on apartment houses in Russia and the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington were by people of similar beliefs and goals?	
Definitely agree	20.4%

Table 2 (continued)

Mostly agree	27.8%
Mostly disagree	17.7%
Definitely disagree	14.9%
Do not know	18.9%
Percentage of respondents agreeing to the statement: “Within the last 6 months, the USA has built military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In your opinion, for what purpose were these bases constructed?”	
1. Struggle against international terrorism from Afghanistan	17.3%
2. Expansion of US sphere of influence	49.2%
3. Establishment of control over oil fields and gas in former Soviet republics	32.6%
4. Assisting Russia in protection of her territory against drug and weapon trafficking	8.3%
5. War against Islam	11.4%
6. Replacement of Russia from traditional sphere of her influence	37.8%
7. Rendering assistance in political stabilization and democratization in the region	4.2%
8. Any of the above	1.0%
9. Do not know	11.1%

^a Except for the last table, only one answer is possible. Respondents could give up to three choices for answers to the last question.

tions within Russia and settlement hierarchy show no significant differences within their specific groupings.¹⁶

To make the comparisons easier, we arranged the percentages from high to low and present the results in Figs. 1–8. Care should be taken to examine each figure with respect to its mean value, which range from 15.4% (approve extending the war to Iraq) to 79.7% (approve President Putin’s foreign policy) and because the range around the respective means is also highly variable.

Geopolitical support for Putin’s storyline

Since his election in March 2000, President Putin’s support has been remarkably stable, ranging in a narrow band about 67% overall approval rating (the negative ratio is consistently about 20%). In our survey in April 2002, we measured the degree to which President Putin’s foreign policy decisions were supported; our results showed the average was 79.7% (see Table 2). The range of support for the President’s foreign policy varies from 67% for Muslims in the Volga–Urals to 92.7% from Edinstvo voters (Fig. 1). Reddaway (2002: p. 32) cautions that this support can be characterized as “numerically extensive but probably shallow popular support” and he concludes (p. 39) that Putin’s power is more form than substance.

¹⁶ This Islamic sub-sample lives in the regions of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.




Fig. 1. Percentages in support of President Putin’s foreign policy.

Central to Putin’s 9–11 storyline was the idea of a ‘civilizational alliance’ against terrorism that *de facto* meant a close alliance with the United States. Six months after Putin’s public declaration of support for the US, all socio-demographic groups in Russia offer their approval of Putin’s ‘civilizational alliance’ against the ‘common enemy’ of terrorism (a mean value of 72.4%) (see Table 2 and Fig. 2). While Putin’s natural supporters in the largest political party (*Edinstvo*), the richest segment of the population, and Westernizers cluster at the top end of the approval




Fig. 2. Percentages approving of close alliance of Russia with the US against terrorism.

scale (at or near 80%), Muslims, widows, Communist party supporters, and residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg show two-thirds approval. Even sub-populations typically opposed to Putin’s policies (female Communist party supporters and Muslims in the Urals/Volga region) show more than 60% approval. The American imperialist storyline of the Communists and national-patriots appeared not to resonate with their traditional supporters when the question is posed as support or opposition to Valdimir Putin as a foreign policy leader.

With respect to the first two questions about Russia’s foreign policy, there is a similar ranking of the socio-demographic groups. A significant difference in ranking appears between Muslims of the Volga–Urals and Muslims of the North




Fig. 3. Percentages agreeing with the comparison of the 9–11 attacks and the Autumn 1999 bombings in Moscow and other Russian cities.

Caucasus in their support for Putin. While Tatars and Bashkirs have the lowest approval of Putin’s actions (Figs. 1 and 2), the Muslims of the North Caucasus are ranked near the other end of the scale. Our North Caucasus sample came from the western part of the region and our survey indicated that Muslims in Karachay–Cherkessia and Kabardino–Balkaria attend mosque less than their co-religionists in the Volga–Urals (the category ‘practically never’ was chosen by 73% and 58%, respectively). Islam was adopted in the former regions much later than in the Volga–Urals region. Differences between Russia’s Muslims based on regions are




Fig. 4. Percentages who agree that there is a parity in the alliance between Russia and the US.

confirmed by research reported in Malashenko (1998), Malashenko and Trenin (2002), and Malashenko and Ynusova (1998). Lehmann’s (1997) surveys indicated that the strength of Islam as a religious and social institution varied regionally within Russia. Muslims in Dagestan and Chechnya showed more active religiosity than Muslims of the two regions sampled in our survey (North Caucasus and Volga–Urals).

As Figs. 1 and 2 demonstrate, Putin’s policies draw strong support from a *troika* of Westernizers, the richest stratum of the population, and *Edinstvo* voters. The




Fig. 5. Percentages who believe that the US war against the Taliban in Afghanistan was justified.

opposite pole to this *troika* comprises Communist party voters, especially women, and the elderly. What is noteworthy is the reversal of these poles on a key question testing support for the analogy central to Putin's storyline, namely that the 1999 apartment bombings in Russia and September 11 were by "people of similar beliefs and goals" (Table 2 and Fig. 3). By equating these events, a 'common enemy' was asserted underpinning Putin's talk of a 'civilizational alliance'. Our survey indicates that the Putin analogy worked reasonably well. Just under half (48.2%) of all Russians accept the equation of 9–11 and the apartment bombing blasts (Fig. 3). There is a dramatic reversal of the usual positionings on our survey questions. Communist supporters and the elderly accept the Putin equation of the two sets of attacks significantly more than the average. In this ranking, they are joined by most of Putin's usual supporters (*Edinstvo* supporters, males, younger adults, and Westernizers). Females accepted the President's rationale more than male




Fig. 6. Percentages approving of US attacks on countries that the US deemed as terrorist supporting.

respondents. The elderly and middle-aged reverse their usual positions with the young on questions involving the Putin storyline. Muslims, especially those closest to Chechnya in the North Caucasus, residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg and the highly educated maintain doubts about Putin’s analogy. Interestingly, the richest people (most often living in large cities and highly educated), heretofore amongst the strongest supporters of the Putin positions, shared their doubts. (Compare the group rankings in Fig. 3 with those of Figs. 1 and 2.) Gerber and Mendelson (2002) conclude from their national survey that Russians were only




Fig. 7. Percentages approving of a US-led war against Iraq as part of the 'axis of evil'.

moderately concerned about terrorism in the autumn of 2001. As in our survey, the state of the economy and the struggle for an adequate standard of living were more important than any wars on terrorism, domestic (Chechnya) or foreign (the US-led attack on the Taliban). In April 2002, most Russians across the political and socio-economic spectrums supported the most general and uncontroversial aspects of the Putin storyline. They did, however, have some misgivings about the nature of this anti-terrorist alliance.



Fig. 8. Percentages agreeing that the motive for new US bases in Central Asia is to expand US influence or to displace Russia from its traditional zone of influence.

Geopolitical skepticism about the ‘war on terrorism’

While support for a close alliance between the United States and Russia in a struggle against international terrorism attracts general support, there is considerable skepticism about the equality of that alliance and division over the US-led war against terrorism generally. To get a measure of the geopolitical skepticism of the Russian public about the new US–Russian alliance, we asked the question: “Russia and the USA declare that they are allies in the struggle against international terror-

ism. What do you think of this alliance? (a) Russia is an equal partner to the USA, (b) The USA imposes its policies on Russia, (c) Russia imposes its policies on the USA, (d) it is an artificial and short-term union, (e) I don't know". On average, only one-quarter of the national sample hold that the partnership is equal, with only a derisory fraction (1.4%) stating that the US is the weaker partner (see Table 2).

The incongruity of almost three-quarters of Russian adults supporting the alliance with the US and only one-quarter thinking that it is a partnership of equals is dramatic evidence of a reservoir of skepticism. Clearly, arguments that the US was taking advantage of Russia and that the alliance was a marriage of convenience resonated with the majority of the Russian public. On the question of the equality of the Russian–American alliance, the most educated respondents and young adults (aged 18–30) join the usual critics (female Communists, Muslims of the North Caucasus, and Communist party supporters) at the lowest ranks (less than 20%). The *troika* (the richest voters, *Edinstvo* and Westernizers) indicates a level of confidence in the equality of the relationship significantly above the mean value for Russians of 24.6% (Fig. 4). On this question (and all others), the gender gap is significant with females more skeptical of the Putin storyline than males and demonstrating much lower support for any military action against supposed terrorists. At the same time, support for Putin's foreign policy was much stronger among women. The strong skepticism about the equality of the US–Russian alliance is no doubt influenced by the population's general perception of Russia's power standing in the world. Given the consistent power of national pride in public opinion surveys, a surprisingly high 40% of our respondents *do not* rank Russia in the top 50 most powerful countries in economic terms in the world and one in four do not rank it in the top 50 most powerful in political terms.

By April 2002 at the time of the survey, the US 'war on terrorism' had been operational for about 6 months, beginning with the attack against the Taliban government in early October 2001. This military action was presented as equivalent to Russia's actions in Chechnya by Putin's supporters and as an act of imperialist aggression by the Communist Party. Our results indicate that less than half of Russians believe that the US was justified in striking against the Afghan regime, a considerable indicator of generalized skepticism. For this and the previous question about the use of American force, only a minority of Russians agree to it. Other public opinion polls have shown that a majority of Russians consistently oppose any use of Russian military forces, even to suppress the Chechen revolt (O'Loughlin, 2001). This distaste for military force carries over into the use of US force. But, like the other questions, a large range of opinion (from over 50% to under 20% approval) exists on this question (Fig. 5). The religious dimension (Orthodox at the top and Muslims at the bottom) shines clearest as a predictor of opinion. On questions that specifically mention Muslim countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran) or Muslim regions (Chechnya), Russia's Islamic population is significantly more likely than other groups to show opposition to war, to demonstrate doubts about the motives of the Russian and Western governments, and to support negotiations and other means of settling conflicts (Malashenko and Trenin, 2002). In contrast to

Muslims, residents of Siberia, the young, males and the rich show majority support for the US attack on the Taliban. This gap is large (over 20%), and is another indication of the segmentation of the Russian population along gender, religious, age and income lines.

Geopolitical suspicion about US motives in the war against terrorism

Three of our questions revealed widespread public opinion attitudes that are best characterized as geopolitical suspicion rather than mere skepticism about US military actions. Our survey asked if people personally approved of US military actions on countries found to be supporting international terrorism, if they supported actions against Iraq, and what they thought were the motivations behind the establishment of US military bases in Central Asia. Only one-fifth of Russians backed attacks on countries supporting terrorism, only 15.4% approved a US-led war against Iraq, and only 25.6% attributed benign motives (establish democracy, fight drugs and crime, bring stability to the region and fight international terrorism) to US actions in establishing bases in Central Asia (Table 2).

The socio-demographic groups approving US attack on countries supporting terrorism are consistent with those seen in other questions (Fig. 6). The rich, males and the young are up to 10% points above the overall low mean of 20.4% while women Communist supporters and Muslims in the North Caucasus demonstrate the greatest levels of suspicion, with scores just above 10%. Interestingly, there is a significant divide between the rich, on the one hand, and those with higher education and living in St. Petersburg and Moscow, on the other hand.

Since the opinions of each socio-demographic group was consistent across the three questions that asked specifically about a possible extension of the 'war on terrorism' to each of the countries of the 'axis of evil' (Iran, Iraq and North Korea), we present here only the results of the question about Iraq¹⁷ (Fig. 7). Only a small minority of Russians (15.4% mean value) approve of a US attack on Iraq as part of the 'war on terrorism'. This low mean value is halved among the Muslim populations of the North Caucasus but almost doubled among the richest, youngest and male populations. The gender gap on this question, already evident in the previous one, is huge—21% of males approve the possible strike but only 11% of females agree with it. Subsequent polls at the time of the Iraq war in March 2003 showed only 10% approval of the US action, despite the arguments made by the Bush administration in the United Nations Security Council and elsewhere for an invasion (FOM, April 3, 2003, www.fom.ru). Forty-nine percent opposed military means to solve the Iraq crisis. By spring 2003, the Putin administration had come out strongly against the US war on Iraq, arguing for a continuation of UN sanctions and increased inspections of possible Iraqi weapons sites. Though these

¹⁷ The respective approval percentages were Iran 14.5%, Iraq 15.4% and North Korea 10.5% but the respective positions of the socio-demographic groups on each of the questions were approximately the same. In light of subsequent events that led to the US-led war against the Saddam Hussein regime in March 2003, we chose the Iraq question for presentation.

questions about the attack on countries that support terrorism do not directly speak to the Putin storyline, they indirectly measure the support for oppositional arguments about the aggressive nature of US militarism and the widening of US geopolitical ambitions in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. While many Russians believe the connection between the events of September 11 and the presence of Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, they do not accept the extension of such linkage to other countries. In this regard, they do not have to choose between the Putin and oppositional storylines, none of which articulated a reason for the US to expand the 'war on terrorism'.

What the Communist and national-patriotic storyline did, however, was articulate a strong alternative explanation for US military actions in world affairs. Our question on the motives for the establishment of US military bases in Central Asia tests the degree to which the geopolitical suspicion found in the 'American imperialism' storyline is widely held. The graph in Fig. 8 reports the results of answers to one of the questions about possible motives for the establishment of US bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. As we have shown above, the 'American imperialism' storyline tends to attribute a conspiratorial logic to American actions overseas especially those that are located close to Russia. Within this storyline, Russia is a desirable bastion of natural resources being encircled by the United States, which is moving into Russia's traditional sphere of influence in the Baltic republics, the Caucasus and Central Asia. A drive by the US to control the resources of Central Asia and Eurasia generally, especially gas and oil, is a staple of national-patriotic and Communist argumentation. The most popular explanation of US motives, as 'expansion of US sphere of influence' was chosen by half of the respondents followed by "replacement of Russia from the traditional sphere of her influence". Few Russians accept the official rationale, the "struggle against international terrorism from Afghanistan". Fig. 8 is remarkable for its large percentages of geopolitical suspicion and the special identification of the nature of the top three (higher educated people, Muslims of the North Caucasus, and residents of Moscow/St. Petersburg) and the bottom three groups (elderly people over 60, Women supporters of the Communist party, and widows). This socio-demographic distribution reveals a spectrum of geopolitical knowledge and sophistication within Russian geopolitical culture. People with the highest education are more interested in foreign policy (13% more than the national average of 72.1% according to our survey question on this specific issue). These individuals gain their knowledge from a variety of sources (books, newsmagazines, and newspapers) rather than relying heavily on television for information about foreign events. They are, thus, more likely to question the geopolitical 'common sense' promoted by the administration and mainstream media. The elderly, widows and women supporters of the Communist party, in contrast, have low incomes and relatively few information options beyond television. Thus, they are more likely to accept the state position propounded by the media. As noted earlier, Muslims of the North Caucasus differ significantly from their co-religionists in the center of the country in their levels of suspicion of US motives in the war on terrorism. In Fig. 8, the usual political cleavages are submerged by a level of geopolitical sophistication that allows typical

Putin's voters to be suspicious of US motives but at the same time, to support Russian membership of the US-led anti-terrorist alliance. How this works in detail, however, needs further research.

Conclusions

Our analysis of the Russian geopolitical response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 has documented a dominant storyline that reflected the government position and two less prominent alternatives, one supportive of greater integration with the West while being skeptical of Putin's policies, while the second attributed an imperialistic logic to US military actions and holds that the 'war on terrorism' is a pretence for the US to impose its power on Russia and other world regions. While the Putin storyline gained most media coverage, it was not hard to find representations of alternative views on serious television news shows and in less popular outlets, especially in the newspapers associated with the Communist and national-patriotic parties. Most storylines are ultimately muddled and somewhat incoherent but remain politically powerful nevertheless.

Our public opinion survey indicated considerable levels of geopolitical support for Putin's foreign policies and for some aspects of his post-9–11 storyline. It also indicates, however, considerable reserves of geopolitical skepticism among the Russian public towards the US-led 'war against international terrorism' and strong levels of suspicion about the motivations for US military actions close to the Russian Federation. Our breakdown of Russian public opinion into socio-demographic categories reveals some interesting patterns. Except for the responses to the question on the comparison of the September 11 attacks and the unexplained bombings in Moscow and other cities in 1999 made by President Putin, the relative ranking of the socio-demographic groups are fairly consistent. The main storyline enunciated by Putin and his administration received strong support among the richest respondents, people who intended to vote for *Edinstvo* (the party supporting Putin), young adults, males, residents of Siberia, Westernizers, and single people. Lowest support for Putin's positions came from Communist party supporters and Muslim respondents, the elderly, women, residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the poor. These groups constitute much of the support base of the Communist challenge to Putin and generally adhere to a more critical storyline about US military actions in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

The typical backers of the Putin administration (young people, the rich, males) show support well in excess of the national average for US attacks on unnamed countries that 'support terrorism' while socio-demographic supporters of the storyline espoused by the Communists and the national-patriotic movements (widows, female Communist voters, Muslims of the North Caucasus and the elderly) demonstrate the lowest approval rates. Residents of the national capitals (Moscow and St. Petersburg) and the most educated adults share a common critical attitude to extending the 'war on terrorism', a feature of six of the eight graphs (see Figs. 1–8). Though, as in most Western democracies income and education in Russia are

highly correlated, its rich represent a small ratio of the population who have (relatively) prospered in the privatization economy that emerged after 1991. By contrast, many voters of high educational status have seen their incomes plummet with the erosion of state services and the privileging of certain entrepreneurial skills. What is somewhat surprising is the critical disposition of the highly educated and residents of the two main cities, including Putin's home base of St. Petersburg. The Putin storyline about alliance with the West resonates a lot better with these metropolitan voters than the actions of the United States about whom they remain dubious, including its motives for launching the 'war on terrorism' and its extension to states other than Afghanistan. This may reflect a tradition of criticism and of geopolitical sophistication that contrasts with more uninformed citizens.

Lilia Shevtsova (2003) argues that Putin's decision to ally Russia to the West in the fight against terrorism dismayed his comrades in the power ministries and was tantamount to rejecting Russia's great power ambitions. Putin was willing to trade these traditional ambitions for economic revival that relied heavily on Western involvement with the Russian economy. In making this turn, Putin had to also turn away from the traditional statements of Soviet (and Russian) leaders about balance of power, spheres of influence, foreign interference, and great power (aka US) hegemonism. His post-September 11 storyline was designed to portray a new world in which Russia was no longer marginalized but instead, entered as a key ally of the West, especially the US. The West, in turn, made a 'Faustian bargain' to use Shevtsova's term, accepting Russian aid in Central Asia and Afghanistan while turning a blind eye to Russian actions in Chechnya. Westerners supported Putin's 'strategic choice' for the West in September 2001. Government reformers, business leaders and those who are profiting from the privatization of the Russian economy are anxious to increase Russia's exposure to Western markets while communists and nationalists, as well as the military and security establishment, oppose this Western turn (Bremmer and Zaslavsky, 2001–2002). By the spring of 2002, the time of the survey, the 'common enemy' storyline was less evident than 6 months earlier as it was becoming clear that Russia would not receive a lot in return for its support of the US war on terrorism.

While these economic explanations are important in contextualizing Russian foreign policy, we wish to underscore the importance of geopolitical culture, both elite and popular. What our survey reveals is that Putin was operating within a geopolitical culture that had certain limits and political hazards for him. He was vulnerable to the criticism of his policies from oppositional political parties about the lack of 'pay-off' for Russia from his perceived geopolitical concessions. Furthermore, while the Russian public in principle supported a close alliance with the United States against international terrorism, especially when reminded of their own suffering at the hands of terrorists, there existed considerable levels of skepticism and suspicion about a US-driven 'war against international terrorism'. Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the *Yabloko* party in the Duma, believes that Russian public opinion is:

fractured and focuses more on who's talking than what they are talking about. When Putin talks about strategic partnership with the United States and integration with Europe, the public supports him. Yet his anti-American statements and his appeals to rely on no one but ourselves garner just as much support (Yavlinsky, 2003).

The evident unilateralism of US actions, rhetoric about an 'axis of evil', impatience with international institutions, and the international challenge to the credibility of the Bush Administration's motivations all rendered Putin's close embrace of America after September 11 increasingly problematic as the months passed. Putin risked political damage by being seen either explicitly or implicitly endorsing American hegemonism. Analyzing these developments, responding to domestic constituencies, and informed no doubt by political consultants about the ordinary Russian attitudes we have documented here, Putin adjusted his geopolitical storyline in 2002 to take a more oppositional position against the US extending its 'war against international terrorism' to Iraq. Putin revived the idea of 'multipolarity' in maneuvering towards a common position with France and Germany on Iraq while bargaining pragmatically with the United States over Russian contracts, debt and the shape of a post-invasion Iraq. The development of Putin's geopolitical script and storyline is an ongoing one, and, we would argue, cannot be reduced to crude arguments about the 'capture' of decision-making by certain economic forces or pro/anti-Western elites (Felgenhauer, 2003: p. 9).

The various socio-demographic groups we identified in this paper were the targets of political messages in the recent Duma and Presidential election. As in long-established Western democracies, Russian electoral politics has seen increasingly sophisticated use of opinion polling, targeted campaigning in key marginal constituencies, use of focus groups to clarify the main worries of voters, and massaging of the political messages of the candidates to convey the candidate's identification with the average citizen. Since increasingly Russians get their news from television and newspaper readership is falling, the struggle over control of the television networks in 2000–2002 has major implications for whose versions of events will reach the public and help defined the future storylines and socio-demographic divides that characterize Russian geopolitical culture (O'Loughlin et al., 2004). But, as recent events from Iraq to Chechnya demonstrate, even the most sophisticated political technologists and effective politicians cannot control the tendency of unwelcome news to derail their carefully crafted storylines.

Acknowledgements

This research is supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation no. 0203087. The assistance of Dr. Nadia Burodulina of the Russian Academy of Science in the collection of the archival data and the cooperation of FOM (Foundation of Public Opinion), especially its Deputy Director Dr. Elena Petrenko, is gratefully acknowledged.

References

- Adamishin, A., 2002. Zachem nam nuzhna prozapadnaya vneshnyaya politika (Why do We Need a Pro-Western Foreign Policy). *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 16 March, p. 2.
- Airapetova, N., 2001. Kak Rossiya vyshla iz SNG (How Russia Quit the CIS). *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 26 December, p. 5.
- Aksyanova, G., 2001. 100 narodov Rossiiskoi Federatsii (100 Peoples of the Russian Federation). *Stary Sad*, Moscow, pp. 12–50.
- Aldoshina, T., 2001. Interview with CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov. RTR television “Prodrobnosti” program host “Lobbying for Branch Interests”, 5 November (FBIS translated text).
- Andriyakina, L., 2001. Desiat let opasnosti dlia Rossii (Ten Years of Danger for Russia). Interview with Viktor Ilukhin. *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 28 December.
- Andrushenko, L., 2001. Prezident dlozhen trebovat u SShA ustupok (President Must Claim Concessions from the US). *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 26 October, p. 2.
- Arbatov, A., 2002. Rossiya Amerika. I ne drug, i ne vrag. A kak? (Russia America. Now a friend and Now an Enemy. And What?). *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 21 March, p.3.
- Bremmer, I., Zaslavsky, A., 2001/2002. Bush and Putin’s tentative embrace. *World Policy Journal* 18 (4), 11–17.
- Chugaev, S., 2001. Druzhiba s Amerikoi sdelaet nashu stranu silnee? (Friendship with America will make our country stronger?). *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 16 November, p. 3.
- Cottrell, R., 2001. Russia: Army Wary of Becoming Involved in Any Action. *Financial Times*, 19 September, p. 4.
- Federal News Service, 2001. Interview with CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov, translated transcript of television interview, 5 October (Lexis-Nexis).
- Felgenhauer, P., 2003. Kremlin Taking Bad Advice. *Moscow Times*, 24 April, p. 9.
- Furman, D., 2001. Mirovye soobshchestvo i my: postignet li sud’ba antigitlerovskoi koalitsii anti-terroristicheskuyu koalitsiu? (The World Community and Us: Will the Fate of the anti-Hitler Coalition Befall the Anti-Terror Coalition?). *Moscow Obshchaya Gazeta*, 6 December, p. 8.
- Gerber, T.P., Mendelson, S.E., 2002. Russian public opinion on human rights and the war in Chechnya. *Post-Soviet Affairs* 18 (4), 271–305.
- Glasser, S., 2001. Russia Rejects Joint Military Action with United States. *Washington Post*, 15 September, p. A6.
- Gorbachev, M., 2001. Ot koalitsii protiv terrorak spravedlivomu mirovomu poriadku (From the coalition against terror toward a fair world order). *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, 20 October, p. 3.
- Ivashov, L., 2002a. Mezhdunarodnaya situatsia i mirovoi kriminal (The international situation and the global criminal). *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 3 June, p. 3.
- Ivashov, L., 2002b. Upravlenie cherez khaos (Management via chaos). *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 2 March, p. 3.
- Kabannikov, A., 2001. Posol SShA zakhazhivaet k Putinu bez priglasenia? (The U.S. Ambassador goes to Putin without an invitation?). *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 15 December, p. 3.
- Kalashnikova, M., 2001. V NATO bez revolutsii. Amerika ne budet blagodarit Rossiiu za loialnost (No revolution in NATO: America Will Not Thank Russia for Loyalty). *Nezavissimaya Gazeta*, December 8, p. 3.
- Kalashnikova, M., 2002. Chechenskii vopros vse isportil (The Chechenian Question Spoiled Everything). *Nezavissimaya Gazeta*, 26 January, p. 2.
- Kolossov, V. (ed). 2001. La collocazione geopolitica della Russia: Rappresentazioni e realtà. Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli.
- Kontseptzia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (The concept of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy). *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 11 July, 2000.
- Kuranov, A., 2002. Ot druzhby Moskvy i Washingtona “dokhody” poluchayut glavnym obrazom amerikantsy (It is mainly Americans who profit from friendship between Moscow and Washington). *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 19 January, p. 5.

- Kuvaev, A., 2002. Pragmatizm i mazokizm (Pragmatism and masochism). *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 18 May, p. 1.
- Lehmann, S.G., 1997. Islam and ethnicity in the republics of Russia. *Post-Soviet Affairs* 13 (1), 78–103.
- Malashenko, A.V., 1998. *Islamskoe vozrozhdenie v sovremennoi Rossii* (The Renaissance of Islam in Modern Russia). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow.
- Malashenko, A.V., Trenin, D., 2002. *Vremya Yuga. Rossia v Chechne, Chechnya v Rossii* (The Time of the South: Russia in Chechnya, Chechnya in Russia). Gendalf, Moscow.
- Malashenko, A.V., Ynusova, A.B., 1998. *Etnichnost i konfessionalnaya traditsia v Volgo-Uralskom regione Rossii* (Ethnicity and Confessional Tradition in the Volga-Urals Region of Russia). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow.
- Nikiforenko, Y., 2001. Zuganov: posle teraktov v SShA my vse prosnulis v drugom mire (Zyuganov: After Terrorist Acts in the USA, All of Us Have Woken Up in Another World). *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 17 September, p. 1.
- O'Loughlin, J., 2001. Geopolitical fantasies, national strategies and ordinary Russians in the post-communist era. *Geopolitics* 6 (3), 17–48.
- O'Loughlin, J., Ó Tuathail, G., Kolossov, V., 2004. A risky westward turn? Putin's 9–11 script and ordinary Russians. *Europe-Asia Studies* 56 (1), 3–34.
- Ó Tuathail, G., 2002. Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: the case of U.S. Bosnia policy in 1992. *Political Geography* 21 (5), 601–628.
- Pavlovsky, G., 2001. Soyuzniki bez predoplaty (Allies without Preliminary Payment). *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, 12 October, p. 3.
- Prokhanov, A., 2001. Ne obagrim russkoi kroviu mecheti Kabula! (We will not stain Kabul's mosques with Russian blood!). *Zavtra*, 39/408, 29 September, p. 1.
- Prussakov, V., 2001. Voina i Rossia (The war and Russia). *Zavtra*, 41/410, 9 October.
- Pushkov, A., 2001. Rossia i Soedinennye Shaty: predely sblizhenia (Russia and the United States: limits of rapprochement). *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 27 December, pp. 1, 7.
- Putin—lubimaya sestra Busha (Putin is Bush's beloved sister). *Zavtra* No. 47 (416), 20 November 2001, p. 1.
- Reddaway, P., 2002. Is Putin's power more formal than real. *Post-Soviet Affairs* 18 (1), 31–41.
- Rossia dolzhna uchest oshibki Ameriki (Russia Must Take into Account the Errors of America). *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 13 September, 2001.
- Salmin, A., 2001. Iznanka vneshnei politiki: vnutrennie faktory v sisteme sviazei, obiazatelstv i proektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii (The inner side of foreign policy: internal factors in the system of relations, engagements and projects of Russian federation). *Politika* 5, 140–235.
- Sheinis, V., 2002. *Natsionalnye interesy i vneshnyaya politika Rossii* (National Interests and Foreign Policy of Russia). Available from <http://www.politcom.ru/2002/jour116.php>.
- Shenin, O., 2002. *Ekonomicheskii krizis i vozmozhnost vseobshchego mirovogo krizisa* (Economic Crisis and Possibilities of a General World Crisis). *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 6 March, p. 3.
- Shevtsova, L., 2003. *Putin's Russia*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.
- Shlapentokh, V., 2001. Putin's first year in office: the new regime's uniqueness in Russian history. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 34 (4), 371–399.
- Smith, G., 1999. *The Post-Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition*. Edward Arnold, London.
- Tetekin, V., 2001. Takaya zhestokaya mest (Such a brutal revenge). *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 15 September, p. 3.
- Trenin, D., 2002a. From pragmatism to strategic choice. In: Andrew, K. (Ed.), *Russia after the Fall*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, pp. 187–204.
- Trenin, D., 2002b. *The End of Eurasia*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.
- Tsygankov, A.P., 2003. Mastering space in Eurasia: Russian geopolitical thinking after the Soviet breakup. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 35, 101–127.
- Volkova, M., 2001. Tainyi sovetnik: o sostave intellektualnoi komandy Putina, obespechivshei emu vneshnepoliticheskii proryv v Brussele (A Secret Councilor. On the Composition of Putin's Intellectual Team that Ensured Him the Foreign Policy Break-through in Brussels). *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 5 October, p. 5.

- Yavlinsky, G., 2003. Patching Things Up at Putin's picnic. *Moscow Times*, 6 June, p. 8.
- Zakatnova, A., 2001. Politologi predlagayut torgovatsia s SShA (Politologists suggest bargaining with the USA). *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 3 October, p. 5.
- Zyuganov, G., 2001a. Politika vlasti protovorechit interesam strany (The Policy of the Authorities Contradicts the Nation's Interests). *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 27 October, p. 1.
- Zyuganov, G., 2001b. Zuganov: SShA idut ne po puti Roosvelta, a dorogoi furera (Zyuganov: USA takes the road of the Führer, not of Roosevelt). *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 31 October.
- Zyuganov, G., 2001c. Odstupat nekuda! (Otkrytoe pismo prezidentu) (There is Nowhere to Withdraw! (Open Letter to the President of Russian Federation V.V.Putin). *Zavtra*, 13 November, p. 1.
- Zyuganov, G., 2001d. Budet u planety levyi povorot (The Planet Will Have a Turn Left). Interview with *Sovetskaya Rossia*, 24 September, p. 1.