



Belonging to the world: Cosmopolitanism in geographic contexts

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Abstract

The notion of cosmopolitanism is today gaining new relevance in attempts to understand how globalization in an increasingly interdependent world-society is affecting traditional identities, including that of the nation. We focus on a positive definition of cosmopolitanism as a sense of belonging to “the world as a whole”, expressed in responses to a question from the World Values Surveys (WVS) 1995–1997. In building a multilevel statistical model of the 21 national contexts of societal attitudes and values surrounding cosmopolitanism, we inject empirical analysis into what has, until now, been a largely rhetorical field of scholarship. Because the data are collected hierarchically, with individuals clustered into regions in turn grouped into countries, the model allows for the consideration of different concepts of cosmopolitanism across geographic contexts. A greater likelihood of cosmopolitan identification is found among individuals who are environmentalist, less patriotic, politically active, with higher levels of education, youthful, and a positive orientation to living among immigrants in places where relatively more immigrants reside. Respondents from countries in the former Soviet Union show a significantly higher sense of belonging to the world as a whole, a difference attributed to the lack of confidence in the post-Communist regimes of these states in the 1990s.

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1. Introduction

In recent years the notion of cosmopolitanism has been revitalized by the dilemmas of social organization amid globalization. Having largely shed its associative role as a negative stereotype of Jews (traitors to national solidarities), communists (enemies of the ‘free world’), and free market liberals (capitalist imperialist opponents of socialism), cosmopolitanism “is back” (Harvey, 1999, p. 529). Though a great deal of effort has been expended recently in an attempt to theorize a practical cosmopolitanism as a means of addressing the exigencies of intensifying global human interdependence, geographers have made few contributions to this growing debate. Where much scholarship on cosmopolitanism remains idealist and abstracted, the

nuanced attention to meanings of place offered by geographic scholarship can set cosmopolitanism on its feet. Instead of defining cosmopolitanism as an identification that rejects geography altogether in favor of an abstract and utopian allegiance to ‘humanity’ (Furia, 2005, p. 338), a geographic cosmopolitanism orients us towards understanding human interdependence in terms of the ‘global sense of place’ – a sense of place which is extroverted, that integrates in a positive way the global and the local (Massey, 1994, p. 155).

Cosmopolitanism is a discourse embroiled within local/global and universal/particular dialectics. Using the term ‘cosmopolitan’ almost invariably implies a geopolitics of contradictory locations and multiple lines of flight (Wilson, 1998, p. 352). Being cosmopolitan seems to involve an indeterminate, simultaneously local and global positioning of the subject who is therefore not really bound to either a particularistic local identity or to some abstract global imaginary. Our analysis supports the cosmopolitan notion

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that cosmopolitans occupy ethical spaces of encounter in the intensifying human interdependence accompanying material processes of globalization. The debates surrounding cosmopolitanism are often normative, serving simultaneously as speculation on the shape of a future global order and advocacy of a deeper sense of global community. Unlike much of the literature on cosmopolitanism which attempts to envision a path to a future, more united world (e.g. Held, 1995; Brennan, 1997; Robbins, 1999; Hill, 2000), we seek instead to understand the geography of cosmopolitanism of those persons who say that they share some sense of belonging to the world as a whole. We thus follow in the empirical tradition of Norris (2000).

While many theoretical explications of globalization exist, most do not extend to empirical explorations, into what characterizes cosmopolitan global consciousness. This paper explores what Beck (2002, pp. 25–26) calls 'cosmopolitanization', or globalization from within, expressed by respondents who answered questions from the World Values Surveys (WVS), 1995–1997. For the purposes of this paper, cosmopolitans are those who say that they 'belong to the world'. This is a positive definition of cosmopolitanism, an extroverted, global sense of place (Massey, 1994) which does not necessitate a denial of more local social ties, including even strong identification with a nation. While the WVS does not incorporate qualitative measures of how the meaning of 'the world as a whole' may differ among survey respondents, our quantitative analysis of the values and attitudes associated with categorical expressions of belonging to the 'world as a whole' produces greater knowledge of cosmopolitanism as a phenomenon influenced by processes of globalization.

This paper is situated within the recent explosion of cosmopolitan writings that speak to a broader need for understanding the development and functioning of identities, membership, and loyalties in a global context (Turner, 2002, p. 45). Many definitions and conceptual traditions in the currents of moral and political philosophy that surround the issue of cosmopolitanism are peripheral to our treatment of the literature and theory (e.g. Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann, 1997; Hutchings, 1999; Jones, 1999; Linklater, 1999; Robbins, 1999; Franceschet, 2002). Rather than attempting an exhaustive historical, literary and philosophical treatment of cosmopolitanism, we concern ourselves with the literature that informs our effort to analyze cosmopolitanism through the WVS.

Cosmopolitanism is usually constructed in political theory as essentially opposed to national patriotism where world citizenship necessarily involves denial of obligation to a national community (e.g. Rorty, 1989; Singer, 1993). This version of 'political cosmopolitanism' is critiqued by theorists of 'cultural cosmopolitanism' who are not so quick to discount the possibility that cosmopolitans may retain more localized forms of territorial identity, even national identity (Cheah and Robbins, 1998). 'Cultural cosmopolitanism' is the subject of a growing body of literature in cultural and literary studies which shares a broad

definition of cosmopolitanism as an openness to, and willingness to engage with, cultural Others (Hannerz, 1992; Archibugi and Held, 1995; Cohen and Nussbaum, 1996; Cheah and Robbins, 1998; Hutchings and Dannreuther, 1999; Linklater, 1999; Robbins, 1999; Archibugi, 2000; Hill, 2000; Anderson-Gold, 2001; Derrida, 2001; Breckenridge et al., 2002; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002; Archibugi, 2003; Held, 2003; Bowden, 2003). If empirical analysis finds greater patriotism to be negatively associated with cosmopolitanism, we would have some support for the notion that national patriotism and a sense of belonging to the world tend to be mutually exclusive. However, such findings would not rule out a type of cosmopolitanism in which a sense of belonging to the world would coexist with a sense of belonging to a nation that does not tend towards a "my nation right or wrong" ideology. Such cosmopolitans could serve as progenitors of a new form of global social order where nations become mere expressions of cultural difference that cosmopolitans respect, rather than a world where nations are defined along faultlines of political conflict.

The paper moves from a discussion of definitions of cosmopolitanism to theorizing cosmopolitanism and its effects on political life to a discussion of our hypotheses, data and methodology. The final section of the paper describes the construction of our multilevel statistical model of cosmopolitanism and reports our findings. Our analysis incorporates nationally representative samples from 21 different countries into a single model. Because the data are collected hierarchically, with individuals clustered into regions in turn grouped into countries, the model allows for representations of different concepts of cosmopolitanism across geographic contexts.

2. Defining cosmopolitanism: a sense of belonging to the world

Scholars often distinguish between political and cultural varieties of cosmopolitanism. Political cosmopolitanism can be traced to the Cynic, Diogenes, in the 4th century BCE who said, "I am a citizen of the world" whenever someone asked from where he came. By declaring himself to be a world citizen Diogenes was denying his citizenship obligations to his Greek city-state. Over the centuries between Diogenes and the present, 'communities of fate' have grown to become nations or 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1991) that corporealize the social body by means beyond the personal relationships and face-to-face political life of the ancient Greek polis. Yet, despite, or maybe because of, the contemporary presence of territorially-large polities, the whole and harmonious cosmos of a world-society guided by a single set of moral principles remains utopian. States and nation-states continue as the primary political units, discretely defined by borders, circumscribing homelands, belonging to peoples defined in opposition to one another. In the absence of a world government defining citizenship rights and obligations, cosmo-

politanism defined as world citizenship remains conceptually empty, a negative definition. This notion of political cosmopolitanism, defined as world citizenship through direct translation from the Greek *kosmopolitês*, thus entails a contrarian stance towards membership in any of the polities that fragment the world into competing territorial allegiances.

'Political cosmopolitanism' gains contemporary relevance through the explicit construction of a binary opposition between cosmopolitanism and nationalism (Kaufmann, 2003). Yet, Kaufmann's (2003) analysis finds 'somewhat of a paradox' in cosmopolitanism defined solely as an anti-nation-state orientation. The notion of 'cultural cosmopolitanism' is meant to ameliorate the insufficiency of 'political cosmopolitanism' for understanding how persons may feel attachment simultaneously to both their nations and to supra-national geographies such as Europe and the 'world as a whole'. For example, successive Eurobarometer surveys reveal that majorities in most EU member states express some level of identification with Europe. However, only small percentages of respondents see themselves as 'European only', rather than European and [nationality], or [nationality] and European (Antonsich, 2007). Attempts to measure identification with Europe thus reveal that "European identity coexists with other identities – nation-state, regional, ethnic, and local – in a way that is not strictly hierarchical" (Murphy, 1999, p. 61). Similarly, the World Values Surveys (1995–1997) data reveal that a majority of cosmopolitans identify with their countries as

well as the 'world as a whole' (see Fig. 1). This complicates the nationalism/cosmopolitanism antinomy where a sense of belonging to the world should exclude national or other more localized sources of identity among cosmopolitans.

As the 'next big idea', (cultural) cosmopolitanism involves 'thinking and living in terms of *inclusive oppositions* (including nature into society, etc.) and rejecting the logic of exclusive oppositions, which characterizes methodological nationalism and first modernity sociology' (Beck, 2002, p. 19). Here the notion that a cosmopolitan sense of belonging to the world must necessarily supersede attachment to a nation is a sort of false cosmopolitanism still founded on an inclusion/exclusion, either/or principle that the logic of 'methodological cosmopolitanism' rejects in favor of a 'this-as-well-as-that' principle (Beck, 2002, p. 19). By introverting globalization in his notion of cosmopolitanization, or globalization from within, Beck defines cosmopolitanism as an acceptance of and willingness to engage with foreign Others.

The contemporary academic discourse on cosmopolitanism is closely bound to that of globalization and the problems arising from increased human interaction across cultural lines. Barber (1995) observes reactionary parochialisms, exemplified by radical Islamism, coevolving and conflicting with homogenizing forces of globalizing capitalism that replicate the capitalist worker–consumer. In view of the nature of contemporary globalization, scholars have sought to turn post-modern suspicions of universalizing 'grand narratives' to a source of strength for pursuing the cosmopolitan imperative of negotiating pluralistic, yet global principles of more harmonious human interdependence (e.g. Derrida, 2001). Cosmopolitanism as Western liberal human rights universalism masks material relations of domination and exploitation and makes cosmopolitanism a sort of 'class consciousness of frequent travelers' of the transnational neoliberal executive (Brennan, 1997; Calhoun, 2002). Instead, Rabinow (1996, p. 56) argues for a self-critical cosmopolitanism obliging respect of difference across places, peoples and historical trajectories. Because of this critical anti-universalist, anti-imperialist agenda, much writing on cosmopolitanism halts as if on a precipice, poised at the brink of advocating a set of universal values necessary for the desired global order as 'consensual dis-sensus' (Pollock et al., 2002).

The allure of cosmopolitanism for many critical theorists is undoubtedly a sense of the paradox and challenge in constructing a critical, reflexive cosmopolitan universalism as a mode of global social ordering that will not sublimate differences, but rather oblige a respect for them. Butler's (1996, p. 48) reflexive cosmopolitanism recognizes that in broadening the conceptual scope of universalism to cross-cultural context, principles held up as universal often emerge as cultural particulars. In this vein, universalism is desirable only insofar as it is always incomplete and expanding to embrace outsiders. Our concern with the place context of cosmopolitanism demands adding spatial dimensions to Butler's 'not yet complete' universalism by




Fig. 1. Answers to the World Values Survey questions "To which of the following geographic groups would you say you belong first of all? And the next?" It represents the total percentage of respondents expressing belonging to each of the five 'geographic groups', excluding respondents who answered "don't know". The respondent cannot choose the same answer twice.

theorizing cosmopolitan encounters with Others as 'heterotopic' (Marin, 1984; Hetherington, 1997, p. 11). Heterotopia marks particular margins of society where encounters with Others take the form of an inclusive *and* rather than an exclusionary *either/or* (see Pollock, 2002). As such, heterotopias are cosmopolitan sites of encounter and contestation where local universalisms are challenged and remade.

Massey's (1994) extroverted 'global sense of place' articulates well with the cosmopolitan standpoint, and those who choose to occupy such ethical spaces of encounter may collectively be producing something that Marden (1997) calls 'cosmopolitan culture'. Marden (1997) may, however, not be correct in holding that identification with a cosmopolitan culture and politics will mean the shedding of 'old' territorial loyalties; rather, these may be nested within more complex forms of identity (Herb and Kaplan, 1999). A global sense of place that does not exclude local attachments represents a potential solution to the dilemma that Calhoun (2002, p. 95) identifies at the center of developing a practical, global cosmopolitanism: how to develop sodality among culturally-disparate peoples of different polities? Turner (2002, p. 49) argues that without a geographical sense of place, cosmopolitanism "would commit the same mistake as 19th century socialist internationalism. It would be devoid of emotional specificity". A sense of world-place may serve as a vehicle through which sodality across culturally-disparate peoples is produced or a point of attraction around which sodality in global society forms. Because a sense of belonging to the world must be produced in everyday life, local context is particularly important. Throughout the edited volume *Cosmopolitics* (Cheah and Robbins, 1998), there are frequent calls for a rooted cosmopolitanism that can combine more local sentiments with cosmopolitan universalism, thus maintaining diversity in cosmopolitanism.

3. Cosmopolitanization: theorizing its causes and effects

Cosmopolitanism is a particular mode of social apprehension of globalization – a production process of a new world-space/place to which cosmopolitans assign symbolic order in an inclusive and dialogical fashion. The symbolic landscape of environmentalism illustrates this argument; a sense of immanent planetary crisis is an important way in which environmentalists conceive of the 'world as a whole'. Environmentalists appropriate representations of planet earth to mobilize political consciousness of the risk of environmental destruction through unrestrained economic development. Similarly, Beck (2002) sees a contemporary process of cosmopolitanization as experienced and recognized as a crisis of ineffectual nation-state politics in mitigating global scale risks, especially the risk of environmental catastrophe that permeates polities' borders. Because the 'world as a whole' is a common trope of the environmentalist movement, we should expect that environmentalist attitudes among individuals condition a greater likelihood of cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitanism is often defined as primarily involving a detached loyalty to humanity and as such is derided as incapable in theory or practice of providing a general platform for political activism. Such arguments are shared by both anti-cosmopolitans and pro-cosmopolitanism critics of Nussbaum's (1996) version of Stoic cosmopolitanism where a belief in an essential, universal human rationality is a source of deep, primary attachment extending outward from the individual across concentric social circles to the whole of humanity. As Gramsci (1971) and a long line of other anti-cosmopolitan intellectuals argue, a cosmopolitanism that substitutes an abstract 'humanity' for the nation as the primary community of engagement and sentiment is a vagary and counter-productive to the real work of politics. A sense of belonging to the world is also somewhat abstract, but we should not be so quick to disavow the potential significance of an association between belonging to the world and political activism. While we would not expect that participation in nationalist or other forms of exclusionary identity politics would be positively associated with cosmopolitanism, we expect that types of political activism that entail a dialogical expansion of concern to social circles beyond the closest and most familiar would be positively associated with cosmopolitanism.

Nussbaum further emphasizes that cosmopolitans, while primarily loyal to humanity, can also maintain local affiliations and identification with existing class, race, gender, ethnic, professional, and other social groupings. However, these secondary attachments exclude patriotism and seem designed only to mitigate the lonely business of becoming a citizen of the world (Nussbaum, 1996, p. 9 and 15). Nussbaum's (1996, pp. 4–5) main argument is that patriotism, while seeming an innocuous sentiment, is but a short leap to jingoism. Nussbaum's position is closely associated to Billing's (1995) formulation of patriotism as 'banal nationalism' or the constant flow of quotidian symbolic practices that encode the significance of the nation as individual loyalty. Appiah (1996) counters this line of argument by differentiating between patriotism as a sentimental attachment to national culture and homeland versus nationalism as an ideology – 'my country right or wrong'. Appiah's (1996) version of 'cultural cosmopolitanism' thus disallows ideological nationalism similarly to 'political cosmopolitanism', yet theorizes how 'cosmopolitan patriots' may belong at once to the nation and the world in an unhierarchal, dialogical manner. Following Appiah (1996), we should thus expect that expressing great pride in being part of one nation would be negatively associated with cosmopolitanism, while expressing a sense of belonging to a nation together with a sense of belonging to the world may be a form of cosmopolitan patriotism. Cosmopolitan patriotism might allow for sentimental attachment to a national community while disallowing effective appeals to national identity as justification for discrimination or violence against foreigners. However, in discussing patriotism and nationalism, it is important to also note the fact that nationalisms and patriotisms are plural. Nations are

located in various places, serving different purposes, entailing different historical trajectories. Our model of cosmopolitanism allows for representing a plurality of relations between patriotism and a sense of world-place.

Scholars further associate generalized social trust with cosmopolitanism. Earle and Need (1995, p. 103) believe that higher levels of generalized social trust lead to a cosmopolitan society. They differentiate between pluralism and cosmopolitanism, endorsing the view that pluralistic trust is cited within more parochial social groupings while cosmopolitan trust extends between and across groups. In his models of social trust in Japan and Switzerland constructed using the same WVS data as our study, Freitag (2003) finds a significant, positive relationship between generalized social trust as an outcome variable, and a measure of 'cosmopolitanization' that combines the WVS questions addressing patriotism and belonging.

Both religiosity and secularism are also theoretically associated with cosmopolitanism. Van Der Veer (2002) associates religiosity with cosmopolitanism in post-colonial contexts where the association between cosmopolitanism and Enlightenment secularism is seen as less deterministic than in the West. Robertson (1992) argues that globalization involves the "universalization of particularism" as well as the "particularization of universalism", and the dynamics between them produces "glocalization". Further, Norris (2000) found that larger percentages of the members of more recent birth cohorts across the seventy countries surveyed in the 1990–1991 and 1995–1997 World Values Surveys say that they belong to 'the world as a whole'. This might be a product of youthful interest in what is fresh and new, in contradistinction to more traditional objects of identification. Youths are more likely to consume global popular culture and wanting to travel, they tend to be more open to broader influences than local culture and tradition. A quick glance at the 1999–2004 WVS data indicates that this age difference is maintained.

4. Hypotheses, data and methodology

We outline here our hypothesized relationships between cosmopolitanism and socio-demographic and contextual characteristics of the respondents in the WVS samples. Resulting from differential incorporation into globalization, cosmopolitanism should be more likely among the populations of relatively more connected and wealthier countries, measured by the ratio of country GDP accounted for by trade. At the same time, the cosmopolitan 'sense of belonging to the world' might represent a rejection of more local scales of identification. The country contexts of regions with significant political upheaval such as Latin America and the former Soviet Union should condition a greater likelihood of cosmopolitanism as their populations look to the wider world for effective governance and an expression of dismay with conditions at home. If cosmopolitanism is a matter of thinking beyond the nation, we would expect expressions of less patriotic sentiment to

be associated with a greater likelihood of cosmopolitanism. Further, because the 'world as a whole' is a common trope of the environmentalist movement, we should expect that environmentalist attitudes among individuals condition a greater likelihood of cosmopolitanism.

Because political activism involves an expansion of concern to groups larger than the most intimate, political activism may be an individual characteristic that conditions a greater likelihood of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is also expected to be more likely among individuals who do not express negative attitudes towards Others. Our analysis tests this notion using a measure of non-negative attitudes to immigrants. At the same time, openness to cultural difference conditioning a greater likelihood of cosmopolitanism should also be influenced by the proportion of immigrants in individuals' localities. If cosmopolitanism is a function of openness to cultural difference coupled with greater than normal intercultural contact, we expect to find that living in areas with a relatively greater proportion of immigrants in the local population conditions a greater likelihood of cosmopolitanism among individuals. As forms of political activism have become increasingly connected into global thematic networks around which globalized civil society movements such as environmentalism coalesce, we expect activism to be positively associated with cosmopolitanism. We measure activism on the basis of whether a respondent had done one or more of the following; signed a petition, joined a boycott, attended a demonstration, joined a strike, or participated in a sit-in.

In the absence of more qualitative research among the survey respondents, we cannot know more exactly what 'the world as a whole' means to any of them. We do however know that 22% of all the 33,017 respondents in the 21 different World Values Surveys country samples said "the world as a whole" when they were twice asked the question "to which geographic group do you belong?" (Inglehart, 2000, p. 45). We would expect to find that the 22% of the respondents who said they are cosmopolitan tend to be consistent in their ideological expressions, such as a lack of animosity to immigrants.

As expected (see Fig. 2), 'the world as a whole' is not a popular answer relative to closer, more familiar human geographies whose defining boundaries are more distinct; the nation or country is the geographic group that draws the most responses across the two survey questions. A clear majority (57%) of respondents expressing belonging to the world for the second question chose their country for the first question. Slightly less than a majority (48%) of the respondents who chose the world first said they 'belong to their country' second. A cosmopolitan expression thus does not preclude a sense of attachment to one's country. Implicit in these data is an assumption that there are multiple territorial scales of belonging with which respondents may identify, allowing for overlapping and 'nested identities' within an embedded hierarchy of geographic scales (Herb and Kaplan, 1999).




Fig. 2. Geographic group of belonging (other than the world as a whole). Percentage of cosmopolitans.

The World Values Survey project is “designed to enable cross-national comparison of values and norms on a wide variety of topics and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe” (Inglehart, 2000, p. 7). So far, a total of 64 independent countries, nearly 80% of the world’s population, have been surveyed in at least one wave of the WVS. Data are now available from four waves (1981–1984, 1990–1993, 1995–1997 and 1999–2004). Sixty surveys representing mass public opinions of 53 independent countries are included in the 1995–1997 WVS, from which we selected 21 countries using the criterion of data availability for our dependent and independent variables.¹ The surveys followed essentially the same questionnaire but were conducted by separate teams of researchers in different countries. The enormous WVS data set offers the best information for making cross-country comparisons of values and attitudes. A major finding of the project to date is evidence of a temporal, age-related shift in the societal values of increasingly affluent countries towards what Inglehart calls ‘post-materialism’ (Inglehart, 1986; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995).

All of the WVS data were collected through face-to-face interviews carried out at the respondents’ homes in the local language. The sampling universe consists of all adult

residents in the respective countries, ages 18 and over. A multi-stage random selection of sampling points within each country sampled respondents from a broad assortment of different places within the country in proportion to population. After stratification by region and degree of urbanization, a number of points were drawn from all administrative regional units with a starting address drawn at random in each sampling point and further addresses selected using random route procedures (Inglehart, 2000, pp. 7–9). In some countries, quota sampling was used to make a final selection of survey respondents with quotas assigned on the basis of occupation, age, sex, and region. These researchers used census data as a guide to the distribution of each group in the region (Inglehart, 2000, p. 9).² Correcting for these sampling problems where certain demographic groups are underrepresented and others overrepresented, a weight variable assigned a non-integer probability weight value to each respondent representing that person’s probability of being selected in a nationally representative sample defined by demographic characteristics, usually age and education. Throughout our analysis, we used the weighted cases.

The WVS includes demographic information for each respondent including education, age, sex, religiosity, region of residence, country of residence, and whether the respondent was born in the country of residence. Further survey items that were deployed in the analysis include the scale of a respondent’s feeling of geographic belonging from which we derived a binary independent variable, cosmopolitanism defined as a sense of belonging to the world. Also included in the multilevel model as individual-level predictors of the likelihood of cosmopolitanism are measures of patriotism, political activism, the respondent’s attitude towards immigrants, and the respondent’s preference for or against prioritizing protection of the environment over economic development.

The WVS data we analyzed are stratified by region and country with 33,017 individual respondents clustered into 247 regions and these regions are clustered into 21 countries (Table 1). These countries were chosen solely on the basis of data availability. In some countries one or more of the questions from which we derived our variables were not asked, leaving missing values for the entire variable. Rather than having entire countries drop out of the final model, we chose to exclude these countries in advance, leaving 21. The total number of respondents is 32,225 when

¹ The 1999–2004 WVS data only became available after we had completed the analysis of the 1992–1997 data. Comparison of the ratios for the individual countries of those who identify “with the world as a whole” show the same general rank order as represented in Fig. 3. Over the (approximately) 5-year gap, the biggest decreases are observed for Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; conversely, the only increase is seen in Ukraine (12 percentage points). The values for the other countries are stable. The average of respondents who “identify first with the world” for all countries in the most recent WVS is 9.3%. Consistent with this figure, 12% of European Union citizens (in 25 states) in 2005 “often think of themselves as citizens of the world” (Antonsich, 2007).

² The country samples included in our analysis that diverge from the above sampling design are Chile, Argentina, Nigeria, and Russia. The Chile sample covers only the central portion of the country (63% of the national population) where the average income is about 40% higher than the national average. The Argentina sample is restricted to the central, urbanized portion of the country where incomes are again above average. Nigeria’s sample is limited mainly to urban areas with rural areas randomly selected, in southern Nigeria, from rural settlements within a ten kilometer radius of urban centers. In Russia, respondents were drawn from centralized lists of addresses of everyone living in the jurisdiction of a selected state-run address bureau (Inglehart, 2000, p. 8).

Table 1
Respondents by country and region

Country	Total <i>N</i>	Regions	Mean <i>N</i> per region
Argentina	1485	6	250
Armenia	1497	10	136
Australia	1486	7	214
Azerbaijan	1500	8	188
Belarus	1467	7	215
Chile	1477	4	375
Estonia	1494	16	94
Finland	1490	11	136
Georgia	1488	10	150
Germany	2969	17	176
Latvia	1450	36	40
Lithuania	1456	5	300
Nigeria	1163	5	234
Peru	1478	11	137
Philippines	1500	4	375
Russia	1498	11	137
Spain	1489	17	88
Switzerland	1474	19	75
Ukraine	1463	26	58
USA	1422	10	144
Venezuela	1480	6	250

the weight variable discussed above is applied. Using this weighted total number of respondents, the average number of respondents per region is equal to 130. A rule of thumb in multilevel modeling suggests there should be at least 15–20 cases per unit for reliable modeling; only seven of our regions violate this norm. We dropped a small percentage of cases from several countries with missing region values and independent variables. We further drew from sources outside of the survey to provide country-level data to explore interaction effects between country contexts and an individual's likelihood of cosmopolitanism. Following researchers in international political economy, we measure the country's level of economic globalization as openness to trade. We divided the sum of a country's exports and imports for that year by its 1997 GDP (Gross Domestic Product), and we hypothesize that more economic connections, and thus more contact with people beyond country borders, promote societal tendencies to cosmopolitan attitudes. Also included in the data is the country's score on the 1997 United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index. The HDI score provides a good aggregate measure of the relative affluence among the different countries that affect mass cosmopolitan attitudes similarly to observed cross-country differences in post-materialism.

Norris (2000) used the same two WVS questions that we are using to construct her measure of cosmopolitanism. The first geographic group to which survey respondents said they belonged was used to define cosmopolitanism; relatively cosmopolitan respondents first chose larger geographic groups, locality, sub-country region, state, continent, or the world. Unlike Norris, our model explores the values and attitudes associated with a sense of world-place. As such, we do not discriminate against respondents' secondary attachments in our definition of cosmopolitanism

since this might bias the model towards measuring 'political cosmopolitanism' that assumes a hierarchy of territorial identities. Norris's OLS regressions and summary statistics incorporate different place contexts only as individual characteristics. In contrast, multilevel modeling enables observation of how independent variables explain variance arising from the different geographic contexts of the spatial units used to group respondents. Norris (2000) explored the place contexts of cosmopolitanism at an aggregate world-regional level and by 'type of society' – post-industrial, post-communist, and developing. Her summary statistics and regressions reveal the significant influence on individual cosmopolitanism of relative youth, greater education, level of urbanization, and not being born in the country of residence, together with a country's level of human development and democratic status. By integrating individual-level data, sub-country regional and country contexts into a single, multilevel model of the WVS data, we take a step further in the effort to build a critical cosmopolitanism that does not overlook contextual differences in the pursuit of universal order. Multilevel modeling offers advantages over OLS regression in that it does not require converting differences to deviations which are then filtered out as background noise or ignored as unexplained variance.

Human geography emphasizes the importance of diverse place contexts that shape social life, leading to increasing adoption of contextual modeling techniques (see O'Loughlin, 2003). This corrects some of the problems inherent in the assumption of independent observations by introducing a degree of context-dependence between observations within groups. Contextual spatial models have been employed successfully by political geographers to reveal the significance of place contexts to understanding voting patterns across different neighborhoods (Jones et al., 1998). Extending multilevel modeling of political attitudes, Secor and O'Loughlin (2005) revealed the significance of different neighborhood contexts in conditioning levels of generalized social trust in a comparative analysis of Istanbul and Moscow. Further, O'Loughlin (2004) used WVS data to demonstrate the significance of sub-state region, country, and world-region contexts across 65 countries in understanding values and attitudes associated with democratic beliefs and practices.

The hierarchical structure of the WVS data makes them ideal for multilevel modeling: individual responses (level-one) are grouped into sub-country regions (level-two) that are, in turn, grouped by country (level-three).³ The multilevel modeling procedure allows for evaluation of fixed and random effects on the dependent variable at each of the model's three levels. The residual values at the individual level that are normally relegated to an "unexplained variance" category in more traditional regression models

³ These region-clusters are defined by the survey design and should not be considered coincidental with the subjective individual sense of a region as a scale of belonging (see Fig. 1).

become the source of further analysis at higher levels in multilevel modeling. In this way, more of the variance in the data can be accounted for as place/group-contextual effects on the outcome variable. Jones and Duncan (1996) argue that multilevel modeling should always be employed in geographic analyses of survey data, since multilevel modeling allows an examination of the effect of place context conditioning the fit of the model across respondents in different places. Also, multilevel modeling allows the exploration of cross-level interactions that can show a significant effect of place-specific context on individual attitudes.

A traditional approach to representing between-place heterogeneity of contexts would involve fitting separate regression equations for every place. For our analysis, this would involve 21 separate equations for each country and 247 separate equations for each region. This is impractical and would make drawing meaningful comparisons between cosmopolitanism in different places exceedingly difficult as country contexts would be subsumed in regional models and regional contexts would be lost in country models. Ignoring the spatial clustering of a hierarchical data structure such as WVS can result in biased parameter estimates and biased standard errors (Guo and Zhao, 2000, p. 444). The basic appeal of multilevel modeling is the integration of the aggregate data analysis usually employed by geographers and the individual-level analysis preferred by other social science researchers (Jones and Duncan, 1996; O'Loughlin, 2004).

Multilevel models share the same underlying structure as do all statistical equations. A state of the response or dependent variable is the result of systematic (fixed) components and fluctuations or randomness (Jones and Duncan, 1996, p. 85):

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

response fixed intercept [slope × predictor] random parameters

If 21 separate regression equations, as in Eq. (1), were to be fitted, each country would have a different intercept coefficient and different slope coefficient. We would assume that the random errors ϵ_i for each country have a mean of zero and a variance of σ_i^2 .

In a multilevel model, we keep the notion that separate, first-level linear models should be fitted to each context, i.e. region and country groups. Models specified at the different scales are statistically integrated in a multilevel model (Kreft and de Leeuw, 1998, p. 2); the second and third-level groups are treated as a random sample of the population of groups. Regression intercepts are allowed to vary across groups while assuming the same common error variance across all groups. Regression slopes can also be set to vary randomly at higher levels that reveal the strength of a predictor variable for each cluster relative to the others; in our case, for example, level of education in one region may not be as important a predictor of cosmopolitanism as in other regions. In linking scales, the regression coefficients of the first-level models are regressed on the higher level explanatory variables, with the first-level coefficients treated as ran-

dom variables at higher levels. Each first level regression coefficient is viewed at higher levels as 'originating' from the probability distribution (binomial) in our case. Details on the method are readily available in Kreft and de Leeuw (1998).

While a single level logistic regression model would normally use maximum likelihood estimation, we chose Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models (GLLAMM), a program available at www.gllamm.org for STATA 8.2. GLLAAM uses Gaussian quadrature (GQ) to estimate the model, thereby finding a best fitting logistic function that maximizes the predictive probability of a respondent being cosmopolitan. Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2002) show that GQ tends to underestimate the variances of the model's higher levels when a large data set (like ours) is being estimated. Since more integration points mean a larger covariance matrix and longer computation time, adaptive Gaussian quadrature can correct these downwardly-biased estimates using fewer integration points and it works well for estimating binary responses (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2002, p. 9). For these reasons, we use adaptive quadrature with 10 integration points to estimate our models; while the size of the predictor variables' coefficients did not change appreciably over the default setting, the size of the region and country variance estimates increased.

Multilevel modeling is an iterative or stepwise process. Starting from a 'null model' where the variance in the response variable is partitioned among the levels, we add explanatory variables to the model and compare each successive model with its predecessor in order to evaluate whether the addition of a predictor is improving the fit of the model. The difference in the log likelihood values or the 'deviance' is used as a test statistic with a chi-squared distribution and degrees of freedom equal to the number of additional parameters (Snijders and Bosker, 1999, p. 89). Successive iterations of the model add fixed effects (as in an individual level explanatory variable) and random effects (allowing the slope of the relationship between an individual level variable and the dependent variable to vary across countries).

We coded the binary dependent variable, *cosmopolitanism*, as follows: First, we coded all '5' ('belonging to the world as a whole') values of *v203* and *v204* in the WVS as '1' (cosmopolitan), and all other values as '0' (not cosmopolitan, except "don't know" answers which were relegated to the missing values category). For each individual respondent, or case/data row, we summed the transformed values of *v203* and *v204*, yielding a new, single (dependent variable), *cosmopolitanism*. Because each respondent was able to answer '5' only once, summing the transformed values of *v203* and *v204* coded as '1' all respondents who expressed a feeling of belonging to 'the world as a whole' for either of the two questions. Thus, *cosmopolitanism* is defined as a characteristic of individual respondents who chose 'the world as a whole' as their first or second choice of the geographic group to which they belong. This measure of cosmopolitanism among individual WVS respon-




Fig. 3. Cosmopolitanism percentage by country (21 countries in the study).

dents was also used by Norris (2000). In her summary statistics Norris found an equivalent ratio of 22% of *cosmopolitanism* across a weighted *N* of 147,319, the same ratio as we find across our 21 country weighted sample of 32,225 respondents. Fig. 3 presents the total percentage of *cosmopolitanism* across the respondents in each of the 21 countries included in the models. The most notable feature of the graph is the clustering of the nine former Soviet Union

countries near the top of graph. These countries (Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Armenia, and Belarus) have an average of 28% cosmopolitan respondents.

5. Modeling cosmopolitanism in a multilevel framework

The iterative process of building a multilevel model begins by defining the null model (Table 2, column 2). The null model partitions the variance of *cosmopolitanism* across the three levels of the multilevel model – individual, region, and country. With no explanatory variables, the null model thus measures the random effect of *cosmopolitanism* at the region and country levels of clustering; the individual level variance has a fixed value. The null model provides an estimate of the variance (σ^2) in *cosmopolitanism* across the 247 different *y*-axis intercepts of regression lines fitted to each region, and a different variance for the 21 different country intercepts of *cosmopolitanism*. Regional and country intercept variances are not equal to zero as indicated by a Wald test. Since the probability of *cosmopolitanism* thus differs significantly across region and country contexts, an important goal of adding variables to the model is to probe these effects by filtering out the individual-level characteristics of respondents – attitudes, values, and demographics – to determine whether the region and country level coefficients remain significant.

The null model also estimates the *y*-axis intercept (constant) of the regression line across all individuals. In order to provide the grand, individual level intercept, the creators of GLLAMM fixed the individual level variance at $\Pi^2/3 = 3.28986$ for binomial models. (The rationale for this is explained in Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005).) This is important for calculating the intra-class correlations, or the average degree to which the observations of *cosmopolitanism* within each region and country cluster are correlated. We calculate the intra-class (intra-region correlation)

Table 2
Modeling cosmopolitanism

Predictor	Null model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Final model
Constant	-1.504, 0.113	-3.055, 0.242	-3.155, 0.265	-3.118, 0.252	3.161, 0.270	-3.256, 0.209
σ^2 region	0.315, 0.094	0.303, 0.095	0.242, 0.125	0.199, 0.062	0.233, 0.079	0.234, 0.079
σ^2 country	0.115, 0.036	0.151, 0.039	0.236, 0.093	0.191, 0.074	0.033, 0.028	0.050, 0.027
Immigration		0.360, 0.100, 1.43	-0.080, 0.065, 1.38	0.158, 0.103, 1.17	0.173, 0.130, 1.12	
Patriotism		0.377, 0.057, 1.46	0.361, 0.109, 1.43	0.370, 0.056, 1.45	0.362, 0.056, 1.43	0.353, 0.057, 1.42
Activism		0.250, 0.052, 1.28	0.257, 0.057, 1.29	0.256, 0.054, 1.29	0.261, 0.050, 1.29	0.260, 0.049, 1.30
Environmentalism		0.264, 0.048, 1.30	0.286, 0.048, 1.33	0.269, 0.047, 1.31	0.283, 0.050, 1.33	0.285, 0.048, 1.33
Education		0.046, 0.010, 1.05	0.043, 0.010, 1.04	0.046, 0.010, 1.05	0.042, 0.009, 1.04	0.043, 0.009, 1.04
Age		-0.014, 0.002, 0.99	-0.014, 0.001, 0.99	-0.014, 0.002, 0.99	-0.014, 0.001, 0.98	-0.014, 0.001, 0.99
% Immigrants			2.813, 0.621, 1.67	0.985, 0.763, 2.68	1.350, 0.768, 3.85	
Supervenient				2.008, 0.871, 7.44	2.048, 0.885, 7.75	3.161, 0.422, 25.92
Latin America					0.040, 0.136, 1.04	
CIS					0.368, 0.168, 1.44	0.591, 0.121, 1.80
Europe					-0.347, 0.234, 0.71	
Trade					-0.446, 0.152, 0.64	-0.596, 0.116, 0.55
HDI					0.295, 0.593, 1.34	
Log-likelihood	-19092.09	-12192.96	-13269.89	-13258.986	-13247.57	-13253.08

Within each column, the first number is the coefficient, the second is the standard error, and the third is the Odds Ratio. The final model had 25,904 cases.

for the regions by dividing the region variance by the total variance as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \rho &= \sigma^2 \text{ region} / (\sigma^2 \text{ country} + \sigma^2 \text{ region} \\ &\quad + \sigma^2 \text{ individual}) \quad \text{or} \quad 0.315 / (0.115 + 0.315 + 3.290) \\ &= 0.085 \end{aligned}$$

In a similar manner, the intra-country correlation of *cosmopolitanism* is calculated by dividing the country variance by the total variance, yielding 0.031. Thus, 8.5% of the total variance of *cosmopolitanism* is a function of the region context where a respondent lives, and 3.1% of the total variance is a function of the respondent's country context. The low value of the *rho* coefficient means that observations of *cosmopolitanism* are not highly correlated within countries and regions on average.

Our findings are consistent with those of other studies employing multilevel modeling to examine survey data on societal attitudes and values that indicate that most of the variance is found at the individual level. For example, the two-level model of Evans and Need (2002, p. 666) estimates that about 15% of the total variance in their scale of attitudes towards minority rights is at the region level across 59 regions in 13 East European countries. O'Loughlin (2004) using WVS data, finds about 70% of the variance in various measures of political attitudes and practices across the globe is due to individual differences, 10% and 20% at the region and country levels, respectively. Further, Secor and O'Loughlin (2005) show a similarly small, yet significant, effect (3–10%) of place context in their two-level models of individual and neighborhood characteristics associated with levels of social trust in Moscow and Istanbul. These measured geographic-group context effects fit well with the geographic perspective that place-context embodies small, but significant effects, on individual attitudes and values.

Central to 'cultural cosmopolitanism' is the notion that cosmopolitans think and empathize beyond their own societies; that they are tolerant of, generally open to, and even embrace cultural differences. To test these expectations, we fit predictive models with attributes for immigrants, patriotism, education, age and political activism in a stepwise manner. To save space, we report here only the final models of six predictors and the two scales (country and region) in Model 1 of Table 2. To include an explanatory measure of attitudes towards cultural difference in the model, we use a measure of whether or not respondents express negative attitudes towards immigrants. We thus expect that those not expressing negative attitudes towards immigrants are more likely to be cosmopolitan.⁴ The attitude towards

immigrants is derived from Survey item *v57* in the WVS which listed immigrants as one marginalized social group in a list of other groups (e.g. criminals, homosexuals, persons with AIDS; Inglehart, 2000, p. 27). Respondents were asked to identify any group that they would not like to have as neighbors. In our coding, respondents who did not express a negative attitude towards having immigrants as neighbors (85.5% of the sample) are assigned a value of 1; 0 otherwise. The odds ratio for *immigration* represented in Model 2 (Table 2) indicates that a respondent's expression of a non-negative attitude towards immigrants increases a respondent's likelihood of *cosmopolitanism* by approximately 43% from the odds ratio over those who responded negatively, though the relationship is marginally significant. When we added *immigration* to the model, we noted a downward change in the region variance estimate and upward shift in the country variance estimate relative to the previous step of model building. Thus, adding *immigration* to the model accounts for a sizeable amount of the variance of *cosmopolitanism* at the region-level.

We added *patriotism* as an individual level predictor variable in order to test whether an expression of pride in simply being part of the nation is significantly associated with cosmopolitanism. We constructed *Patriotism* by recoding WVS item *v205*, where the respondent was asked, *How proud are you to be* [citizen of the respective country]? Responses "very proud" and "quite proud" were coded as 1 and "not very proud" and "not at all proud" as 0; "I am not a citizen" and "don't know" were coded as missing (Inglehart, 2000, p. 45). *Patriotism* is thus a non-continuous, ordinal-scale variable of categorical responses measuring discrete degrees of national pride. A few summary statistics illustrate the power of national patriotism as a determinant of social attachment in the contemporary world. Across the 35,580 total respondents, a near majority (47.4%) said that they were 'very proud' to be a member of their nation. 'Quite proud' was by far the second most popular answer, commanding a further 31.5% of the total responses.

Following both 'political cosmopolitanism' and 'cultural cosmopolitanism' theories, we expect that respondents who express a 'my country right or wrong' attitude by representing simple national membership as a strong source of pride will be less likely to say that they belong to the 'world as a whole'. The positive *patriotism* regression coefficient translates to a 46% greater likelihood of a cosmopolitan response with each unit increase on the *patriotism* scale (Table 2, Model 1) where higher values represent expressions of less national pride. The size of the region-level variance estimate increases slightly and the insignificant country-level variance indicates that the addition of *patriotism* changes the regression equation so that the relationship between *patriotism* and *cosmopolitanism* does not vary significantly across different countries. This significant relationship between less patriotism and greater likelihood of cosmopolitanism is an important departure from Norris' (2000) OLS model where identification with relatively lar-

⁴ This significant effect of attitudes towards immigrants was cross-checked using an independent variable derived from survey item *v134* about in-migration of labor. When respondents were asked their opinion about foreign labor migration policy on a four point scale from 'letting everyone come who wants to' to 'prohibit people coming here from other countries', those in favor of relatively freer migration are significantly more likely to be cosmopolitan.

ger geographic groups showed no significant association with patriotism. Our finding supports theories of 'political cosmopolitanism' which suggest that national patriotism and cosmopolitanism are exclusive.

We created the binary *activism* variable by recoding the responses from a series of questions about a respondent's past political actions. World Values Survey items *v118*, *v119*, *v120*, *v121*, and *v122* asked respondents whether they had in the past or might in the future sign a petition, join a boycott, attend a demonstration, join unofficial strikes, or occupy a building or factory (Inglehart, 2000, p. 35). For each proposed action, respondents' answers were coded '1' if they had in the past taken the action, '2' if they might in the future engage in the activity, and '3' if they would never consider undertaking such activism. *Activism* is the result of first recoding each of the four items, leaving '1' values the same and transforming all other values to '0', while recoding 'don't know' responses as missing. The resultant four new, recoded variables were then summed to create a new variable with values ranging from '0' to '4' with a small number of missing values. This political activist group includes 35.8% of the respondents.

Though cosmopolitans are often stereotyped as rootless, un-politically committed mobile elites, divorced from the politics that define their citizenship rights and obligations (Vertovec and Cohen, 2002, p. 6), our model reveals that the forms of political activism measured by the survey are positively associated with *cosmopolitanism*, supporting the notion that belonging to the world does not necessarily represent a negative commitment that precludes participation in the political life of one's society. As the particular forms of political activism in the WVS involve concern for the goals of more expansive social groups rather than the closest and most personal, activism represents a way in which cosmopolitans may expand their attachments in political spheres scaled from local to global. The relationship between cosmopolitan values and political activism may exist in reciprocal relation and likely differs across respondents.

In Model 2 (Table 2), activist respondents are 28% more likely to be cosmopolitan than the average. Since the value of the region variance coefficient increased from the previous step and the value of the country coefficient again became significant, *activism* is more a factor in cross-country variation than in the model fit across regions. This is not surprising since the different political systems of the various countries condition the opportunities and forms for political activism.

Environmentalism is another binary predictor variable. '1' values represent those respondents who expressed an environmentalist response to a single survey item, *v41* (Inglehart, 2000, p. 25). Respondents were read two statements "Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs" and "Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent"; respondents who agreed with the first

statement listed above were coded '1', those who agreed with the second statement were coded '2', and those who volunteered a different answer were coded '3'. To create *environmentalism* we transformed the '2' and '3' values to '0', leaving '1' values unchanged. Thus, those respondents that prioritize environmentalist concerns over economic development – 43.6% of the total respondents – are given a positive value under *environmentalism*.

The regression coefficient of *environmentalism* is positive and significant with self-defined environmentalists 30% more likely to classify themselves as cosmopolitan. This supports the contention that environmentalism, with its associated tropes of 'one-world home' and planetary fragility, helps substantiate a sense of 'belonging to the world'. Laissez-faire economic ideology is not generally characteristic of cosmopolitanism defined as a sense of belonging to the world when set in opposition to environmental concerns. This finding points to an environmentalism concerned with the environmental impacts of capitalist development as a global thematic network into which cosmopolitans tend to enroll themselves.

Education is derived from Survey item *v217* (Inglehart, 2000, p. 48) and represents one of a number of demographic measures included in the survey. *Education* has a nearly normal distribution across all respondents. Because cosmopolitanism is often associated with the highly educated, mobile elite, we expect that the coefficient of *education* should be positive and significant, indicating an association between higher education levels and *cosmopolitanism*.

The regression coefficient for *education* is statistically significant, though much smaller than the coefficients of other individual-level predictor variables. The odds ratio of *education* shows that a unit increase in *education* (on a nine-point scale from no education to completion of advanced university degrees) slightly increases the probability of *cosmopolitanism* by 5% over the average. With the addition of *education* to the model, the regression coefficient of *activism* showed the largest reduction in size, indicating some multicollinearity between *activism* and *education* (a correlation coefficient of +0.17).

Age is the second demographic characteristic that we found to be significantly associated with *cosmopolitanism*. (Neither gender, religiosity, level of social trust nor the amount of television that the respondent watches weekly were statistically significant.) *Age* was mean-centered by subtracting the value of the mean age (39.7 years) across all respondents from each value of the new variable. The regression coefficient of *age* is negative and small, though significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, for a 1 year increase in *age*, the odds ratio tells us that the probability of *cosmopolitanism* decreases by slightly more than 1%, and is broadly consistent with Norris's (2000) finding across the 70 countries of the combined two waves (1990–1991 and 1995–1997) of the WVS where larger percentages of respondents in more recent birth cohorts expressed a sense of cosmopolitanism.

Referring back to the null model in Table 2, the addition of *immigration* to the model caused a substantial decrease in the region variance estimate from the null model. The models depicted in Table 2 examine the effect of *immigration* at the region level more closely by allowing the slope of *immigration* to vary 'randomly' as it is fit to the data clustered within each of the models' 247 different regions. We expect that there should be a higher probability of finding cosmopolitans in more diverse, multi-cultural areas. Living among immigrants forces consideration of cultural differences in everyday life but also, more cosmopolitan citizens might tend to live in metropolitan areas where immigrants cluster.

In order to measure the ratio of immigrants of each region, we constructed a new variable, *percent-immigrants* and added it in Model 2 of Table 2. Starting by recoding Survey item *v206* (Inglehart, 2000, p. 46), we constructed the binary variable, *foreign-born*. The respondent was asked whether they were born in the country where the survey was being conducted. For our purposes, we recoded all 'no' responses as '1' and all 'yes' responses as '0'. Thus, *foreign-born* assigns immigrants a '1' value. Though this measure may include non-immigrant nationals who were simply born abroad, we assume that these are few in number and that most of the cases with positive values (7% of the total) indicate immigrant respondents.

Hannerz's (1992, pp. 240–241) understanding of the relationship between mobility and cosmopolitan attitudes towards cultural diversity implies a necessary acceptance and willingness to engage with cultural Others, but we find that simply being an immigrant is not significantly related to cosmopolitanism. *Percent-immigrants* is a region-level variable since each individual in the same region is assigned the same percentage-value. As immigrants tend to cluster together in particular places within countries, it is not surprising that the frequency distribution of the percentage of immigrants has a positive skew of 2.18. The maximum value of *percent-immigrants* is found in the Tartuma region of Estonia. Of the 19 regions with more than 25% immigrants, four are in Estonia and nine are in Latvia (in both countries, Russians are the minority group), one is in Australia, three are in Ukraine (also Russians), and two are in Switzerland.

Percent-immigrants carries a positive, and strongly significant coefficient in Model 2 relative to the other individual level predictors in the model. The corresponding odds ratio indicates that a unit increase in *percentage-immigrants* increases the probability of *cosmopolitanism* by a factor of 67%, controlling for other predictors. It is also important to note for Model 2 that the values of the coefficients, odds ratios, and standard errors of the individual-level predictor variables remain largely unchanged from the previous model. Most importantly, the region variance estimate remains insignificant while the random slope of *immigration* becomes significant (compare the coefficients in the two columns.) The increase in the size of the country variance estimate means that more of the variance of *cosmopolitanism* is now at the country level.

We add an interaction effect between *immigration* and *percent-immigrants* in order to try to account for the significant random effect of *immigration* at the region level. By multiplying *percent-immigrants* by *immigration*, we created a new variable: *supervenient*. *Supervenient* assigns '0' values to the 14.5% of the total respondents who expressed negative attitudes towards having immigrants as neighbors.

Of the findings displayed in Model 3 of Table 2, notable are the non-significant coefficients of *immigration* and *percent-immigrants*, along with the variance estimate of the region-level random slope of *immigration*. Adding *supervenient* to the model thus accounts for the random effect of *immigration* across regions as well as the effect of *percent-immigrants* at the individual level; the relationship between *cosmopolitanism* and *immigration* seems determined largely by the relative proportion of immigrants in the region where a respondent lives. These findings are, however, preliminary. A significant relationship between *cosmopolitanism* on the left, and *percent-immigrants* and *immigration* on the right-hand side of the regression equation may reappear as significant with the addition of further independent variables – the significance of *supervenient* may not completely explain, or control for, the effects of the other immigrant variables on *cosmopolitanism*. For this reason, we leave *percent-immigrants* and *immigrants* in subsequent models.

While the region-level variance estimate remains significant, it is difficult to devise a theoretical justification for constructing any more region-level variables with the data presently available. Limitations to adding more region-level variables include differences in sampling designs across countries where region size and political form are not parallel. Some sub-country regions do not correspond to existing juridical units for which data from state and local governments might be obtained in order to construct additional region-level variables. It is however possible to draw from other data sources in constructing country-level variables in attempting to account for the remaining country-level variance of about 5.2%.

Theoretical constructions of cosmopolitanism as the purveyance of the global elite in globalization leads to the notion that people living in the contemporary and historical European core of the world economy may be relatively more likely to express a cosmopolitan sense of belonging to the world than residents of other less-privileged and less-connected world regions. We tested this expectation by constructing three country-level dummy variables for country locations in different macro-regions, Europe, CIS, and Latin America (Table 3). The fourth reference category is a mix of countries from various regions, which controls for the effects of adding the three new variables into the precedent model.

Model 4 in Table 2 displays the results of adding the world-regional variables. Two further country-level measures, openness to trade and the 1997 United Nations HDI score, are added. The raw scores for (imports + exports /GDP) across the 21 countries in the model has a

Table 3
Sample country locations in world regions

Europe	Latin America	Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	Other
Germany	Argentina	Belarus	Nigeria
Finland	Peru	Ukraine	Australia
Switzerland	Chile	Russia	USA
Spain	Venezuela	Georgia	Philippines
Lithuania		Armenia	
Latvia		Azerbaijan	
Estonia			

high positive skew of 0.74 so we log-transformed the scores. Anticipating *cosmopolitanism* to be related to country trade connectedness, we expect that this measure of country context would have a positive and significant coefficient when incorporated into the model.

Trade, however, is a significant and negative coefficient and its odds ratio indicates that a unit increase in *trade* decreases the likelihood of *cosmopolitanism* by 36% over the average. The negative relationship between greater economic openness and the probability of *cosmopolitanism* should be understood in terms of the economic contexts of the countries included in the model at the time the WVS was conducted. With a plurality of former Soviet Union countries in the model (9 of the 21), it is especially important to consider the contexts of mid-1990s East European economic and political transitions when interpreting the effect of *trade*. Measures of GDP and trade in these countries for these years are somewhat unreliable considering the enormous shadow economies inherited from the Soviet Union and the drastic restructuring of these economies and financial systems during the transition to capitalist market systems. Also, the drop in GDP had recently reached its lowest post-Soviet level (in the case of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) or was still declining in the CIS countries in the mid-1990s. The financial statistics from those years represent an untypical, tumultuous time when the level of economic production and trade in these countries was at a historically low point, even as large percentages of the national populations were looking to the rest of the world and the West, especially, for economic ties and means of gaining prosperity. Indeed, *CIS* membership becomes a significant measure of individual context as a predictor of cosmopolitanism only after *trade* is added to the model.

Putting both *trade* and *development* together with these country-level predictors into Model 4, we find that location in the *CIS* is a significant predictor of cosmopolitanism while location in *Latin America* is not. In this model, the coefficient of *Europe* is negative but insignificant, contradicting the expectation that *cosmopolitanism* will be more likely among respondents who live in Europe, the region at the contemporary and historical core of the world economy and one that is involved in its own cosmopolitan project of building a supranational polity.

As the country variance estimate is insignificant in Model 4, the addition of the country-level predictor vari-

ables therefore appears to explain the variation in model fit across country clusters, while partitioning more of the variance at the region level. The power of the model to predict *cosmopolitanism* across different region contexts is thus reduced. However, the addition of *trade* and *CIS* to the model means a better overall fit to the variance of *cosmopolitanism* (compare the log likelihood ratios). Perhaps the most interesting finding in this stage of model building is the significant effect of *CIS*, translating to an odds ratio of 44% greater likelihood of *cosmopolitanism*.

In the constrained final model with only significant predictors retained, (the findings are displayed in the last column of Table 2), removing *immigration*, *percent-immigrants*, *Europe*, and *Latin America* from the model results in a notable and expected change in the coefficient of *supervenient*. Also, the coefficient of *CIS* increases dramatically in size and significance. With a *supervenient* odds ratio of 23.59, a unit increase in the percentage of foreign-born respondents increases the likelihood of *cosmopolitanism* by an enormous factor. Though there is no margin of error associated with each region sample as representative of the region population, we should have some confidence in the significance of this result since the respondents were chosen at random in a nationally-representative sample.

Across the former Soviet Union, a greater propensity to express a sense of belonging to the world may involve a rescaling of territorial identity to fill a void among populations accustomed to identifying with a larger territorial whole in addition to more local geographical groups. The legacy of communist propaganda on the world-wide 'brotherhood of man' (*sic*) might also condition a greater propensity among persons in former Soviet Union countries to say that they belong to the world. Further, the former Soviet Union states that joined the *CIS* were less able to arrest economic collapse and political dislocation by reorienting their political and economic systems to the West, unlike Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. In the *CIS* states included in our model (see Table 3), governance at all levels, but especially at the national scale, was discredited by the turmoil following the fall of the Soviet Union. Expressions of belonging to the world in the *CIS* countries may in part result from looking abroad for different models of governance. Propositions such as these cannot be systematically explored in the absence of more qualitative data on the subjective meanings of individual expressions of belonging to the world. This is an important direction of future research on cosmopolitanism.

While the country variance estimate is now clearly insignificant, in the final model, there is unexplained variance still remaining at the region-level. The cross-regional variance estimate decreased in size from that observed in the null model (second column of Table 2). Where 8.5% of the unexplained variance of *cosmopolitanism* was in the null model found within region-clusters, this figure is reduced to 6.7% in the final model. Thus, the final model does not fit equally well across regions. It is unsurprising that a relatively small amount of variance of *cosmopolitanism*

Table 4
High/low residual values ranked by country means

Country	Mean	Low	High
Azerbaijan	1.08	−1.57	4.37
Russia	1.21	−0.58	3.48
Switzerland	1.29	−0.41	3.24
USA	1.35	−0.25	3.39
Ukraine	1.36	−0.85	3.39
Armenia	1.36	−0.75	3.94
Argentina	1.36	−0.38	3.39
Belarus	1.41	−0.61	3.99
Georgia	1.46	−0.86	3.45
Australia	1.64	−0.13	4.31
Latvia	1.75	−0.33	3.54
Venezuela	1.84	−0.25	4.45
Peru	1.88	−0.03	3.76
Estonia	1.89	−0.37	4.02
Philippines	1.90	0.34	3.69
Chile	1.92	−0.04	3.74
Lithuania	2.02	0.31	3.81
Germany	2.10	0.19	4.17
Spain	2.29	0.47	3.85
Finland	2.30	0.71	3.98
Nigeria	2.62	0.53	4.51

associated with country-context effects was explained by the model, while the more substantial region context effects were not. Further, that region contexts matter in the effort to conceptualize cosmopolitanism is interesting in itself.

A list of the residual values of the final model, equal to the predicted values of *cosmopolitanism* subtracted from the actual values of *cosmopolitanism* per respondent is displayed in Table 4, ranked from lowest to highest by their mean value per country, with a standard deviation of 0.44. No geographic clustering or systematic trends in the residuals are apparent which generates more confidence that the final model is not lacking any important predictors.

6. Conclusions

Cosmopolitans tend to be less patriotic, more positive about immigrants, more politically active, more environmentalist, slightly more highly educated, and a bit younger than the average of all WVS respondents. People who say that they “belong to the world” are more likely to be found in places where immigrants are a relatively larger portion of the population and in countries that are part of the CIS. Of course, an expression of belonging to the world might also be a negative expression of identity. Some cosmopolitans may simply choose not to identify with any local or national group. Some respondents may be repelled from identification with local and national groups due to failures of governance and drawn to identification with a world in pursuit of greater liberty or opportunity.

In the context of the theoretical explication of cosmopolitanism presented in the first part of this paper, our analysis contributes to understanding further the phenomenon of cosmopolitanism defined geographically as a sense

of belonging to the world. The burden of causality nevertheless remains heavy. Many of the results of the analysis fulfill theoretical expectations; for example, *supervenient* strongly supports inferences that the sense of ‘belonging to the world’ is consistently associated with a simultaneous respect for cultural difference and more contact with cultural Others for individual respondents. Further research to examine individual interactions with immigrants and within immigrant communities should provide greater support for this finding, and may shed greater light on the mode in which openness to, and contact with, cultural Others engenders a greater sense of belonging to the world.

The model of cosmopolitanism that we constructed successfully incorporates differences in cosmopolitanism across place contexts. Many values and attitudes found to be associated with cosmopolitanism are generally positive, such as a lack of xenophobia and a propensity to political activism. Yet, many of these values and attitudes are highly contested, such as a concern for the environment over economic growth or a tendency towards less patriotism. In the final analysis, the normative sense of world-place retains heterogeneity across different sub-country regions while the tendency to less patriotism among cosmopolitans seems to be a decisive factor in explaining variation in cosmopolitanism across countries, as predicted by ‘political cosmopolitanism’ theorists. Further exploration of ‘cultural cosmopolitanism’ and ‘cosmopolitan patriotism’ (Appiah, 1996) could take the form of further research that systematically examines differences in cosmopolitanism across respondents who express allegiances to the various other geographic groups in addition to belonging to the world.

The finding that relative youth conditions a greater likelihood of cosmopolitanism supports Norris’s (2000) notion that there may be a trend towards more cosmopolitanism with generational change. If such a trend holds in the future, we would expect that more and more people will increasingly contest the hegemony of nation-state ideology with their own visions of a coherent, ordered, and shared world-place where cultural difference is respected – a value that cosmopolitans tend to maintain. The rising sense of globality is therefore a source of optimism that more people living in a globalized world will take a more active role shaping a global social order where peace is the norm and the rights of individuals are upheld in the face of powerful interests.

Sources of pessimism on this point may also be drawn from our model. Living in countries that are more open to trade seems to condition a tendency to relatively less cosmopolitanism. As the world economy becomes more integrated in the future, cosmopolitans may increasingly disappear, perhaps turning to more local territorialities as objects of meaningful attachment. In this way, our model also suggests the possibility of a future dystopia as increasing economic and social interdependence engineers a backlash to globalization. The negative association between economic openness and trade should however be taken in

the context of political and economic transition in the former Soviet Union. The rescaling of territorial identity in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the fall of the Soviet Union would prove an interesting case study to extend the analysis which can be pursued with future WVS surveys.

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