Boundaries and Place

European Borderlands in Geographical Context

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Chapter Twelve

Galician Identities and Political Cartographies on the Polish-Ukrainian Border

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With the removal of the Iron Curtain, dramatic geopolitical changes have reshaped the daily lives of eastern Europeans, especially those living near the borders of the former Soviet Union. The final delimitation of the border of Europe (here, defined as countries sharing membership in the European Union and other Western political/military institutions such as NATO) is, as yet, unfinished, with the possibility of a new geopolitical divide along the former Soviet border further encouraged by the differential rates of political and economic transitions amongst the countries of the region. This new border geography is being formed, however, against a historical backdrop that places current border regions not as peripheries but as centres of long-standing regional entities. Galicia, straddling the Polish-Ukrainian border, remains not just a regional memory as a former autonomous Habsburg province but is rapidly being re-created as a post-1989 spatial-historical imagination and an entry card into Europe.

As the ex-Eastern Bloc states shake off the spatial-symbolic stigmata of the Cold War order, their relationship to the broader European whole—the perennial question 'Will we qualify as European?'—has come to dominate debates from Bialystok to Budapest. The question is certainly not new for, over time, the cardinal problem in defining Europe has centred precisely on the inclusion or exclusion of its eastern borderlands. The designation of a European West has, in fact, long been predicated on the notion of Europe as 'not Russia' (O'Loughlin and Kolossov 2002). The search for Europe's 'natural' boundary, which would, somehow, separate

the civilised, modern West from the premodern East, has always been crucial to this process of signification: a 'civilisational' divide that has fluctuated according to prevailing political as well as intellectual requisites (Delany 1995; Heffernan 1999; Wolff 1994).

The momentous changes of 1989 have come to signify what was, above all, a 'return to Europe', a 'reunion with European civilization from which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were "unnaturally" wrenched by years of Communist domination' (Shaw 1998: 124; Kundera 1983). Countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have progressively drifted into what is now often termed Central or East Central Europe, with the term 'Eastern Europe' most often relegated to the ostensibly less-Western successor states to the USSR. The 1998 expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to encompass the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland has served only to accentuate what is the primary geopolitical divide emergent in the region today: the growing chasm between those states anointed as bona fide Europeans, slated for fast-track incorporation into Western security and economic structures, and 'the others', relegated to the margins of Europe, if not entirely denied the right to symbolic membership in the European family of nations. The process of geographical myth-making continues—only now carried out by self-appointed Central Europeans (Geremek 1999) as well as by Brussels bureaucrats and Washington policymakers. More than a liberation—a return to some idealised, unbounded Europe of years past—the opening of the Iron Curtain has thus given birth to a whole new set of territorialisations, marking 'some remarkably persistent geopolitical instincts of the European idea through the ages' (Heffernan 1999: 239).

Geographical designations are of no small consequence, however. Testimony to the enormous power vested within spatial narratives, European-ness has come to denote a 'way in' (Dahrendorf 1999a, 1999b), the *étoile polaire* for the ex-communist states. The processes of national construction (or, perhaps more accurately, re-construction) in the new European democracies post-1989 and their crafting of bounded territorialised communities have been indelibly marked by questions of these same communities' past and present relationship to the broader European whole. In this chapter we focus on the representational struggle occurring at what is (at least in the short term) the probable future boundary of the European space, the Polish-Ukrainian border. We locate our examination within the emerging tension between the concurrent opening of state boundaries and the accompanying idealisation of shared spaces and multiple identities that contrast with the progressive re-bounding of rigid civilisational, strategic, and economic divides. Our attention focuses on the contrast between post-1989 local re-imaginations of Galicia as a space of

civilised multinational coexistence and the geopolitical and civilisational boundary-drawing exercises that cut through the region's heart. In exploring this contradiction, we examine the spatial ideology and iconography of the Galician representation, querying the ways in which its vision as a historical ethnocultural *oikumene* is being proposed as an antidote to the new walls as a novel means of articulating territories and inhabitants in the European cosmos (O'Loughlin 2000). We analyse the ways in which the re-signification of the border as a space—as Galicia—is being used to subvert the borderline and, by extension, other borders that are symbolically coterminous with the confines of Central Europe, of Europe, and of the West.

GALICIAN DREAMS AND GEOPOLITICAL CARTOGRAPHIES

The 'new geopolitics' is characterised, above all, by the multiscalar processes of territorial control and strategic reconsiderations in the era of American hegemony. Rapid political change in the form of democratisation and economic change consequent on globalisation have rendered Cold War lineups anachronistic. Few regions have been altered as much as the 'crush zone' between Europe and Russia. Rather than the coincidence of state borders with strategic zones and a world of division and order, we have entered an era of geopolitical transition that, at least for the short term, will continue to produce numerous territorial alternatives, regional posturings, ideological machinations, and vivid recall of historical antecedents. While geopolitical strategists try to influence the nature and location of new dividing lines, local groups on the divide may not toe the strategic line or fulfil their assigned roles. Existing de facto (political or administrative) borders often overlap with de facto (ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or civilisational) territories, and in a time of evolving political and cultural identities, cartographic claims abound. Earlier ethnic hatreds in 1918–1921 and 1944–1946 resulted tragically in the forced relocation (or ethnic cleansing) of millions in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires. The winners, advised by political geographers such as Isaiah Bowman (Martin 1980), tried to reduce rival claims and ethnic mixing by imposing a cartographic order matching political and cultural territories using the principle of exclusivity. Though relatively few ethnically mixed territories remain in the former communist states of Europe, the geopolitical sea change of the end of the Cold War has opened up opportunities for a return to the multiethnic local worlds of the early twentieth century, in which groups shared spaces while maintaining their own linguistic and religious traditions. In such a post-nation-

alist world, a search for pre-existing regional identities is under way, from the large-scale construction of a *Mitteleuropa* to the regional scale, characterised by cross-border economic development zones like Euro-Bug (along the Bug River, which separates Poland and Belarus) and local regional enterprises like Galicia. If such cross-border and inter-territorial enterprises are successful, then a new geopolitics that is not state dominated will have emerged from the ashes of the European civil wars and subsequent Cold War.

A glance at the 'fragments of Europe' in Foucher's 1993 book offers convincing evidence of the frequent changes of borders of Poland and its neighbours. The maps in this chapter illustrate only some of the historical changes since 966, the traditional date of the establishment of a Polish state. Borders mark the territorial edges of identities, either from above (state formed), from outside (delimited by war victors), or internally (national claims). Although national identities can adapt to new state borders, there is usually a time lag, and historical claims persist long after geopolitical realities have redefined national borders. Further, because identities are constantly made and re-made, so too borders are claimed, counterclaimed, and reclaimed. Borders can be lines of separation (like the Iron Curtain) or contact (as inside the European Union); every geographical boundary combines these functions to some extent. Borders thus structure the opportunities for conflict (rival territorial claims) or co-operation (trade). More than anything else, the nature of the border (guarded, open, strictly or poorly demarcated, partially open, etc.) reflects the nature of the relations between the respective states. Borderlands, the zones of mixture, contact, and conflict, have their own geographies that distinguish them from their states and render them uncomfortable categories to cultural cartographers concerned with heartlands, domains, and cores. Our examination in this chapter highlights but one portion of the vast border zone stretching from Kaliningrad on the Baltic to Odessa on the Black Sea, a vast borderland which, as Applebaum (1994) among others has noted, has been a terrain of struggle for over a thousand years, its cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity only extinguished by the force of post-1945 frontiers.

Paasi (1986, 1996), in his examination of the institutionalisation of regions, argues that one of the first steps in the formation of the conceptual shape of any regional entity/identity is precisely the establishment of a distinct set of territorial symbols, the most important of these being the name. Naming creates a togetherness, a shared representation of belonging, and joins personal histories to a collective history. As representations of space, regions are mythical constructions, often later legalised with state symbols, governmental agency making, borders, and other symbols

of political control. As a regional 'entity', Galicia too was born of myth—and from myth would rise again. And in the post-communist era, with myths debunked and historical antecedents in short supply, that of *Galicia Felix* (Happy Galicia) would prove particularly attractive, for a number of reasons. Most visibly, the years after 1989 witnessed 'Galicia' cropping up on store signs and adorning a variety of products in southeastern Poland. Yet beyond its role as a marketing tool, the use of the 'Galician' denomination also began to proliferate among a variety of public and private institutions, as well as countless historical preservation associations and literary and cultural groups, while portraits of the emperor (re)appeared on the walls of numerous provincial bars, offices, restaurants, and coffee houses from Krakow to Nowy Sącz to L'viv/Lwów.

Naming, however, also acts to situate territories and their inhabitants in geopolitical, civilisational, historical, and cultural space. Galicia's name thus not only evokes a series of nostalgic associations of home and tradition but also offers other spatial cues recalling a broader set of geographical containers and wider geopolitical representations. Galicia, as Austro-Hungarian, as European, as not-Eastern, certainly as not Russian, is thus located within the Western (or, more accurately, European) 'cosmos'. In contrast to the chaos and backwardness of the Eastern steppes beyond it, Galicia is firmly located within the European tradition, 'before and beyond' the communist occupation, 1945–1991. As always, the names that we grant to our social world, to ourselves, and to the institutions to which we belong are hardly accidental but emerge, rather, from a complex negotiation of meanings that attempts to make sense of the local, national, and international spaces in which we are located.

The Galician resurgence has not limited itself to nominative acts, in fact, and in recent years has begun to take on an increasingly political tone in opposition to the formal politics of the Polish state. What of the political or cultural uses of Galicia? The emergence and consolidation of new sets of local-global economic networks and their associated place-selling strategies are hardly a novel phenomenon, though rare in eastern Europe. Turning to Paasi (1986, 1996) again, we stress here the importance of making a distinction between 'regional identity' as the identity of the region itself (in our case, the identity of Galicia) and the potentially endless identities of the regional actors/inhabitants that may or may not coincide with the regional identity. Regional identity is best conceived, in fact, as a shared or dominant territorial idea or representation of the region, and thus irreducible to the singular identities of regional actors/inhabitants. It is a shared geographical representation that induces coherent behaviour and, over time, acts to consolidate the region (Dematteis 1989). And one thing is certain about the Galician ideal: Lots of people

seem to believe in it. Galicia is a powerful, still-living myth in the culture of two nations, the Polish and the Ukrainian. Certainly, it is not a unitary or homogeneous myth, yet in both cultures it is viewed, overwhelmingly, as an ideal past, as a lost Arcadia and, by extension, 'as the path towards their future' (Sowa 1994: 6).

Sowa (1994) identifies two guiding elements of the present-day Galician myth. The first is the idealisation of the lost time/space of the local—of the familiar Galician village or *shtetl* (small Jewish settlement) but also of the urban magnificence of turn-of-the-century Cracow and L'viv (Lwów). The second lies with the ideal of social and ethnic peace and the pacific coexistence of the 'many peoples, many nations' inhabiting these lands since time immemorial. Both, however, are predicated on a unitary/unified Galicia and thus on a negation of the border that now cuts through it (Sowa 1994; Wiegandt 1988; Wyrozumski 1994). To reclaim the past, Galicia must thus be reconceptualised as a border *space*, a limen of coexistence.

Proponents of nostalgia for Habsburg Galicia do not see their yearnings running counter to the respective contemporary national aspirations, just as the Galician conservatives' love of Austria during the period of provincial autonomy in 1869–1918 was never conceived in opposition to Polish, Jewish, or Ruthenian national aspirations (Szul 1996). The role assigned to Galicia in the post-1989 period draws heavily, in fact, on the spatial-representational equation, Galician = Austrian = European. Adopting one shared geographical/territorial representation, Galicia thus grants its believers access to another, highly valued, shared geographical representation that is the European one. And it is by re-imagining Galicia as a historical, cultural, and traditional liminal *borderland* that its proponents attempt to usurp the power of the *borderline*. This distinction closely recalls Michel de Certeau's (1984) differentiation between spatial imaginaries that are cartographic and those that are narrative, emerging from practices and stories and thus, fundamentally, subversive. Unlike the cartographic, bounded spatial imaginaries of nation-states, narrative identities (such as the Galician one) do not rely on binding actors in(to) space; they do not rely on the setting up of boundaries of inclusion/exclusion. Rather, to quote de Certeau, such forms of identity 'establish an itinerary', 'guide', 'pass through', and 'transgress', establishing a space that is '*topological*, concerning the deformation [and combination] of figures, rather than *topical*, defining places' (de Certeau 1984: 129). Such topological spaces oppose the unitary metric of the borderline; within them 'diverse scales are brought together through networks of "internal" and "external" ties in defining geographical variation in social phenomena' (Agnew 1993: 264).

Making the Galicia Myth

The image of the Galician borderlands as an outpost of 'Western civilisation,'—the boundary of Europe beyond which lay the chaos of the East—had begun to be elaborated in the sixteenth century. It was then that the multiethnic, multireligious, and multilingual 'melting pot' first became codified as a distinct political project, with the evolution of the Polish state from a medieval monarchy into the Polish-Lithuanian ('Jagiellonian') Commonwealth (see figure 12.1). While Polish nationalism grew ever more prominent during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there remained a place where Polish national feeling would be channelled into the idealisation of another institutionalised multinational coexistence; where the multiethnic *koiné* of the Eastern borderlands would be preserved as ideal and practice, only now with better postal service; it would be the home of the emperor's peoples, Habsburg Galicia (see figure 12.2).


Figure 12.1.   Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

Figure 12.2. Habsburg Galicia and Surrounding Empires

Although during the early decades of the partitions Polish cultural life and national(ist) organising efforts in the Habsburg territories were relatively underdeveloped, following Austria's defeat by Prussia and the subsequent *Ausgleich* with Hungary in 1867, a significant shift occurred in the Austro-Polish relationship (Estreicher 1951; Kann 1977; Shedel 1983; Wandycz 1982). For the first time, Polish interests were acknowledged by Vienna in administrative fashion, with the granting of virtual autonomy to the Poles of Galicia. In the post-1866 period, this crownland was granted more privileges than any other province in the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy (Kann 1977; Shedel 1983). A Polish-dominated school board was added to an already Polish-controlled provincial Diet, 'thus giving Poles the means of ending the former policy of Germanisation and setting up a Polonised school system' (Wandycz 1982: 85). In 1869, an imperial decree established Polish as the language of the bureaucracy and of the courts within Galician provincial boundaries and, in 1870–1871, Polish

was restored as the official language of instruction in the crownland's two universities in Cracow and L'viv/Lwów. Politically, the viceroyalty was made a Polish monopoly and, in 1871, a Polish *Landesminister* for Galicia was made a permanent fixture of every Austrian cabinet. Poles began to be appointed to important ministerial posts in subsequent Habsburg cabinets, including prime minister. As Poles rose in the ranks of the imperial bureaucracy, the Galician elite became a vital incubator of Polish national feeling, understandably so, as Poles' status within the Habsburg realm stood in increasingly sharper contrast to the condition of their co-nationals in the Russian and Prussian empires.

It was 'simple pragmatism' that proved most important in effecting a reconciliation between Galician Polish elites and the Empire (Wandycz 1982), with the failure of the 1863 insurrection seen as the convincing factor that turned the Polish leadership towards a settlement with Austria. 'Austria threatened the Polish element far less than did Russia and Prussia and if the Poles were to breathe, they must form a kind of lung, some area relatively free for the development of their national culture, and in Russia and Prussia this was impossible' (Estreicher 1951: 444). It was this recognition that would lead to the famous declaration of loyalty to the Habsburg emperor, issued by the Galician Diet on 10 December 1866, which described Austria as the defender of Polish national interest and the guardian of Western civilisation in the Polish tradition: 'Without fear of deserting our national ideal, believing in the mission of Austria and trusting in the durability of the changes announced by the monarch as his firm purpose, we declare from the bottom of our hearts that with thee, most illustrious lord, we stand and we will stand' (Wandycz 1982).

But allegiance to the emperor as good Austrians also placed Galician Poles on an equal footing with the other peoples of the Empire and located them firmly within the Austro-German (and thus European) politico-cultural sphere. Perhaps even more important, however, such self-identification marked the difference of Galician Poles from the Slavic world that lay across the imperial boundary. Habsburg officials were well aware of the Poles' anti-Russian sentiments. As Count Friedrich Beust, a Habsburg prime minister, remarked, 'By holding out the prospect for the reconstitution of the Polish state under Habsburg protection, hatred for Russia can become a pragmatic love for Austria' (cited in Wandycz 1982). In subsequent years, many Polish national leaders, such as the head of the Austrian Polish Social Democratic Party, Ignacy Daszynski, painted Galicia as a 'Polish Piedmont', aiming to achieve Polish unity under the benevolent Habsburg umbrella (Buszko 1989). The distinct Galician conservatism was, moreover, the product of a very particular vision of the Polish past and Poland's future interests. This vision was elaborated in the late

1860s by the so-called Cracow Historical School (Orton 1982; Buszko 1989). Arguing that the blame for the dismemberment of the Polish state lay primarily with the Poles themselves, as their political institutions and policies had bred anarchy, the historians of the Cracow School (led by Jozef Szujski, the first chair of Polish history at the Jagiellonian University) rejected previous insurrections as disastrous for Polish interests and became the leading Polish proponents of loyalty to the emperor, influencing a generation of political leaders and tracing the outlines of a distinct Galician conservatism guided by 'sober deliberation', recourse only to legal means, 'adherence to traditional verities', and loyalty to Austria as the rightful legal heir to the crown of the old Polish Commonwealth. It is thus due to the rights conferred by the Empire that the Polish elite under Habsburg occupation would fast become Polish-speaking 'Austrians', with Galician loyalty to the imperial project translating the Polish nobility and political leaders into fully fledged Europeans (Wiegandt 1988). (Benedict Anderson [1983: 56], among others, has noted the 'togetherness' inadvertently created by the bureaucracy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: a transnational 'imagined community' based in the 'interchangeability' of imperial subjects.)

More important to understanding the distinct place and time that was Habsburg Galicia, however, is its self-representation as an Arcadian space of felicitous coexistence of peoples, cultures, and languages at the borders of the Empire: *Galicia Felix*. Galicia was, then, both a mirror, a reduced representation of the multilingual, multicultural Habsburg coexistence—a part reflecting the unity of the greater whole—and also a vital, emblematic 'piece' necessary to the construction of the vision of the Empire and the emperor's 'peoples'. Certainly the Galician adhesion to the Habsburg ideal was not unique. Numerous observers, from Kann (1974) to Le Rider (1995) to Magris (1963, 1986), have, in fact, stressed that the most fervent 'Austrians' were to be found precisely at the peripheries of the Empire, on the shores of the Adriatic, in Bohemia, or in Galicia.

The Habsburg Empire itself was an ideal beyond time. As the rightful heir to the spirit of the Holy Roman Empire, it embodied both the universalism of European culture and the role of mediator between East and West, with its paternalistic myth of the 'peoples' running counter to the national ideal heir to the French Revolution. It was a supranational ethno-cultural *oikumene* that strove to transcend the nation both as an exclusive territorial ideal and as the exclusive claimant of identity. This ideal was ensured by the Habsburg imperial bureaucracy that reached out into the corners of its territories. The laws of the Empire, similarly, guaranteed individual and local freedoms, albeit under the emperor's watchful eyes. Habsburg Galicia was the quintessential liminal community, character-

ised by unstable belongings and identities combined and recombined daily in an endless tangle of shifting configurations (Chlebowczyk 1975), reconfigurations, and re-representations that could take place from one conversation to the next, depending on the interlocutor. Belonging, when delimited, was traced along class and religious divides—peasant, noble, Uniate, Jewish—but it was the attribute of *tutejszy* that traced the sharpest confines, with only those 'not from here' considered as 'others', although, if imperial subjects, they were still envisioned as part of a broader commonality that included all the emperor's 'peoples'. Jews made up a vital part of Galicia's multinational, multicultural *koiné*, making up 30 percent of the population of both Cracow and L'viv/Lwów and over 50 percent in a number of key Galician towns. The Habsburg *koiné*, in fact, is inconceivable without the Jewish cultural elite, who were the first to raise the cry of alarm at the dismemberment of the Galician Babel, as the Habsburg dream slid into a nightmare of language laws, ethnic registers, and violent national revindications (Prager 1995; Wrobel 1994).

Borders and Geopolitical Games

The institutional attempts at the delimitation of the Galician space along national and ethnic lines—and the beginning of the slow death of the Habsburg ideal of 'unity in diversity'—date to the 1896–1897 Austrian electoral reform, which would, for the first time ever, demarcate constituencies along ethnic lines, through the construction of ethnically or linguistically separate voters' registers (the famed *Nationale Kataster*). The primacy of ethnic divides tended not only to de-emphasise (and, to some extent, delegitimise) the traditional role afforded to the provinces and to the imperial government but also, perhaps even more important, 'reduced the position of the individual as a citizen of the state, stressing, instead, the individual's role as a member of an ethnic group' (Stourzh 1991: 19). As Jacques Le Rider (1995) notes, from the emperor's *Meine Völker*, a historical, organic pluri-cultural unity cemented together by dynastic right, the citizens of Austria would now become 'nationals', with the structuration of public bodies along ethnic lines producing the entirely new need to attribute ethnic membership to individuals, 'constrained by the national-ism of others to become a nation', as Joseph Roth (1985) would note of the period in his collection of essays *Juden auf Wanderschaft*.

Individuals were now supposed to delimit their belonging to one collectivity, the *Volkstamm*, with the imperial state now able to 'objectively' attribute ethnic membership to persons on the basis of evidence gathered through official questionnaires (the venerable Habsburg census began to include a linguistic questionnaire only in 1880). According to the 1880

census, Poles made up 51 percent of the Galician population, while Ukrainians/Ruthenians accounted for 43 percent. As Wereszycki (1990: 141) notes, however, the Polish figure included the bulk of Galicia's significant Jewish population who, for the purposes of the census (in which nationality was determined by language: Polish, German, or Ukrainian) were identified as Poles. The modern ideal of a nation bound to a distinct territorial base thus slowly supplanted previously dominant Austro-Marxist conceptions of freely chosen nationality within which nationality could attach to persons, wherever they lived and whoever they lived with, at any rate if they chose to claim it (Hobsbawn 1990).

The shape of the newly independent Poland was determined at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The final settlement of Poland's eastern boundary proved most problematic, particularly in Galicia, where Polish leaders disputed Ukrainian claims to territories east of the San River. With the collapse of Habsburg rule on 1 November 1918, local Ukrainian leaders proclaimed the birth of the West Ukrainian People's Republic, which claimed all Galician lands east of the San as well as northern Bukovina and Carpathian Rus. The Republic encountered stiff opposition from Galician Poles, and conflict soon precipitated into a Polish-Ukrainian war that lasted until the summer of 1919, when the Ukrainian forces were driven out of Galicia (Kozlowski 1990). As Magosci (1993: 127) notes, the Allied powers were concerned above all with the threat of Bolshevik revolution from the East and thus acquiesced to Polish demands to occupy Eastern Galicia in temporary fashion. The Treaty of St. Germain in September 1919 granted only those territories west of the San to Poland, leaving the final disposition of Eastern Galicia unresolved. In December 1919, British statesman Lord Curzon suggested two possible boundaries through Galicia, one of which served as the southernmost extension of what he proposed should be Poland's eastern frontier along the so-called Curzon line. Should Eastern Galicia become an independent Ukrainian republic, then the first Curzon variant would be accepted; should such a republic not be recognised, then the second variant, which was farther east and included L'viv/Lwów, would serve as Poland's border. In fact, neither of these variants or any subsequent proposals were accepted by Poland, whose annexation of all of East Galicia was recognised in March 1923 (Magosci 1993: 127) (see figure 12.3). The Curzon Line thus came to identify the maximum territorial reach of Soviet political influence in Europe, and in the years to come provided 'both a reference in the discussion on state boundaries in Eastern Europe and a political rationale for the new Soviet boundary' (Kordan 1997: 705).

Although the interwar Polish state vociferously asserted its claims to what it pronounced as its national territories (and despite the increasingly

national[istic] attacks of certain political forces such as Roman Dmowski's National Democrats), Poland remained a multiethnic, multicultural state; in 1931, ethnic Poles made up only 69 percent of the population. The violent national struggles from 1914 to 1920 and the subsequent national repartitioning of the Habsburg lands did not succeed in fully purifying the East Central European spaces—and certainly not those of Galicia.

That task was to be accomplished by Nazi Germany first and completed by postwar planners later. By 1945, the 'Final Solution' had eliminated 5.4 million Eastern and Central European Jews, erasing almost all traces of the vibrant Aszkenazic communities in Galicia and the Pale (Hinka 1999). Another 9 million to 10 million people—Roma, Poles, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Russians—were killed in the Nazi sweep. The multinational dream of the Habsburgs—Karl Renner's ideal of 'freely chosen nationalisms', barely alive after the strife of World War I and the interwar years—died at Auschwitz.

Figure 12.3.   Poland and Galicia in the Twentieth Century

The Allied postwar project for the reordering of the Eastern borderlands of Europe, although clothed in the rhetoric of peace and political stability, in epistemological terms lay perfectly in line with the 'pure cartography' of politics put into practice by Nazi geopoliticians (Raffestin, Lopreno, and Pasteur 1995). By the war's end, it became common dogma to assert that the presence of large numbers of ethnolinguistic minorities within the states of East Central Europe had been one of the major factors contributing to political instability during the interwar years (Magosci 1993). The apparent solution would lie in '*bringing some logic* to the map of Europe' (Kordan 1997; emphasis added) and although substantial tensions existed on the specific details, there was little fundamental disagreement among the members of the victorious Grand Alliance on the necessity of sorting out the demographic mixture of the East. To clean up the Eastern European space, populations must be realigned to conform to the new state borders: Between 1944 and 1948, no less than 31 million people were uprooted and moved from their homes as part of organised population transfers and forced resettlement (Magosci 1993: 164). The new boundary between Poland and the Soviet Union—designated by the Curzon Line—cut clear across Galicia, and its 'enforcement' necessitated a massive population exchange between as well as within the two countries. The new border, as Kordan notes, was considered 'diplomatically convenient', most importantly since it 'satisfied Soviet geostrategic demands' but also since it 'resolved once and for all the vexing Polish Question which for so long threatened the victorious Grand Alliance and promised to compromise Allied post-war relations' (1997: 705). Simply put, the line was 'just and right', as Winston Churchill proclaimed following the Yalta Conference.

From the Soviet perspective, however, for the new border to be 'just and right', certain complicating demographic issues had to settled. First, there was the problem of the large Polish population that now found itself on the 'wrong' side of the border, in the USSR; similarly, a sizeable Ukrainian population was 'separated' from its now-ordained 'ethnolinguistic homeland' in the Ukrainian SSR. The solution was to be found in a program of forced population transfer that swept through communities on both sides of the new border, uprooting and resetting more than 1.4 million individuals, including 810,000 Polish inhabitants of former Eastern Galicia and Volhynia and 630,000 individuals identified with the Ukrainian ethnolinguistic community coming primarily from the borderlands of Podlachia, Chelm, Jaroslaw, and the Lemko region (Kordan 1997). In the Soviet Union, ethnic Poles and Jews who were citizens of Poland prior to 1939 and wished to leave were allowed to register for resettlement along with members of their immediate families: 882,000 registered for the patria-

tion (Kordan 1997: 707; Kozlowski 1990). Those fleeing were predominantly Polish urban dwellers from the key historical centres of Polish settlement in Eastern Galicia: L'viv (Lwów), Ternopil (Tarnopol), Ivano-Frankivsk (Stanislawów), and Drohobych. Although the Polish anticommunist underground, the *Armia Krajowa* (Home Army), appealed to the Galician Poles to oppose resettlement efforts and attempted to organise local resistance, such resistance was limited and sporadic (Albert 1989; Magosci 1993; Kordan 1997). On the Polish side of the border, between October 1944 and September 1946, 497,680 Ukrainians registered for repatriation, settling primarily in the Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and L'viv *oblasts* (Kordan 1997). Hoping to conclude the operation rapidly, by 31 December 1945 Polish and Soviet authorities had abandoned the relatively passive character of the resettlement efforts, engaging the aid of special Polish and Soviet internal security forces. Within the course of a single year (July 1945 to July 1946) some 400,000 were uprooted and deported (Kordan 1997). The violence of the campaign spurred on popular resistance—channelled into support for the Ukrainian nationalist insurgency—the *Ukrains'ka Povstan'ska Armiia* (UPA), which had been operating underground in Galicia since 1943 against both German and Soviet forces. To extirpate resistance, a definitive solution took the form of a concerted operation of the Polish, Soviet, and Czechoslovak military forces aimed at relocating the entire remaining population; the *Akcja Wisla*, carried out between 29 April and 31 July 1947. Villages throughout the borderlands were emptied, and 139,467 persons were deported in the two-month period and dispersed throughout the newly acquired territories in western and northeastern Poland. The Habsburg dream of mixed populations living under the benevolent gaze of the emperor was finally put to flight.

GALICIA AND CONTEMPORARY GEOSTRATEGIC ORDERS

Previously we alluded to the ways in which the dreams of Galicians and the present re-territorialisations of these 'lands between' meld into a much broader reconfiguration of Europe after the demise of the Cold War geopolitical order. It is here, in fact, at the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands, that a new geopolitical 'crush zone'—a new 'iron curtain' of belonging—is fast taking form (for preliminary theorisations of this emergent divide, see Huntington 1996; Kolossov and O'Loughlin 1999; O'Loughlin 2000). Ukraine is increasingly finding itself on the eastern side of the new divide. In spring 1999, Poland announced a new, highly restrictive visa regime for Ukrainian (and other ex-Soviet) citizens, 'to conform with

future EU norms.' As the Polish Foreign Ministry stated: 'These measures are being implemented only to stop criminal flows, and are certainly not meant to regiment the flows of goods and law-abiding people. We have a very good relationship with the Ukraine' (Rzeczpospolita 1999: 3). As expected, Ukrainians, both government and citizen groups, reacted vociferously. The Ukrainian National Committee for the Defense of National Borders recently declared a new set of rules regimenting foreigners' stay and movements in border areas. According to the new ordinance, the term 'border area' would no longer apply merely to the five-kilometre strip of territory along Ukraine's national boundary but would now comprise the entire territory of all border *rayons* (counties). All foreigners present in or passing through these areas should, at all times, be in possession of a legal document attesting 'their necessity to be in that particular place.' Such documents could be obtained only with the permission of the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior in Kiev (Rzeczpospolita 1999).

Although Poland is, in many senses, on the 'right side' of the new divide, the international community's—as well as the Polish state's—recent boundary-drawing exercises are not passing uncontested. To the tune of 'Huntington go home!', numerous Polish commentators have, in fact, assailed the tracing of a civilisational watershed along the country's eastern borderlands. Popular commentator Ludwik Stomma (whose 1997 editorial coined the above battle cry), for one, labelled Huntington a fanatic and a fascist, 'severing the world into pieces', and called upon Polish national leaders to restrain themselves from facile enthusiasm for a Western 'club' that operates on the principle of exclusion. 'I want no part of a West that ends somewhere before Lwów and Nowogródek. . . . no part of a West . . . based on the principle of division: proposing a world view based solely in fear. And fear—fear of the other—always breeds hate' (Stomma 1997: 89).

Back in Galicia, the Cracow City Council (*Rada Miasta Krakowa*) (as well as a number of other local/regional actors and institutions) have also become increasingly vocal on matters that are usually the province of national policy-making bodies, most visibly foreign policy. In particular, since 1990 Galician actors have taken an increasingly active role in shaping Polish state policy towards Ukraine, while also cultivating a broad dialogue and exchange program with cities in western Ukraine and organising trips and exchanges. In fact, a number of associations active in promoting dialogue with 'the lands of Eastern Galicia' (now in western Ukraine) operate in Cracow, from the *Fundacja Św. Włodzimierza Chrzciciela Rusi Kijowskiej* (promoting Ukrainian culture in Poland and publishing an almanac entitled *Between Neighbours* under the auspices of the Jagiellonian University) to the *Związek Wysiedlonych* (disseminating historical docu-

ments and raising awareness about the post–World War II resettlement activities on both sides of the border as well as organising exchanges and trips for those resettled and their families to 'home places' such as Bełz, Sokol, and Krystynopol).

Such local 'scale-jumping strategies' (Smith 1993) of empowerment had been put into practice quite successfully by Galician economic actors ever since the Iron Curtain came down, with local entrepreneurs and chamber of commerce leaders rapidly launching themselves and their regions into international trade and capital investment networks, long before national bodies regulating this activity had been set up. Trade and traffic across Poland's eastern borders, however, continue to be severely hindered by lengthy delays, and Ukrainian leaders have consistently appealed to Poland to keep the border open, allowing the 6 million Ukrainians, most of whom are *chelnoki* (shuttle traders), to continue to have access to Polish marketplaces and kiosks (Turek 1998). Although a key element of Ukrainian foreign policy is the future acquisition of associate membership in the EU, and thus a progressive opening of its border to the European space, the Ukrainian-Polish border is, at present, an almost impenetrable barrier. Traders often have to wait up to four days travelling east at the Ukrainian border crossings, and the zones around crossing points have become a deregulated space where anything and everything can be bought and sold and all rules (national or international) are off; the roadside ditches each summer breed epidemics of diphtheria or even cholera. Although the Cold War–era Soviet border is no more, the barbed-wire fences and restrictions on the free movement of goods and people remain, now more than ever. L'viv, sixty kilometres from the Polish border, received only twenty thousand foreign tourists in 1998 (Gorchinskaya 1999) despite the city's designation as a UNESCO world heritage site and its wealth of Habsburg-era buildings, streetscapes, and low prices, reminiscent of Prague in 1989 before mass tourism invaded that other imperial jewel.

Although the geopolitical imaginations of—and policy prescriptions for—the 'New Europe' embrace the iconography of unbounded spaces, 'free of past dividing lines', the reality on the ground is vastly different. Post-Soviet fears have, in fact, made the Polish-Ukrainian border highly contested, the NATO expansion process being a case in point. Alongside a variety of discourses of 'righting past wrongs' and admitting 'worthy' and 'historically democratic' nations under the alliance's umbrella, the prevalent thrust of the expansion rhetoric centred precisely on the importance of re-instituting a proper/just/moral European order: a 'one Europe for all', a Europe without divides, without the rigid frontier lines assigned by Cold War geopolitics (or, as NATO pundits claim, the EU's increasingly

exclusionary 'Euro-curtain'). In fact, alliance leaders would stress on numerous occasions the open and 'unaccomplished' nature of the NATO expansion process, noting that the enlargement 'would not be a one-time event, but a process that will continue after the first round' (Bialasiewicz 1999).

United States secretary of State Madeline Albright was busy singing the praises of the demise of 'a system of interstate relations in which everyone had to choose a side': With the collapse of the bipolar order, states (like Poland and the Ukraine) would finally be 'free' to pursue a 'multi-vectored' foreign policy, oriented towards both the East and the West. In a March 1998 speech in Kyiv, Albright declared: 'I think that the most important feature of our new era is that we are trying very hard to erase the dividing lines in Europe. We believe that the era of the zero sum—where if one side wins, the other side loses—is over' (cited in Clover 1999). Just weeks later, agreements codifying NATO's new walls began to be drafted.

CONCLUSION

The story of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands cannot be reduced to a dichotomy between dreams of pacific coexistence and rigid civilisational or security watersheds. At the same time that the U.S. foreign policy community lauds the open spaces of the New Europe, it busies itself in constructing new walls; so too are Galician dreams being seized upon by the Polish state to promote and justify a series of geopolitical positionings that are anything but inclusive. Polish *Ostpolitik* has, in fact, been assailed by many Ukrainian leaders as replicating the worst of the past, with Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek's (1999) recent statements regarding Poland's role in guiding the Ukraine to a free market economy and liberal democracy—and thus 'into the west'—sounding to some Ukrainian commentators like 'the sound of the returning *pany*' (Polish nobility or landed gentry).

The Galician ideal of the multicultural border space—what Le Rider (1995) characterises as the secret of its 'always unaccomplished identity'—is precisely the cartographic chaos of East Central Europe that so frightens policymakers and amateur geopoliticians alike. The tracing of borderlines is always an inherently violent act—operating both a material and a symbolic violence—enforcing a simplification of territory, of identity, and of belonging, as well as of the ways to represent these elements (Ara and Magris 1982; Zanini 1997). The foremost scholar of the Habsburg myth, Claudio Magris (1986, 1999), in fact, takes de Certeau's (1984) distinction a step further. There are endless stories possible about border

spaces, he notes; the borderline, however, has—and can only have—but one story: a singular, undisputed narrative determined by sheer force. There are many stories of Galicia, some certainly more relevant than others ('relevant' as shared geographical representations/territorial ideologies that organise action—see Dematteis 1989). All exist, however, in opposition to the cartographic reality of the Polish-Ukrainian border.

One such narrative is the project for the Carpathian Euroregion, promoted by the Council of Europe and the Soros Foundation with the aim of 'promoting cross-border cooperation and harmonization, especially in the fields of cultural and educational matters, among the border territories of the Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary' (Carpathian Euroregion 1995). The Euroregion, first proposed in 1992, brings together the Polish border provinces of Przemysl and Krosno and the Ukrainian oblasts of Chernovtsy, Ivano-Frankivsk, L'viv, and Zakarpatska, along with a number of Slovakian and Hungarian border counties, and specifies a whole series of co-operation agreements in fields as varied as environmental protection, economic development and trade, tourism, and cultural and historical preservation. It is precisely the fluidity of this budding Euroregion's border space that is represented by its promoters as a sign of Europeanisation—of progress towards (or perhaps a return to) its 'natural state' (Suli-Zakar and Czimre 2000) as a multicultural, multiethnic *koinè*. The success of this initiative will mark, at least in part, the continuing relevance of the Habsburg ideal in post–Cold War East Central Europe.

NOTE

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