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**GEOPOLITICS AT THE END OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY**
The Changing World Political Map

Editors

NURIT KLIOT AND DAVID NEWMAN



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Ordering the 'Crush Zone': Geopolitical Games in Post-Cold War Eastern Europe

JOHN O'LOUGHLIN

The mentality of the people in Central and Eastern Europe is characterized by a collective existential fear of a real or imaginary threat of national destruction due to loss of independence, assimilation, deportation or genocide.¹

Since 1989, one of the main regional foci of post-cold-war geopolitical debates has been eastern Europe.² After nearly five decades of ossification induced by the bipolar bloc system that descended on Europe in the late 1940s, the 'crush zone' between the large states of Germany and Russia has once more become a zone of contention. The new geopolitical quarrels within the western strategic community and between pro-NATO and pro-Russian commentators have spurred a renewed interest in the legacy of a debate that reaches back to the end of the last century. At that time, separatist aspirations in the multinational empires of Austro-Hungary and Russia were growing and the great-power rivalry between Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia and the USA was reaching new levels of military spending. Though much has changed in 100 years, especially the replacement of autocracies by democracies and the effacement of imperial borders, three geopolitical issues of late-twentieth-century eastern Europe would look familiar to an informed citizen of the late 1800s: great-power rivalry, military conflicts over the correspondence between national territories and state borders, and the delimitation of the eastern boundary of 'Europe'.

Some of the earliest and most influential geopolitical writings by Sir Halford J. Mackinder, Rudolf Kjellén and Karl Haushofer concerned the newly independent states of eastern Europe that emerged from the battles, truces and forcible settlements of the First World War. While these protagonists offered deeply contrasting policies for their respective countries, they agreed that the region between Berlin and Kiev was a linchpin in the quest for strategic control of Europe and that the Great Powers would continue to vie for dominance in this borderland. The continued strategic importance of eastern Europe was echoed in the opinions of a later generation of geopoliticians, writing in the chaos and

aftermath of the Second World War. Then, American strategists such as Nicholas Spykman, Robert Straus-Hupé and George F. Kennan had entered the geopolitical fray and centred their attention on the 'denial principle', that eastern Europe should not fall under the influence of a power that was inimical to American interests. Despite their writings, the Yalta agreement of 1943 sealed the lines of dominance, and eastern Europe was firmly placed in the Soviet zone of influence and geopolitical interest in the region waned as the superpower contest moved to the more unorganised strategic realms of the Third World.³ In 1989, the geopolitical game in eastern Europe was renewed as a result of the unexpected collapse of the Communist regimes and, subsequently, by the blatant attempts of the new post-Communist regimes to play their national cards for greatest territorial, economic and military advantage. We have thus re-entered an era of geopolitical uncertainty as major domestic and international debates about issues such as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion and Russia's relations with her neighbours in the 'Near Abroad' (countries formed from the republics of the former Soviet Union) draw pundits from all perspectives.

In this paper, I will revisit a key concern of the early years of political geography – how to fit a place into a geopolitical order.⁴ I will connect the geopolitical visions of external actors, in this case, those of American policymakers and commentators, with the foreign policies of contemporary east-central European states. Earlier geopolitical studies, such as the writings of Mackinder, Bowman, Haushofer and Fairgrieve, always connected the macro-perspective of geopolitics to the micro-scale policies for borders and territories.⁵ While not advocating a return to ethnocentric, state-centred geopolitical study, the linkage of geopolitical critique and policy analysis must continue. This paper is a return to classic geopolitical traditions without the national-patriotic baggage that has accompanied earlier, as well as contemporary, works.⁶

The review in this chapter of the contemporary debates in American foreign policy shows that controversies ebb and flow according to the nature and emphasis of the domestic agenda. Other feedback effects emanate from unanticipated developments in strategically important zones and in global economic relations. The short debate from late 1996 to early 1998 in the American political arena about NATO expansion into eastern Europe helps to highlight current political positions and geopolitical perspectives on offer. One of the dramatic features of the NATO debate was the relative lack of attention to historical antecedents and alternative perspectives.⁷ Though Russian opposition to NATO expansion as far as the border of the former Soviet Union was generally noted, the great diversity of opinion in that world power was generally simplified or dismissed in a condescending

manner. Furthermore, the geographical and historical mosaics of eastern Europe were ignored in the debate and a dichotomy of qualifiers and non-qualifiers for NATO membership summarised whatever attention was paid to the diversity of countries, regions, peoples and politics in the zone between the German and Russian borders.

Geopolitical Controversies in the American World-View

As the western triumphalism of the post-1989 period wanes with growing recognition of intractable territorial disputes that remain unresolved, a decade-long search for a new geopolitical paradigm in the USA has not yet uncovered one capable of 'ordering' a complex world system. This complexity, hidden to US strategists and policymakers blinded by the 'geographic' lens of the cold-war paradigm, now stands revealed; the US establishment, despite a wish to reorder the post-cold-war world, has not yet uniformly accepted a geopolitical code. The kind of domestic political consensus that emerged in the late 1940s around the 'containment' strategy is not yet evident for any of the proposals for the post-1989 world. Various new paradigms (for example, Huntington's 'civilizational' model)⁸ recognise global complexity and a new multipolarity of power, but none has broad political support. US geopolitics of the late 1990s resembles that of the 1920s; indecision and uncertainty in the aftermath of a victory in the First World War resulted in an isolationist withdrawal for two decades. Despite victory in the cold war, the realisation of expectations that have accrued and the limits on foreign-policy activities posed by domestic constraints (not the least of which is the disinterest of most Americans in affairs outside the borders of the USA) have complicated, rather than clarified, the USA's role in the world.

In an attempt to distinguish and highlight current debates, seven 'paradigms' are portrayed in Table 1. In my definition, a geopolitical paradigm is a general world perspective that is moulded by the relative importance and variety of American domestic interests *vis-à-vis* with the state of international relations and the international political economy. Paradigms tend to be associated with specific presidential administrations and become personalised by the global visions that each holder of the presidential office brings to power. 'Mental maps' are strongly influenced by early personal experiences, while others are changed by unexpected global shifts.⁹ More than anything else, paradigms offer a fairly abstract blueprint for dealing with international relations and determining the extent and level of US engagement with the world outside its borders.

In contrast to the general perspective, a geopolitical code is defined as 'a set of strategic assumptions that a government makes about other states in

making its foreign policy'.¹⁰ While highly ethnocentric and oriented to the perceived needs and interests of the state, geopolitical codes are nevertheless worthy of attention in the interpretation of foreign-policy actions. Codes are the spatial expressions of geopolitical efforts to transform a 'global space into fixed perspectival scenes, and as a two-dimensional register of space [they] would reveal some eternal truths about geography's relationship to politics'.¹¹ Thus, in order to understand the actions of the USA in post-1989 eastern Europe, we need to examine the place of the region in the competing geopolitical codes of the USA. Each of the respective geopolitical codes that are in vogue, under discussion or have been recently debated in Washington has a clear implication for the nature of the USA's response to changes in eastern Europe consequent on the collapse of Communism in 1989. Though Brown notes how postwar US strategists such as Dean Acheson, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Allen Dulles, Dwight Eisenhower, Alexander Haig, George F. Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, Paul Nitze and Walter Rostow were influenced by geopolitical theories, a position also held by Sloan, the case for the influence of these theories on US policymaking or plans seems stretched, anecdotal and not yet subject to rigorous analysis.¹² More likely, the general *Weltanschauung* of the times influenced both the geopolitical theorists and the policymakers and generated a geopolitical code that seemed theory based, but was more strongly linked to the operating paradigm in Washington.

The best-known geopolitical code is 'containment' and because its use in Europe and the Middle East in the early days of the cold war is generally viewed as a success of American foreign policy, containment's legacy is powerful and capable of projection to other times and places. Paradigms are not as separate and non-overlapping as a simple list might suggest. Expressions of paradigms often appear in the speeches of policymakers serving in US administrations and are not just issued from the White House. Many foreign-policy speeches mix elements of different paradigms in order to try to bolster public support for a policy, such as a military strike. President Ronald Reagan, for example, combined the 'eagle triumphant', 'world of regions', 'anti-imperialist', and '*noblesse oblige*' paradigms in his televised addresses in the 1980s that argued for support of the Nicaraguan Contras against the Sandinista regime.

Some caveats are in order here. Given the complexity and the shifting lines of geopolitical paradigms, as well as the infrequency of deliberative statements about changing perspectives on world affairs, identification and presentation of contemporary US paradigms must necessarily be imprecise. Overlap between perspectives makes exact identification of all paradigmatic options impossible, but the mix-and-match tendency of

speechwriters, often appealing to central tenets of American foreign policy such as the Monroe Doctrine (1823) helps to clarify positions. The seven paradigms listed in Table 1 were isolated after a close reading of official statements in State Department and White House documents, as well as the published writings of administration officials, presidential candidates, leaders in the US Senate and House, and former governmental officials (now foreign-policy pundits) such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, James Baker and Henry Kissinger. The list of paradigms is deliberately not exhaustive, nor do I claim that it represents a stable array of geopolitical doctrines.

The first paradigm in Table 1, '*noblesse oblige*', takes its title from a report of the Carnegie Endowment National Commission on America and the World. 'Twice before in this century, the United States and our allies triumphed in a global struggle. Twice before we earned the right to be an

TABLE 1
AMERICAN FOREIGN-POLICY PARADIGMS AND GEOPOLITICAL
CODES IN THE LATE 1990s

| Paradigm | Geopolitical Code | Policy |
|-------------------------------|--|---|
| 1. ' <i>Noblesse oblige</i> ' | Global reach with countries differentiated by need; idealist; for example, JFK's inaugural address | Promote US principles (democracy and the market); US military power and money |
| 2. 'US first' | Identification of 'rogue' states; anti-globalisation; isolationist; for example, Buchananism | Highly differentiated world with big commitments to a few key allies |
| 3. 'Declinist' | Shared effort with allies; careful selection of commitments; US as ' <i>primus inter pares</i> '; for example, Clinton | Withdraw troops; local allies pay; consult and enlarge the engagement; for example, Bosnia and Kosovo |
| 4. 'Contingency' | USA as global balancing wheel; no geopolitical code; every situation requires an 'ad hoc' response | Respond to crisis after it develops; for example, Somalia or Kosovo |
| 5. 'Eagle triumphant' | Globalist; force without diplomacy; world still dangerous; cold-war-style geopolitics; Pentagon view most important | 'Be prepared'; continued high military expenditure |
| 6. 'World of regions' | Identify key regions; regionalist view; focus on places that are important to US welfare; money, allies and troops | Focus on western and central Europe; Middle East; North East Asia |
| 7. 'Anti-imperialism' | Focus on future power emergence; exceptionalism; Russia as a threat; for example, NATO strategists | Continue containment of Russia and China; expand NATO |

arbiter of a post-war world. This is our third chance.'¹³ The general view of the American 'great and good' (the eastern foreign-policy establishment) is that 'only the United States can do it'; ultimately, only the USA can save the various peoples of the world from disasters of their own making. After a lot of dithering, the '*noblesse oblige*' theme was prominent in President Clinton's 1995 national address at the time of the decision to send troops to Bosnia: 'it's the right thing to do'.¹⁴ A similar perception seemed to have propelled the surprising intervention of the Bush administration in Somalia at Christmas 1992. As trial balloons, some Clinton appointees have suggested that there are some places of the world where the USA should not be taking the interventionist lead (for example, western Europeans should be in the vanguard in Bosnia and Kosovo) and only after the allies have dropped the ball, should the USA step in. Current examples of the idealist paradigm in action are the direct American promotion of peace negotiations in Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine, and the US lead in the bombing of Yugoslavia to stop Serb attacks on Kosovars.

The supreme example of this kind of 'obligations and burdens' rhetoric and approach to world affairs is President John F. Kennedy's inaugural address in January 1961, when he promised that the USA would 'pay any price, bear any burden' in defence of American values and support of 'freedom'. Earlier, in February 1947, President Truman declared that the USA would help any anti-Communist movements anywhere in the world that requested American help. The approach relies very much on the notion of American exceptionalism and the support for programmes and policies that expand the number of countries that share American principles of free markets, civil liberties and democratic societies. Dick Armev (Republican majority leader) in June 1995 (proposing a much reduced foreign aid bill) said, 'In the history of the world, no nation has ever so much loved freedom that their nation's people have been willing to risk their own peace to secure freedom for other nations... We are willing to put some part of our treasury behind the dream of freedom and peace for all the world's people.' But rhetoric and reality frequently do not coincide. The debate about foreign aid is a good example. Recent surveys show that American respondents believe that it accounts (on average) for 15 per cent of the federal budget. The actual figure is about one per cent and, interestingly, the average level of support, according to the survey respondents, should be five per cent.¹⁵

In the USA, the level of interest and concern with foreign questions is now (1999) at an all-time low since the Second World War. Normally, more than ten per cent will cite a foreign-policy issue as a response to the question 'What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today?' The most recent figure is two per cent. On the other hand, 65 per cent of the respondents to a recent Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

poll believe that the USA should play 'an active role' in world affairs.¹⁶ Since the 'obligations' can occur in any region of the world, there is no specific geopolitical code associated with this paradigm. Instead, US reach and concern stretches to all corners of the earth, even to previously invisible (in the US public's consciousness) states such as Somalia.

The second paradigm is often now associated with Pat Buchanan, the right-wing Republican presidential candidate noted for his opposition to the North American Free Trade Area and other perceived infringements on US autonomy. We can ascribe this paradigm as 'anti-internationalism' and its catch phrase seems to be 'no aid, no casualties'. With deep and wide support in the Republican party beyond the right wing, this world-view is deeply suspicious of international institutions and especially of the United Nations. While some Americans, especially those in the militias, are rabidly suspicious of non-Americans agencies such as the UN, this paradigm is not exactly the same as isolationism. As noted by Lawrence Eagleburger, former under-secretary of state, 'Isolationism means a pox on both your houses, don't get involved. I don't think that is what most [Americans] are. They have no real knowledge [of foreign affairs]. They don't care about it. They're focused on domestic problems.'¹⁷ The suspicious basis of this paradigm is well illustrated by the statement by Senator Phil Gramm (Republican, Texas), a former presidential candidate, on foreign aid: 'The US is like a little rich kid in the middle of a slum with a cake, handing out slices yet receiving in return resentment rather than gratitude.' He proposed, instead, that the US should keep the cake, but share the recipe of democracy and market economics.

The liberal Democratic faction is also not immune from similar views. Another former presidential candidate, Reverend Jesse Jackson, has complained of the cost to US taxpayers of the stationing of American troops overseas and how the money could be better used for domestic programmes. One result has been the successful pressure on countries to pay part of the costs of the stationing of US troops in their country. The practical geopolitical output of this approach to foreign affairs is strong loyalty to a few favoured states (Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel). Other states either do not register as important places in the US geopolitical orbit or they are rich enough to pay substantially for the stationing of US troops (Japan, South Korea and Germany).

The third paradigm starts from a 'declinist' view that accepts that the USA has slipped from its immediate postwar dominance and now needs the support of allies to promote its global aims. Though the evidence for US decline is mixed and it is clear that the USA stands alone as the military hegemon,¹⁸ there is a widespread perception that the USA can no longer afford all the 'burdens' that President Kennedy was willing to assume in

1961. Consequently, the USA promotes a shared global leadership. As a leading paradigm in Washington DC during the Clinton administration, it holds that the USA is still '*primus inter pares*'. Since global conditions have changed with the growing relative parity of many US allies and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the paradigm holds that other countries of the western camp must share in the global costs of management of the world system in the interests of democracy and free enterprise. The clearest expression of this position was former Secretary of State Warren Christopher's enunciation of four principles. 'First, America must lead. Second, we must seek to maintain productive political and economic relations with the world's most powerful states. Third, we must adapt and build lasting institutions to enhance cooperation. Fourth, we must support democracy and human rights to advance our interests and our ideals.'¹⁹ Like the '*noblesse oblige*' paradigm, the declinist perspective has no specific geopolitical code, though events in countries close to the USA and in Europe attract more attention.

The notion of 'shared leadership' in a kind of regionalised world has been mentioned many times, especially in connection to Bosnia and Kosovo. For more than two years, 1993-95, Clinton administration officials claimed that the Bosnian conflict was intrinsically a 'European question' and the European states should take the lead in resolving the conflict. In the USA, idealists called for more US actions to stop the fighting and for open support for the Bosnian government at a time when the UN and European Union negotiators were trying to ensure a cease-fire. The 'declinist school' has been heavily criticised by the 'American Firsters', who believe that this approach relies too heavily on 'multilateral institutions', especially the UN, of which they are deeply suspicious. However, the overwhelming majority of Americans (74 per cent) believe that 'the US should play a shared leadership role'.²⁰ The eventual cease-fire in Bosnia in 1995, propelled by US air bombing and later insertion of US-European ground troops, is typical of the approach to crises that will likely emanate from this paradigm, which relies heavily on a shared ideology and closely agreed military operational strategies.

The fourth paradigm does not start from a fixed position, but treats each situation *de novo*. Each situation is viewed as 'contingent' and, therefore, no geopolitical code can be predetermined. Dismissed as 'ad hocery' by critics such as former Senator and Republican presidential nominee, Robert Dole, it is partially a result of the current (1999) impasse in Washington DC as Congressional power in foreign affairs continues to grow. Until the First World War, Congress was hardly visible in foreign affairs as such issues were considered essentially to be a presidential prerogative. After blocking US entry to the League of Nations in the early 1920s, Congress began to

become more assertive. Despite President Bush's claim of a 'New World Order' at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the Clinton administration is visibly dismayed by the chaotic nature of the world system in all its varied regional manifestations. The foreign-policy outcome is thus a kind of 'contingency' paradigm rather than an imposition of some sort of global vision on the complex world mosaic. For the first two years of the Clinton administration, the president was focused on domestic affairs and so was the public. The phrase 'It's the economy, stupid' echoed through the 1994 re-election campaign. Lawrence Eagleburger said it best in 1991, after the USA was victorious in the Gulf War: 'it [the USA] finished the war out of breath'. The contingency paradigm can be considered as an extension of the previous declinist view that assumes that local 'policemen' will resolve regional issues, and only after they fail will the USA step in when the conditions and events demand. Somalia, Kosovo and Bosnia are good examples of this progression as these situations were viewed in the USA as humanitarian crises arising as a direct result of UN failures. The USA came riding to the rescue after other options expired, and therefore, no geopolitical code is needed. The actions of the USA in this regard are those of a 'lite power, with a lot of airy rhetoric in its diplomacy and not much kick'.²¹

The fifth paradigm can be termed 'eagle triumphant' and offers a globalist perspective on a 'dangerous world'. It portrays a continued cold-war-style geopolitics accompanied by high military expenditures. It retains a classic 'force without diplomacy' policy, which can be as ineffective as 'diplomacy without force', supposedly the dominant foreign-policy instrument of the early years of the Clinton administration. As a blunt foreign-policy instrument, the globalist view is not now in vogue in Washington and its most visible recent expression was the sounding of the 'triumphalist' notes at the end of the Gulf War (victory parades and so on). The 'Vietnam syndrome' (the public-opinion restraint on US military actions) was supposedly ended at the end of the Gulf War when President George Bush declared: 'We have finally kicked the Vietnam syndrome.' But the Somalia and Kosovo episodes question whether the Vietnam syndrome has indeed been kicked.²² Use of cruise missiles (as in the August 1998 attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan) and bombers based in safe havens are especially attractive to the proponents of the globalist paradigm as it offers power projection without casualties. The political instability in the former Soviet Union and continuing civil strife in more than 40 locations provides 'evidence' for the dangerous-world perspective. But without a clear and consistent presence of an archenemy, such as the Soviet Union during the five decades of the cold war, this paradigm is hardly credible or sustainable. The geopolitical code associated with the globalist paradigm is global in scope, but differentiated by the relative importance of the allies and foes of

the USA. The geographic externalities of foreign-policy actors in these states are explicitly considered and the code does not differ much from that of the Reagan presidency in the 1980s.

A sixth paradigm offers a regionalist alternative to the globalist view and identifies the key regions of Europe, the Middle East and North-East Asia as places most important to the USA. This regionally differentiated world-view harks back to the perspective of George F. Kennan in his 'X' article in 1947.²³ It is especially neglectful of the rest of the Third World and is motivated by the major concerns that were identified in a recent national public-opinion survey. Key threats to the USA were identified as nuclear attack (72 per cent named this item), high immigration (72 per cent) and international terrorism (69 per cent). Asked to identify the places where the USA has a 'vital interest', respondents in 1994 listed Japan (85 per cent), Saudi Arabia (83 per cent), Russia (79 per cent), Mexico (76 per cent), Canada (76 per cent), Great Britain (69 per cent) and China (68 per cent) as the top seven countries, while states such as Egypt (45 per cent), France (39 per cent), Ukraine (35 per cent) and Poland (31 per cent) were well down the list. Four regions matter consistently on these national surveys: North-East Asia (the two Koreas, Japan and China); the Middle East (Saudi Arabia above all other states including Israel); Europe, both central (including Russia) and western; and the Caribbean, including Mexico.²⁴ The rest of the world has little importance except as 'emerging markets' for US products. Senator R. Dole expressed the linkage between important regional interests and US welfare.²⁵ For him, the core interests of the USA are 'preventing the domination of Europe by a single power; maintaining a balance of power in East Asia; promoting security and stability in our hemisphere; preserving access to natural resources especially in the energy heartland of the Persian Gulf; strengthening international free trade and expanding US access to global markets; and protecting American interests and properties overseas'. The continued centrality of Europe, including eastern Europe, in this paradigm is a mainstay of a differentiated geopolitical code and recognises both global complexities and the varied relevance of foreign places to the USA.

The final paradigm in Table 1 returns to a world of 'great powers' and treats the USA as the leader of the western bloc coming into conflict with an oppositional Russia and an assertive China. In a sense, it is a return to the bipolar world order of the cold-war years, but the identification of the 'other' is not yet revealed. In any case, it would require ringing the opponent with allies and a containment ring. With the growing uncertainty of the success of the economic and political transitions in Russia and the growing belief that Russia is a 'third world country with nuclear weapons', there is ample opportunity for a return of the 'anti-Sovietism' of the cold-

war years. This scenario is even more plausible if the leaders strongly favoured by the USA (the cabal gathered around President Yeltsin) fail to win the continued support of the Russian population and are replaced in an election or a *coup d'état*. This alarmist view of Russia is predicated on the belief that contemporary Russia is the inheritor of the expansionist Russian tradition of hundreds of years. It is especially concerned to push NATO expansion to the borders of Russia, despite the strong opposition of Russians of all political stripes. It anticipates cold-war redux and promotes a geopolitical code based on a bipolar and simple world order. In a return to containment, the USA should fit countries into a geopolitical code that expresses again the half-moon (rimland) of the distribution of American support and attention during the cold war.

The distinctiveness and clarity of these paradigms are rarely evident to the various commentators trying to understand the foreign policy of the USA in the post-cold-war years; they have typically noted the lack of clarity and consistency. Examining the geopolitical codes of Madeline Albright (Clinton's second Secretary of State), Jan Nijman notes that, in comparison to American-born policymakers, those of European origin (Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Albright) have a more nuanced, cynical and less idealist perspective.²⁶ A British journalist, Martin Walker, dismissed the Clinton administration's foreign policy as the 'geopolitics of casual sex', claiming that it involved the 'promiscuous and irresponsible use of US military force without lasting commitment'. Force would only be used in places where quick, casualty-free wins would be certain.²⁷ Recent cruise-missile attacks on Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan ('force without diplomacy or casualties') supports Walker's contention.

Major foreign-policy debates have not been prominent in Washington or more broadly in the American body politic since the end of the cold war. Domestic issues have not only dominated political debate, but the sense of peace and security induced by sustained economic growth and a lack of visible threats to Americans at home has not been shaken by terrorist attacks or so-called 'rogue states' such as Iraq, North Korea or Libya. The military budget and overseas troop numbers are down significantly in the past decade (a decrease of about one-third, from an expenditure of \$375 billion (1995 dollars) to \$260 billion), though that trend will soon reverse.²⁸ US force levels in East Asia (about 100,000 personnel, mainly in Japan and South Korea) are to be maintained, as are those in Europe (nearly 100,000 plus amphibious forces). The objective, however, remains to be 'capable of prevailing in two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts' in the words of the 1998 US Department of Defense Budget Statement. Concurrent bombing of Yugoslavia and Iraq in spring 1999 is viewed as offering a test of this proposition.

Geopolitical Codes and Eastern Europe

No issue has clarified current geopolitical posturings in the USA like the 1996-98 debate about expansion of NATO into central Europe to admit Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and the associated arguments about the USA's role in Europe, especially in the Balkans. Involvement on the European continent as the dominant power in NATO is widely accepted all across the American political spectrum; the debate begins when the specific implications of that involvement come to the forefront of foreign-policy issues. A key element for US policymakers, as for Europeans, is the definition of Europe: which countries meet the criteria for entry into European institutions and which should remain outside Europe, either temporarily or permanently? As noted from the public opinion polls, major European countries are widely accepted as places to which US foreign policy must be directed. The historic association and links between Europe and the USA have been the main axle of US foreign policy, as noted by President Clinton in his major foreign-policy addresses on NATO expansion and on the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. The conundrum of balancing strategic commitment to western Europe while avoiding long-term military involvement in the ethnic wars to the east continues to perplex US strategists. Further expansion of NATO and admission of all qualified states to western institutions remains the cornerstone of US policy. Even Serbia is considered a potential ally. 'Our Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe. NATO is an essential pillar of a wider community of shared values and shared responsibility. Working together, Allies and Partners, including Russia and Ukraine, are developing their cooperation and erasing the divisions imposed by the Cold War to help to build a Europe whole and free, where security and prosperity are shared and indivisible.'²⁹ To examine this conundrum further, the positions of the various players in the NATO-expansion debate will be examined in light of contemporary political and economic changes in the countries of eastern Europe and in light of the historic significance of this region in geopolitical writings and strategic plans.

As domestic events in the USA continue to dominate public attention, eastern Europeans jockey for geopolitical positioning in international fora. The division of Europe into a 'fast-track' incorporation into the western institutions of the European Union and NATO versus 'the others', who are either put into long membership queues (the fate of Turkey for more than a decade) or deemed not to have the free markets and politics necessary for membership of the 'West', can now be anticipated. A recent visit by Leonid

Kuchma. President of Ukraine, to the EU summit in Vienna clarifies the risks, strategies and obstacles inherent in the pending classification of countries as eligible and ineligible. Kuchma, like other eastern European leaders, views EU membership as 'an absolute priority for Ukraine' and wants Ukraine to become an associate member of the EU immediately, an option that would reduce tariffs on Ukrainian exports to the EU. For his part, Kuchma tried to portray Ukraine as making steady progress toward a market economy. Significantly, Kuchma opposed a new visa regime on the Polish-Ukrainian border that would treat Ukrainians in the same way as Polish border guards currently treat Russians and Belarussians. Poland, now a NATO member and in the front of the EU queue, has clearly been accepted as 'European' and Kuchma complained that 'the trouble does exist and it troubles us from the point of view of this new splitting of Europe'. Furthermore, Kuchma emphasised Ukraine's non-aligned status with respect to NATO enlargement, but believed that Ukraine must 'move to Euroatlantic structures and the EU as the only alternative to a return to the past'.³⁰

Fears and aspirations such as Kuchma's are found from Tallinn to Sofia. To strengthen the case for admission, the depth and length of the European legacy of each country is stressed, most visibly in the new history and geography texts now appearing.³¹ In Ukraine, rapprochement with Poland and the other central European states is viewed as an intermediate step toward incorporation into the West and toward separation from Russia. The states that emerged from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire stress their western democratic credentials and fear that the economic problems of the countries to the east might be contagious. As a result, they work to preserve their differences with Ukraine.³² Overlooked in the triumphalism and joy that accompanied the destruction of the Iron Curtain, the important boundary that separated the Soviet Union from the other eastern European states remains largely intact, with barbed-wire fences and severe restrictions on the movements of goods and people. The post-Soviet governments in Belarus and Ukraine have also maintained tight control of the border crossings to collect tariffs and customs duties and have engaged in intensive struggles with local power elites for control of the lucrative grey trade.³³

For geopolitical students, of course, this debate about the character and orientation of the eastern European states elicits an overwhelming sense of *déjà vu*. Eastern Europe is a classic borderland in two senses. At the macro-scale, 'Europe's' limits are generally believed to lie somewhere between the Vistula and the Dnieper, as seen prominently in Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* thesis.³⁴ But at the meso-scale within the region, there are almost innumerable limological uncertainties because of centuries of turmoil, settlement, ethnic cleansing, truce lines, state formation and

truces.³⁵ Applebaum, in a brilliant travel book, notes that at the peace conferences after the First World War, borders were to be rationally drawn through plebsicities, treaties, and border demarcation. In the end, however, 'borders in the borderlands were drawn by force. During the five-year course of the Russian civil war, no less than eleven armies ... fought for possession of Ukraine.'³⁶ The linkage between the macro-geopolitics of great powers and the micro-geopolitics of contested territories was clearly made by Karl Haushofer, promoting his notion of 'movable frontiers'.³⁷ He perceived borders as temporary battle-lines that moved depending on the relative strengths of the competing neighbouring states. Consequent on the weakening of empires (as happened to Wilhelmine Germany and Tsarist Russia in the First World War), the victors, by creating new states, expected the borderlands to be able to express their own cultures and identities. Decades of war and forced population shifts have now created a 'minority-free' zone of states where minorities constitute less than five per cent of national totals. The zone now covers 15 states (instead of six in 1910), and forms a compact region from The Netherlands to Hungary and from Norway to Slovenia. Conversely, the number of minorities in the European states (Atlantic to Urals) is now 150, 40 per cent higher than it was in 1910, as increasing numbers of states have produced more minorities stranded on the wrong side of the boundaries.³⁸

The apposition of land-powers to sea-powers has a century-long legacy in political geography, though Halford Mackinder traced it back to the classical civilisations of the Greeks and the Persians. Like Mackinder, ('who commands Eastern Europe commands the Heartland'),³⁹ Fairgrieve identified eastern Europe as a buffer zone. The 'buffer zone' principle was developed by Lord Curzon, based on his personal experience in central Asia, and his intent to separate the expanding Russian and British empires of the nineteenth century. Before and after the First World War, eastern Europe was promoted by geopolitikers as a buffer to separate the German and Russian empires. Fairgrieve popularised the term 'crush zone'; this zone of small states in eastern Europe, though separating the two big states, was unstable and precarious due to internal dynamics and external pressures. 'With the organisation of the heartland and the sea-powers, a crush zone of small states has gradually come into existence between them.... With sufficient individuality to withstand absorptions, but unable or unwilling to unite with others to form any larger whole, they remain in the unsatisfactory position of buffer states, precariously independent politically, and more surely dependent economically. This zone of states ... has included Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, ... the Balkan states.... Central Europe, unorganized and broken into small and antagonistic communities, essentially belongs to the crush zone, but organized and

powerful is in a very different position.⁴⁰ Turning the idea of the buffer zone on its head, Saul Cohen has recently argued that eastern and central Europe can be an emerging gateway region, a transitional zone that could facilitate contact and interchange between the two realms (Maritime and Continental).⁴¹

The boundaries of 'Europe' have been gradually moving to the east since 1900. The Russian empire first and the Soviet Union later were unable to make their imperial projects stick in the central European area, and the end result was a proliferation of small states west of Russia. 'The territory of Russia is now smaller than it has been at any time since the late seventeenth century.'⁴² Anticipating Huntington's 'clash of civilizations', the Germanophile geopolitiker, Rudolf Kjellén, referred to the divide between Europe and Russia as the 'Great Cultural Divide' and talked about a union of small central European states under German leadership (German-Slavic Union of States) sitting in opposition to the Russian empire.⁴³ Various geopolitical models for ordering international relations have been proposed since the end of the cold war and assorted geopolitical codes emanate from their spatial expressions. Among the most interesting is the replacement of the bipolar world of the cold war by 'a power-political hierarchy with its centre in Brussels – or alternatively in one of several major West European capitals – with concentric circles extending outwards from the central West European cosmos to the increasingly chaotic regions in the periphery'. This interpretation sees the 'friend-foe' divide along the Iron Curtain of the cold-war years superseded by a 'cosmos-chaos' divide separating the cosmos of the EU or NATO from chaotic eastern Europe and Russia. In relation to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia also appears as a cosmos and Moscow as the centre, with concentric zones of dominance and influence.⁴⁴ Unlike the cold-war years, the 'other' is not an implacable foe but a region of 'chaos', more threatening in many respects because the expectation and norms of the great-power geopolitical games do not apply. The geopolitical code of NATO expansion is thus not territorial aggrandisement, as is normally the goal of geopolitical manoeuvrings, but, instead, the promotion of an economic and political agenda to expand the range of the democratic world, centred on Brussels in the case of Europe. Russia, above all, constitutes the chaotic alternative, and if Europe turns its back on the Orthodox/Eurasian/Russian world, we move firmly to a 'cold peace'.⁴⁵

Viewed from the East, the extension of NATO membership and the associated delimitation of the 'West' have had the appearance of a one-sided discussion. Though the USA and the other NATO states issued numerous assurances that enlargement was not directed toward containing Russia, Russian public opinion was not convinced and the suspicions of NATO

intentions have reached across the ideological divides. For many westernised Russians, a new division of central and eastern Europe is particularly troublesome. Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma, noted that 'the already tense situation is aggravated by the attempts of some presumptuous circles in the Ukrainian political elite to draw a new *de facto* border between the West and the East – somewhere along the Don River as the ancient Greeks did – thus making Ukraine into some kind of "front line of Western civilization"'.⁴⁶

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, one general perspective and four broad geopolitical tendencies can be identified in Russia. The idea of Russia as a Eurasian country (a world unto itself, neither East nor West) is growing beyond its traditional adherents.⁴⁷ The grand debate in Russia about whether Russia is part of the European-western world or the centre of a separate Eurasian sphere has generated four opinion blocks. The 'westerners', such as Vladimir Lukin, want to be part of the Atlantic-European community, though the opponents (nationalists) see westernism as the root of Russia's problems ('neo-democrats' in the language of Brzezinski and Sullivan). The perspectives of the centrists and Communists are less dogmatic, but veer toward the western and the Eurasian ideologies, respectively.⁴⁸ A shared belief that NATO enlargement institutionalises a new European wall, bringing it closer to Russia's border, links the otherwise disparate perspectives.⁴⁹

The western debate about NATO enlargement, short and cursory as it was, took little account of divergent Russian opinions or the historical background of east-central Europe. Its proponents stressed the benefits to the alliance and to the three countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) selected from the list of applicants and would-be aspirants, while continuing to promise that other countries could join in the future. A crystallisation of geopolitical codes was expected during the NATO enlargement debate, especially in the USA, but the debate seems to have had no lasting impact in an era of 'parachute journalism'. As will be argued in the next section, a strenuous avoidance of geopolitical metaphors that are implicit in many of the paradigms in Table I limited the NATO-expansion debate to estimated costs (economic and military), the wish to support new democracies, and a definition of new roles for NATO. In a time of no obvious external threats to American citizens, it is difficult to engage the sustained attention of the public and of the politicians in foreign policy. The NATO-enlargement vote in the US Senate was overwhelmingly positive, but the legacy of the decision will extend significantly, far more than the focus of the debate.

American Geopolitical Codes, the NATO Debate and the Legacy of Geopolitics

As agreed by NATO member states in 1995, prospective members had to meet four criteria for admission, namely (a) demonstrating adherence to democracy, (b) accepting alliance principles, including mutual defence assistance, (c) showing a capability and readiness to contribute to NATO's security functions, and (d) bearing the responsibilities of NATO membership, including any necessary increases in military spending. States were invited to apply for possible membership and 11 countries (Albania, the Czech Republic, Estonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) entered into dialogue with the NATO partners. Ultimately, three states (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) were accepted for membership beginning in March 1999.

In a report to the US Congress in February 1997 on the 'rationale, benefits, costs and implications' of the enlargement of NATO, the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs of the State Department made the case for NATO expansion into east-central Europe. Among the myriad of benefits of expansion were listed 'the broader goal of a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe'. Other benefits to the West that were specifically identified were 'democratic reforms', a 'stronger defence capability', 'improved burden-sharing', a 'better environment for trade, investment and economic growth', and 'improved relations among the region's states'. Of the total costs of expansion, European allies would be expected to pay \$18-23 billion over ten years, while the USA would be expected to pick up about \$9-12 billion in additional costs. The report to Congress stressed the minimal costs to the American taxpayer of NATO expansion and it also downplayed any extra financial burdens that might be placed on the applicant countries. The report briefly noted the opposition of the Russian government and people, but stressed that the expansion was not directed against any one country and was designed to assure the stability and democracy of east-central Europe. 'Thus far, Moscow has pursued a two-tracked policy. On the one hand, the Russian government and political elite continue to voice opposition to enlargement. On the other hand, President Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Primakov and other senior Russian officials are now engaging in an intensive dialogue with the US, other key allies and NATO about the enlargement process and prospects for developing the NATO-Russia relationship.'⁵⁰ The report further asserted that Russian public opinion was relatively indifferent to the issue of NATO expansion.

Fundamentally, the pro-enlargement argument was based on the 'New Strategic Concept' for NATO developed in 1991, which 'moved beyond the

Cold War NATO stress on positioned forward defense to place a new emphasis on the development of multinational force projection, supported from extended lines of communication and relying on deployable and flexible logistics support capabilities for crisis management operations. Since then, NATO has taken steps to put these ideas into practice. It has led to the military mission in former Yugoslavia.⁵¹ Only a half-page in the report was devoted to the wider geopolitical implications of the expansion under the heading 'Putting geopolitical costs in perspective'. In this section, the main emphasis was on the message that failure to expand would deliver to the NATO applicants, including the assertion that such an action 'would falsely revalidate the old and now-arbitrary divisions of the Cold War at a time when Western policy is committed to overcome them. The resulting sense of isolation and vulnerability would be destabilizing to the region.'⁵²

Numerous critics in the West of NATO enlargement generally have also avoided a geopolitical argument, emphasising instead economic, cultural, military and strategic costs. Amongst the anti-enlargement arguments were (a) the increased nuclear danger because of the failure of the Russian Duma to ratify the START II treaty, (b) the increased military costs of forces' integration with the new members (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) and with the USA, (c) confusion in the NATO mission as it switches from a North Atlantic to a North American and western and central European alliance, (d) the alienation of populations in countries not offered membership (Bulgaria, Rumania and the Baltic states), (e) the strengthening of the anti-West factions in Russia, and (f) the further alienation of Russia as future NATO expansion is planned in parts of the former Soviet Union.⁵³

The geopolitical argument, that NATO enlargement risks the delimitation of a new dividing line in Europe, was made most forcibly by George F. Kennan. On one side of a new geopolitical divide would be the 19 members of NATO and on the other side, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. With plans for future incorporation of the Baltic states, this division could become even more controversial because of the presence of ethnic Russians in these states and the growing sense of encirclement that would undoubtedly grow across the Russian political spectrum, with a subsequent growing appeal of the anti-West blocs. Kennan called NATO expansion the 'most fatal error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era'.⁵⁴ As Nijman argues persuasively, the current US administration, under the leadership of Secretary of State Madeline Albright (a native of the Czech Republic), has deliberately avoided a geopolitical quarrel and moved the debate instead to geography, suggesting that the new members are part of a democratic, capitalist, historical Europe.⁵⁵ What was most noticeable was the *historical* nature of the NATO discussion in the USA. By contrast, a pro-expansion argument resting on traditional geopolitical arguments by the

central European émigrés, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, stood out dramatically.⁵⁶

As was shown earlier in this paper, the 'crush zone' of east-central Europe figured prominently in the geopolitical codes of the Great Powers from the late-nineteenth century to 1945. After a half-century of relative obscurity due to the clear domination of the Soviet Union in the region, the geopolitical strategists once again have the chance to consider '*Mittleuropa*' in all its regional dimensions. While Russian strategists and political leaders clearly want to keep central Europe as a neutral or transition zone, the West in the guise of NATO wants to incorporate the region firmly into the European world. Rather than accepting or even debating the proposition that the area between the Oder and the Dnieper has always been a 'shatterbelt' or 'crush zone', western leaders, such as Madeline Albright, claim that NATO expansion into this region returns it to Europe, in effect releasing the '*occident kidnappé*', in Milan Kundera's phrase.⁵⁷ The near total avoidance of geopolitical language and concepts is both clever and short-sighted; historical geopolitical memories in the region could eventually undermine the strategic decision to expand NATO or at least, the challenges sown by the geopolitical fragments that continue to resonate in the region could tie NATO down in more Kosovo-like conflicts.

Conclusions

Gerjan Dijkink defines a geopolitical vision as 'any idea concerning the relation between one's own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy'.⁵⁸ Both Dijkink and David Campbell argue that there is a pervasive connection in US foreign policy between the fear of disunity at home and the fear of unrest abroad in countries and regions in which the USA has a strategic interest.⁵⁹ The end of the cold war has clouded the clarity of a divide between self and other. Conservative American commentators decry the resulting 'hollow hegemony' as the USA has 'lost faith in its own ideals'.⁶⁰ To the average American, the world appears more confusing, chaotic and unruly than ever before and no amount of US foreign aid or military assistance appears to be able to bring it to order.

For scholars writing in the critical geopolitical tradition, the foreign policy of the USA provided an easy foil in the years of the cold war. In the post-cold-war dilemmas posed by the bloody events in Bosnia, Chechnya and other nationalist battlegrounds, the USA has been caught between intervention, now promoted by humanitarians to prevent more 'holocausts', and isolationism, supported by most of the public who are fearful of another

Vietnam-style 'quagmire'.⁶¹ The lack of consensus is clearly reflected in the menu of geopolitical codes that are currently on offer (Table 1). As a consequence of the uncertain global role for the USA, critical geopolitical works have become less 'critical' and more speculative. As the foreign-policy ground keeps shifting and geopolitical debate is assiduously avoided, critics of US foreign policy find themselves with little recourse except either to bemoan the lack of attention to foreign events on the part of a great power or to try to comprehend an erratic policy.

Classic geopolitical concepts, such as the 'crush zone' or 'shatterbelt', do not change meaning or location, except over the long haul. The absence of geopolitical memory, now endemic in the US foreign-policy establishment, requires that political geographers explain the importance of geopolitical precedents and regional legacies. No place has a more troubled and prominent history of local and international conflict than eastern Europe, and the attempt to patch over the legacy of these wars through the extension of NATO to the Polish eastern border does not resolve the issue of where Europe ends. As the Ukrainian political establishment clamours that their country is (historically) an integral part of Europe and plans to extend NATO to the Baltic states in the future augur a shift of the 'European' border to the east, a new geopolitical divide seems destined to appear on either the western or eastern border of Ukraine. The future geography of 'Europe' thus remains undecided and there appears little chance that it will ever include 'unruly' Russia. At this historical juncture, the Clinton administration has tried to avoid taking a stand while sweeping away out of sight the geopolitical debris of past wars and the geopolitical uncertainties of contemporary foreign relations.

NOTES

1. A. Miller, 'Europe's East or East of Europe' (*Vostok Evropa ili na vostok iz Evropa*). *Pro et Contra* 3/2 (1998) p.5 (in Russian).
2. In this paper, I will refer to the region between the Oder and the Dnieper by various names. Though the term 'eastern Europe' is most widely used in English to describe the area, other terms that are commonly used include 'east-central Europe', '*Mittleuropa*' and 'central Europe'. By most accounts, the region includes the former Communist countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Romania and the three Baltic states (Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania). Though physically part of the Oder-Dnieper world, the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad is typically not included in the region and neither are the Balkan states of the former Yugoslavia and Albania.
3. The geopolitical manoeuvrings of the USA and the Soviet Union in the Third World during the second cold war, 1979-85, are described in J. O'Loughlin, 'World-power competition and local conflicts in the Third World', in R. J. Johnson and P. J. Taylor (eds.), *A World in Crisis* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986) pp.289-332.
4. The concept of 'geopolitical order' is elaborated in P. J. Taylor, 'Geopolitical world orders', in P. J. Taylor (ed.), *The Political Geography of the Twentieth Century* (London: Belhaven Press 1993) pp.33-61.

5. Among these studies are H.J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (London: Constable 1919); K. Haushofer, *Grenzen in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung* (Berlin: Karl Vowinckel Verlag 1927); I. Bowman, *The New World. Yonkers on the Hudson* (New York: World Book Company 1921); and J. Fairgrieve, *Geography and World Power* (London: University of London Press 1915).
6. For examples of state-centred geopolitical analyses, the reader can look at any issue of *Strategic Review*, *Journal of Strategic Studies* or any of the main foreign-affairs journals, such as *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *Orbis*, *World Policy Journal*, *Washington Quarterly* or *International Organization*.
7. George F. Kennan was a notable exception to this statement. In his opposition to NATO expansion, Kennan emphasised the continuities of Russian fears of encirclement, a fear that he had first highlighted in his famous 'X' article, 'The sources of Soviet conduct', *Foreign Affairs* 25 (1947) pp.566-82.
8. For his thesis about the 'clash of civilizations', see S.P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster 1996).
9. For studies of the 'mental maps' of US leaders, see A. Henrikson, 'The geographical mental maps of US foreign policy makers', *International Political Science Review* 1 (1980) pp.495-530; and J. O'Loughlin and R.J. Grant, 'The political geography of presidential speeches, 1946-87', *Annals, Association of American Geographers* 80 (1990) pp.504-30.
10. This definition is from P.J. Taylor, *Political Geography: World-System, Nation-State and Locality*, third edn. (London: Longman) p.91. Taylor elaborates that a geopolitical code 'will have to incorporate a definition of a state's interests, an identification of external threats to those interests, a planned response to such threats and a justification of that response' (p.64). This concept is similar to that of 'image plans' as described by Henrikson and the term 'geopolitical code' was first used in J.L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press 1982).
11. The quote is from T. Luke and G. Ó Tuathail, 'Global flowmations, local fundamentalisms, and fast geopolitics: "America" in an accelerating world order', in A. Herod, G. Ó Tuathail and S. Roberts (eds.), *An Unequal World?: Globalization, Governance and Geography* (London: Routledge) pp.72-94.
12. S. Brown, 'Inherited geopolitics and emergent global realities', in E.K. Hamilton (ed.), *America's Global Interests* (New York: W.W. Norton 1989) pp.166-77; and G.R. Sloan, *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890-1987* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books 1988).
13. The quote is the opening lines of a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, National Commission on America and the New World, *Changing Our Ways: America and the New World* (Washington DC 1992).
14. For details on the dilemma facing the Clinton administration in Bosnia, caught between a 'quagmire' and a 'holocaust', see G. Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 1996).
15. The figures are reported in S. Kull, 'What the public knows, what Washington doesn't', *Foreign Policy* 101 (winter 1995-96) p.109.
16. The figures are reported in J.D. Rosner, 'The know-nothings know something', *Foreign Policy* 101 (winter 1995-96) p.124.
17. The Eagleburger quote is found in R.S. Greenberger, 'Dateline Capitol Hill: the new majority's foreign policy', *Foreign Policy* 101 (winter 1995-96) p.162.
18. J. O'Loughlin, 'Fact or fiction?: The evidence for the relative decline of the US, 1966-1991', in C. Williams (ed.), *The Geography of the New World Order* (London: Belhaven Press and New York: John Wiley 1993) pp.148-80.
19. W. Christopher, 'America's leadership, America's opportunity', *Foreign Policy* 98 (spring 1995) p.8.
20. This according to the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations poll cited in Kull (note 15). In a similar poll by the *Wall Street Journal* and reported in the same article, 72 per cent said that the USA should let other countries and the United Nations take the lead in solving international crises and conflicts.

21. B. Buzan and G. Segal, 'The rise of lite powers: A strategy for the postmodern state', *World Policy Journal* (autumn 1996) pp.1-10.
22. Maybe it has been replaced by a 'Somalia syndrome' as a result of the death of 18 US troops in a shoot-out in Mogadishu in 1993. After this fire-fight, US troops were pulled out immediately, though the fact that US troops killed 3,000-5,000 Somalis in that conflict seemed lost on the public with its feish on US casualties. As noted by Buzan and Segal (note 21) p.3, 'the weakening of shared identity means that individuals are not as prepared as in the past to die for their country, although they may be perfectly willing to risk their lives in dangerous sports or by excesses of consumption'. In recent military actions, 'America's impressive demonstration of high-tech military power was offset by its equally impressive desire to avoid both casualties and entanglement' (Buzan and Segal, note 21, p.8).
23. Kennan (note 7).
24. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations surveys 1990 and 1994, as reported in Kull (note 15).
25. R. Dole presents his list in 'Shaping America's global future', *Foreign Policy* 98 (spring 1995) p.35.
26. J. Nijman 'In search of Madeline Albright's geopolitical vision', *Geojournal* 44 (1999) forthcoming).
27. Cited in Ó Tuathail (note 14) p.206. In a similar vein, Ó Tuathail reports the jokes of a late-night television comedian: 'we do deserts; we don't do jungles. Or mountains.'
28. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 'Military expenditure database', *SIPRI Yearbook* (Stockholm: SIPRI 1998) Ch.6. There is a substantial increase proposed for the Pentagon budget in fiscal year 2000.
29. The Washington Declaration, signed and issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington DC, 23 and 24 April 1999.
30. The quotes from Leonid Kuchma are reported in N. Hodge, 'Kuchma curries European favor, aid', *Kyiv Post* (20 Oct. 1998) p.1.
31. V. Kolossov and J. O'Loughlin, 'New borders for new world orders: Territorialities at the fin-de-siècle', *Geojournal* 43 (1999) pp.259-73. For a recent example of this kind of geographical placement, see O. Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993). This book firmly places Ukraine in Europe and Russia in the East. For an example of the new geographical texts, see O. Shablii, *Social-Economic Geography of Ukraine (Sotsialno-ekonomicheskaia geografiia ukrainy)* (Lviv: Svit 1995) (in Russian).
32. A. Moshes, 'Ukraine's geopolitical quest: Central and eastern Europe in Ukraine's foreign policy' (*Geopoliticheskie iskania Kiev: Tsentral'naya i vostochnaya Evropa v politike Ukrainy*), *Pro et Contra* 3/2 (spring 1998) pp.95-110 (in Russian).
33. T. Warner, 'The second Iron Curtain', *Kyiv Post* (23 Oct. 1998) p.5.
34. Huntington (note 8).
35. For a very useful treatment and an analogy, see M. Foucault (ed.), *Fragments d'Europe: Atlas de l'Europe médiane et orientale* (Paris: Fayard 1993).
36. A. Applebaum, *Between East and West: Across the Borderlands of Europe* (New York: Pantheon Books 1994) p.xii.
37. Haushofer (note 5).
38. V. Kolossov and A. Treivish, 'The political geography of European minorities', *Political Geography* 17 (1998) pp.523-4.
39. The full text of the famous Mackinder aphorism is 'Who Rules East Europe Commands the Heartland; Who Rules the Heartland Commands the World Island; Who Rules the World Island Commands the World'. It was first published in *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1919).
40. J. Fairgrieve, *Geography and World Power*, eighth edn. (London: University of London Press 1941) pp.329-31.
41. S.B. Cohen, 'Global geopolitical change in the post-cold-war era', *Annals, Association of American Geographers* 81, pp.551-80.
42. G. Parker, *Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future* (London: Pinter Publishers 1998) p.92.
43. R. Kjellén, *Der Staat als Lebensform* (Leipzig: S. Hitzel, 1917).
44. O. Tunander, 'Post-cold war Europe: Synthesis of a bi-polar friend-foe structure and a hierarchic cosmos-chaos structure?' in O. Tunander, P. Baev and VI. Einmangel (eds.),

- Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 1997) p. 18.
45. Tunander (note 44) p.37. Regarding the concentric circles around Brussels, see also O. Waever, 'Imperial metaphors: Emerging European analogies to pre-nation-state imperial systems', in Tunander, Baev and Einagel (note 44) p.67.
46. V. Lukin, 'Our security predicament', *Foreign Policy* 88 (autumn 1992) p.63.
47. See the articles in Z. Brzezinski and P. Sullivan (eds.), *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data and Analysis* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 1997), especially Brzezinski on the Eurasian tradition in Russia in 'Introduction: Last gasp or renewal?' pp.3-9. Alexander Solzhenitsyn is a prominent spokesperson for the Eurasianist perspective.
48. I.B. Neumann, 'The geopolitics of delineating "Russia" and "Europe": The creation of the "other" in European and Russian traditions', in Tunander, Baev and Einagel (note 44) pp.148-50. Brzezinski and Sullivan use the terms 'neo-democrats', 'national-patriotic', 'pragmatists' and 'left extremists' to designate the same four geopolitical ideologies.
49. Neumann (note 48) p.171. Y. Boriko, 'Possible scenarios for geopolitical shifts in Russian-European relations', in Tunander, Baev and Einagel (note 44) p.206 reports that public opinion in Russia is highly variable and is a contrasting mosaic. Most Russians are suspicious of plans for NATO expansion, but 33 per cent were favourable to the EU, while 19 per cent were neutral and only seven per cent had a negative attitude, according to *Central and Eastern Eurobarometer* 6 (1996).
50. Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, US Department of State, *Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications* (24 Feb. 1997) p.19. The State Department also distributed a glossy 24-page brochure entitled *The Enlargement of NATO: Why Adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO Strengthens American National Security* (Washington DC: Feb. 1998). The brochure prominently featured the most widely known quote by Secretary of State Albright: 'A larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe where wars simply do not happen.' (7 Oct. 1997).
51. Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs (note 50) p.10. These new NATO aims were formally certified at the fiftieth anniversary meeting of the organisation in Washington DC, April 1999.
52. Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs (note 50) p.9.
53. For criticisms of the NATO enlargement, see A. Perlmuter and T.G. Carpenter, 'NATO's expensive trip east', *Foreign Affairs* 77/1 (1998) pp.2-6; M. Brown, 'The flawed logic of NATO expansion', *Survival* 37, pp.34-52; and P. Kennedy and M. Gorbachev, 'The false pretence of NATO expansion', *New Perspectives Quarterly* 14/3 (1997) pp.62-4.
54. G.F. Kennan, 'A fatal error', *New York Times* (5 Feb. 1997) p.13.
55. J. Nijman (note 26).
56. See Z. Brzezinski, 'A geostrategy for Eurasia', *Foreign Affairs* 76/5, pp.50-71 and Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and the Geostategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books), while an early statement on NATO enlargement was provided by H. Kissinger, 'Expand NATO now', *Washington Post* (19 Dec. 1994) p.27.
57. M. Kundera, 'Un occident kidnappé ou la tragédie de l'Europe centrale', *Le Débat* 27/11, pp.2-24.
58. G. Dijkink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain* (London: Routledge 1997) p.11.
59. Dijkink (note 58) pp.49-57 and D. Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press). For a specific example of NATO actions in Bosnia, see D. Campbell, 'Apartheid cartography: The political anthropology and spatial effects of international diplomacy in Bosnia', *Political Geography* 18 (1999) pp.395-435.
60. F. Zakaria, 'Our hollow hegemony: Why foreign policy cannot be left to the market', *New York Times* (1 Nov. 1998) pp.44-5, 47, 74, 80.
61. G. Ó Tuathail (note 14) Ch.6.