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THE ELECTION OF BLACK MAYORS, 1969 AND 1973*

JOHN O’LOUGHLIN AND DALE A. BERG

ABSTRACT. The failure of black mayoral candidates in Detroit and Los Angeles in 1969 can be attributed to an increased voter turnout by the white electorate, combined with bloc-voting by blacks and whites. In 1973 racial bloc-voting increased in the Detroit and Atlanta mayoral elections and continued at a high rate in Los Angeles. Black candidates were successful in the three cities because of a significantly higher rate of black voter turnout. Significant changes in the voting surfaces of the three cities occurred between 1969 and 1973 related to residential change, the choice of candidates, voting age, and social status. The success of black political candidates can be predicted with some accuracy.

In 1969 strong challenges for the office of mayor were made by black candidates in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Atlanta. Black mayoral candidates, Austin (in Detroit) and Bradley (in Los Angeles), came within three percentage points of victory. In 1973, black mayoral candidates were successful in these three cities. This paper will analyze the bases of electoral support for the mayoral candidates in all six elections. It will attempt to answer three questions: 1) Why were black mayoral candidates unsuccessful in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Atlanta in 1969, but successful in these same cities four years later? 2) Are comparable blocs of electoral support available to black candidates in these cities and is racial bloc-voting by blacks and whites the dominant method of electing mayors in racially-divided contests? 3) Can the success or failure of black candidates in racially-divided elections be predicted with any accuracy?

This study differs from previous geographic investigations of municipal voting because of its comparative and longitudinal character.¹

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¹ The authors acknowledge the cartographic assistance of Karen Siemiarowski and Becky Berg and the critical comments of Curt Roseman and Jerry Fellmann on an earlier version of this paper.

Emphasis here is placed on common patterns of voter support, differences in turnout rates, similar election issues, and the nature of the local political environment. The election outcomes in the three cities may be compared because each city has a nonpartisan ballot. Party labels are not allowed on the ballots and in all three cities nonpartisanship appears to be accepted in electing city officials.² The issue of party was raised in only one of the six elections under study, the 1969 Atlanta runoff between Sam Massell and Rodney Cook.³

In 1969, blacks made it through the primaries successfully in Detroit and Los Angeles but Horace Tate finished third in Atlanta behind Sam Massell and Rodney Cook. Tate's failure to reach the runoff can be attributed to a split in the black vote, forty-nine percent of which went to Tate, forty-four percent to Massell, and the rest to Cook (Table 1).⁴


² This is not to say that the electoral support of the candidates is independent of party. In Los Angeles, although Bradley and Yorty are both Democrats, Bradley's support was concentrated in Democratic precincts while Yorty's vote correlated strongly with the presence of Republicans.


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### Table 1.—Election Results of 1969 and 1973 Mayoral Runoffs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Percentage of Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>Roman Gribbs (White)</td>
<td>50.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard Austin (Black)</td>
<td>49.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>Samuel Yorty (White)</td>
<td>53.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Bradley (Black)</td>
<td>46.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>Sam Massell (White)</td>
<td>55.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rodney Cook (White)</td>
<td>44.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>Coleman Young (Black)</td>
<td>51.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Nichols (White)</td>
<td>48.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>Thomas Bradley (Black)</td>
<td>56.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samuel Yorty (White)</td>
<td>43.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>Maynard Jackson (Black)</td>
<td>59.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sam Massell (White)</td>
<td>40.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by authors.

### Table 2.—Number of Precincts and Average Precinct Size, 1969 and 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Precincts</th>
<th>Average Number of Registered Voters Per Precinct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>666.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>731.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2,924</td>
<td>357.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3,231</td>
<td>379.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>1420.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1063.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by authors.

census tracts, they rarely coincide precisely. The process of allocating precincts to census tracts is time-consuming and fraught with inaccuracies as, for example, the necessary assumption of equal distribution of population within precincts.

### BLACK ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

Research on various elections that pitted black against white candidates has indicated that racial bloc-voting (the overwhelming support of a group for a candidate of the same race) explained most of the variation in the voting pattern.\(^7\) The variable that determined the success or failure of black candidates was the percentage of the white vote that they managed to win. Obviously, the size of this percentage necessary for victory depends on the size of the black vote.

In many cities, with the continuing shift of the white population to residences outside the

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5 Lewis, op. cit., footnote 1. This use of election returns is limited to those elections where the population groups demonstrate extremes of voting behavior.


city limits and the growth of the black population in the city, the proportion of voters who are black is now either a majority or approaching parity with the total number of white registrants. The percentage of the voters who are black usually lags five to ten percentage points behind the proportion of the city’s population that is black. In Atlanta in 1970, when the proportion of the population that was black was 51.3, the percentage of the voters black was only 43.3. This lower proportion is attributed not only to a relatively large proportion of the black population under the voting age but also to a higher mobility rate that influences their ability to meet residency requirements. The lag is attributed also to a higher proportion of the black population in the lower social classes.8

For cities where blacks still are in a minority, a balance of power position can nonetheless be achieved by the black voters. Stone claims that for the black vote to become the balance of power, three preconditions must exist: 1) black voter cohesion—a bloc vote, 2) a two-way split of the white vote, and 3) the political oscillations of fragile loyalties among blacks.9 The first two factors operated in Cleveland (1967), Gary (1967), and Newark (1970) where black candidates, with ninety-five percent support from blacks, achieved nineteen percent of the white vote in Cleveland, twelve percent in Gary, and fifteen percent in Newark.10

An important determinant of the success of black candidates is their ability to get their supporters to the polls in large numbers. Voter registration drives in black neighborhoods are common before an important election.11 The salience of a particular election to the black population will affect the registration and turnout rates. In black-white contests for the Houston school board (1962) and Texas state legislature (1966) the turnout rate for blacks exceeded that of whites, whereas for other elections it was substantially lower.12 In Los Angeles, the average citywide turnout for mayoral elections was forty-two percent in the primary and forty-nine percent in the runoff.13 Contrast these figures to a primary turnout of sixty-six percent and a turnout of seventy-six percent in the runoff when Tom Bradley ran for mayor in 1969. The apathy that usually characterizes municipal races is not present when black candidates enter the race.

Another factor governing the success of black candidates is the strength of the voting alliance with liberal whites. This alliance, referred to as the “Atlanta (or Manhattan) Coalition,” brings together blacks with upper-middle income whites in a voting bloc to support liberal candidates. The “Atlanta Coalition” of blacks and middle-class whites, put together by Mayor Hartsfield in the 1950s, dominated Atlanta politics till 1973 and kept moderates (on the racial issue) in the mayor’s office.

The alliance between blacks and upper-middle class whites can be explained in terms of Banfield and Wilson’s concept of “public-regardfulness.”14 They presented data showing that, in referenda, blacks and upper-middle income whites favored public expenditures that conferred benefits such as money for schools and hospitals on poorer segments of society but resulted in higher property taxes. These “public-regarding” groups contained large proportions of Anglo-Saxons and Jews. Opposition to these expenditures is found in groups who espouse the “immigrant” ethos, and whose conception of politics is one of competition among individual (that is, family and parochial) interests.15 Members of this group are dominantly low- and middle-income homeowners. They view public expenditures as benefiting blacks while they themselves must suffer higher taxes.


11 A keystone of Carl Stokes’ campaign strategy in the Cleveland 1967 mayoral election was a massive registration drive in black wards. See Hadden, Massotti and Thiessen, op. cit., footnote 7.

12 C. Davidson, Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), pp. 87–89.


14 Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., footnote 8, pp. 38–44.

ISSUES AND CAMPAIGNS

Prescott has suggested that “the most definite analysis will be possible either when the electorate is offered two or more deeply contrasting policies covering a wide range of subjects, or where the election centers on one specific and clearly defined issue.”16 With the possible exception of the 1969 Atlanta mayoral runoff, all six elections under scrutiny here meet these two criteria. The candidates were the issues. Not only did the candidates offer sharply contrasting views on the municipal choices, but they themselves, because of their race, were seen by a large number of voters as the main point of contention. Race and platform correlated closely in both Los Angeles elections and in Detroit and Atlanta in 1973.

Elections do not take place in a political vacuum. They occur in the context of the city’s political sociology, and more specifically, at the conclusion of a campaign. A brief review of the main campaign issues and strategies follows. The large daily newspapers in the three cities studied here (Detroit Free Press, Los Angeles Times, and the Atlanta Constitution) provided details of the campaigns.

The 1969 Detroit mayoral campaign was characterized by moderation. In the primary Mrs. Mary Beck had run a one-issue campaign, that of crime control. She finished third with only twenty-two percent of the vote. Roman Gribbs, of Polish background and the incumbent Wayne County Sheriff, proclaimed himself a middle-of-the-roadader. He proposed a nineteen-point program that emphasized a review of the police department and improving housing conditions in the inner city. Richard Austin, the black candidate, also stressed his moderate stance. His campaign strategy was two-fold: to allay the fears of whites and to convince them that a responsible black man could successfully govern Detroit. After winning the primary, he hoped that he could double the number of black voters with a registration drive, cooperation from more militant black leaders, and money, volunteer help, and endorsements. In addition, Austin was endorsed by three big unions (United Auto Workers, Teamsters, and Steel-

workers), the Detroit Free Press, and the Urban Alliance. Gribbs’ endorsements came from all three city police organizations and from the conservative Real Detroit Committee.

By 1973, the number of blacks registered to vote in Detroit was close to the number of whites registered. Three centrist candidates were eliminated in the primary leaving John Nichols, the police chief, facing Coleman Young, a black State Senator, in the runoff. The election campaign was more bitter than that of 1969. It focused on the city’s extremely high crime rate and operations of the police department. Young was endorsed by the city’s two major newspapers and the major unions. Nichols, as expected, won the support of the policemen’s groups, white ethnic clubs, and homeowners associations.

In sharp contrast to the Detroit race of 1969, the Los Angeles mayoral campaign of the same year was bitter and focused on the qualifications of a black man attempting to become mayor of the third-largest city in the country. Discussion of local issues (student militancy at local colleges, unrest in the high schools, role of police in the community, and crime control) was entwined with the color and personalities of the candidates. Sam Yorty, the incumbent, managed to portray Tom Bradley, the former policeman, as soft on crime and himself as tough. “Yorty has denounced Bradley as dishonest, a Black Power advocate, and an associate of radical leftists. He has gone so far as to charge Bradley with being anti-law-enforcement because of his criticism of the police department’s community relations program.”17 Bradley’s strategy was to revive the liberal white-Mexican-black coalition. Although the Los Angeles Times supported the moderate Republican, Alphonso Bell, in the primary, it switched its endorsement to Bradley in the runoff.

In 1973, the positions of Bradley and Yorty on the main issues were clearcut. As in 1969, Yorty focused the campaign on Bradley’s ability to govern Los Angeles. Bradley’s strategy differed dramatically from 1969 when he lost. He debated Yorty on television and raised the issue of Yorty’s long absences (370 days in four years) from the city. With help from a large corps of volunteers and support from labor, in

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addition to endorsements from leading Democrats and the city’s major newspapers, Bradley’s campaign was aggressive and focused on Yorty’s shortcomings as mayor and his own experience and background.

In the 1969 Atlanta primary all candidates but one adopted moderate positions. The black candidate, Horace Tate, was endorsed by Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Dr. Ralph Abernathy but other black leaders supported Mas sell or Cook. (These endorsements were reflected in a three-way split of the black vote.) Massell expected to pick up most of his support after Tate was eliminated. Maynard Jackson, the successful black vice-mayor, remained neutral. Because of the lack of sharp differences on the issues between Massell and Cook, the competition between the two was based on personalities. The incumbent mayor, Ivan Allen, backed Cook. A “get-out-the-vote” campaign by both candidates and the accusations of illegal campaign practices by Cook and anti-Semitism by Massell were the only highlights of the contest.

In 1973, after barely making it through the primary and faced with a black opponent and a black-majority electorate, Massell pointed out that he hired more blacks than any other Atlanta mayor and called Jackson a racist. Jackson, who had supported a strike by black garbage workers and who had made charges of police brutality, in turn pointed to his biracial campaign staff. Massell tied Jackson to the more militant Rev. Hosea Williams, a candidate for the city council presidency, by claiming that “if Maynard Jackson wins, Hosea Williams will win.” It was ironic that Massell, who had been elected on the strength of black votes in 1969 and who had certified credentials as a racial moderate, should raise the racial issue.

NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS

Banfield and Wilson provided a three-way classification of cities on the strength of non-partisanship. Detroit is classified in the middle group of cities where formal organizations other than political parties take part in municipal election campaigns. Los Angeles is placed in the most nonpartisan group of cities—cities in which the political parties play no role and where there are no purely local parties or slate-making associations. Emphasis is placed on the candidate’s own efforts at building a campaign organization and raising funds. Atlanta belongs in the category of cities where the Democratic and Republican parties play a limited role in local elections. Generally, however, the two parties do not interfere in the selection of candidates or in the campaign itself.

Several authors have shown that nonpartisan elections are nonpartisan in name only, stressing the strong relationships that exist between candidates, political parties, interest groups, and newspapers. Besides the voting cues provided by these groups, voters in nonpartisan elections receive other electoral stimuli. Newspapers in nonpartisan cities play a significant role in the choice of candidates. The major dailies in the three cities in this study strongly support the use of nonpartisan elections in their city and endorse candidates for all offices. A comparison of black electoral success in partisan and nonpartisan cities revealed that black representation on city councils in partisan cities is higher than those with nonpartisan ballots. Minority candidates have a most dif-

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21 According to Banfield, an endorsement by the Atlanta Constitution is said to be worth 5,000 votes in a city-wide election. The Detroit daily newspapers, the *Free Press* and *Detroit News*, are both strongly committed to “good government” and play an influential and generally conservative role. The endorsements of the two major Los Angeles dailies, the *Herald- Examiner* and the *Times*, are believed to count for a great deal with a substantial part of the electorate. As one newspaperman stated (in a nonpartisan election), “you can’t tell the players without a scorecard, and we sell the scorecards.” Banfield, op. cit., footnote 13, pp. 32–33, 60 and 89; and Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., footnote 8, p. 157.

difficult time being elected in nonpartisan at-large contests where they have to face the city-wide electorate. In Detroit, a black was not elected to the nine-person Common Council until 1961, even though the proportion of the population that was black exceeded thirty percent. In Detroit, Atlanta, and other cities with a growing black majority, white candidates will find it increasingly difficult to win election to nonpartisan at-large seats.

The 1969 and 1973 elections involving black mayoral candidates contradict the general statements made here on nonpartisan elections. By injecting the element of race into the choice of mayor, they succeeded in raising the salience of the election in the voters' minds. Turnout increased dramatically over previous years. The months before the elections were distinguished by vigorous campaigning by the candidates in the wards, by constant debate on the issues which were more clearly defined than ever before, and by intense lobbying for endorsements from the press, labor and business groups, ethnic organizations, and local political figures.

HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

The three hypotheses of this study are: 1) that bloc-voting by blacks and whites was present in the 1969 elections but diminished in 1973 as social tensions eased in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Atlanta; 2) that a combination of a bloc-vote from the black population and a significant proportion of votes from upper-income whites provided the voter support for black candidates; and 3) that a continuing high turnout of blacks and a decreased turnout of whites from 1969 is related to the success of black candidates in 1973.

Possibly the biggest problem facing a researcher in the field of electoral geography is that of isolating voting choice by groups. The most accurate method is a survey of individual voters stratified by sex, race, education, party, and income. If the aim is to explain voting choice, such survey data are essential. The problem of ecological correlation precludes the possibility of using aggregate data from the Census or from precinct records.

In this paper, the aim is not to explain the voting choice of individuals; we are concerned with areal patterns of support for the candidates. The communities themselves are the units which we wish to study and we are interested in the relationships between community-level variables. In addition, when we are examining the turnout of blacks and whites, we isolate only those precincts that could be classified as ninety percent black, ninety percent white, and ninety percent Spanish-speaking. The method appears to be more accurate than that proposed by Glantz and allows the researcher to analyze the differences in turnout between groups.

The use of isopleths enclosing a given proportion of the vote for candidates or choropleths indicating racial and social groups has some limitations. When maps are used in conjunction with statistical tests, however, they can add to an understanding of the patterns of electoral choice.

The ninety percent isopleth was selected as a measure of bloc-voting. In addition, isopleths were drawn at other levels indicating the relative strength of voting attachment in those precincts. The isopleths were superimposed on maps indicating the racial makeup of census tracts. Primary emphasis is placed on those areas incorporated by the ninety percent line. This figure guarantees the isolation of those neighborhoods which are all black or that are trending in that direction. The use of the isoplethic overlay method is much preferred to statistical correlation because of the time and data-unit differences. This technique shows the best results when the population group mapped is spatially concentrated.

VOTE PROFILES

In democracies the expected distribution of the vote is bell-shaped. Most districts split almost evenly between the candidates; few dis-

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26 Isopleths incorporating individual and isolated precincts are omitted from the isoplethic overlay maps.
Fig. 1. Histograms of black candidate vote, by precinct (1969 Atlanta histogram is Massell vote).

districts will show more than seventy-five percent or less than twenty-five percent for the candidates. This is especially true in the American democracy where extremes of voting are rare. Alternatively, if bloc-voting is present, the profile of the vote should resemble a U-shaped curve, with large numbers of districts at the extremes and few near the center. This vote profile is seen in elections where two antagonistic groups support their candidates exclusively, as in Northern Ireland and Cyprus.\(^{27}\)

Contrary to the usual American pattern, both the 1969 and 1973 vote profiles for Detroit have extreme U-shapes (Fig. 1). In 1973 over one-half of the 1,122 precincts in the city showed either more than ninety percent or less than ten percent support for Young, the black candidate. In fact, the 1973 profile shows a more extreme distribution than in 1969. The moderate images projected by Austin and Griggs, a sharp contrast to the bitter 1973 campaign, is reflected in the 1969 profile. By 1973, the continued expansion of the black ghetto and the shrinking size of the white population led to an increase in precincts predominantly black. This population change is reflected in the larger proportion of precincts giving the black candidate over sixty percent of the vote in 1973. The first hypothesis, that bloc-voting decreased over the four-year span in Detroit, is not substantiated by the vote profiles.

Los Angeles presents an ideal case study of the trends in bloc-voting. The same candidates and similar campaign issues were present in both elections. The two profiles for Los Angeles exhibit neither the characteristics of the bell-shaped or U-shaped curves. Clearly, in both elections, Bradley had a core of bloc-votes in the black neighborhoods (Fig. 1). In contrast to this, Yorty did not possess such a core of strength. Yorty’s success in 1969 lay in winning fifty to eighty percent of the vote in over half the city’s precincts. His inability to repeat this in 1973 contributed to his defeat. Vote preferences in white areas trended towards the middle of the spectrum in 1973, indicating a move away from the overwhelming support these neighborhoods had given Yorty four years earlier. Bloc-voting in the black neighborhoods was replicated in both elections and Bradley picked up support in white precincts in 1973 and this, added to his solid black support, ensured his election.

The two profiles for Atlanta should not be compared directly (Fig. 1). In 1969 both candidates were white, while in 1973 Maynard Jackson, a black, reached the runoff; the correlation between Massell’s vote in 1969 and Jackson’s in 1973 was \( r = +.745 \) (\( r^2 = .555 \)). The success of both candidates depended heavily on a bloc-vote by the black population. Both voting profiles indicate bloc-voting, although the 1973 histogram indicates a trend towards the extreme values, caused by Jackson’s candidacy. Massell’s 1969 appeal was more uniform than Jackson’s in 1973; no precinct gave Massell less than ten percent in 1969. Whereas both voting profiles appear similar, the voting choices behind the histograms are entirely different. In 1969 the white vote split between Massell and Cook, but by 1973 the vast majority of whites voted for Massell. Bloc-voting by

\(^{27}\) Prescott, op. cit., footnote 16, p. 379.
the white population, which had gained ground in the late 1960s, was a reality by 1973.

Comparatively, the 1969 profiles for Detroit and Atlanta were similar and exhibit the typical U-shape distribution of votes that is characteristic of bloc-voting. The Los Angeles profile for that year was significantly different because both candidates, in addition to their core-areas of support, split the votes of other precincts. The 1973 comparison reveals the same positions with respect to bloc-voting. Detroit shows the most extreme pattern of bloc-voting; Atlanta follows, while the Los Angeles precincts indicate the least bloc-voting. This ranking is a function of the candidates and election issues in each city and the size and extent of racial segregation in the precincts.²⁸

The vote profiles for the three cities do not indicate a diminution of bloc-voting between 1969 and 1973. The reverse is true for Detroit and Atlanta where extreme voting was noted, while in Los Angeles the anti-Bradley vote was moderated and his bloc-vote consolidated.

DETOIT, 1969 AND 1973

The correspondence between the census tracts ninety percent or more black and the ninety percent (for Austin) isopleth is noteworthy (Fig. 2). Those few all-black tracts not incorporated by the ninety percent line are enclosed by the isopleth of eighty percent. Black ghetto outliers in the southwest, north, and southeast are each enclosed by the bloc-vote isopleth. The Turnbull Corridor, a racially-mixed neighborhood in the center of the city, falls outside the ninety percent isopleth indicating the divided loyalty of its residents. The general vote pattern indicates two cores of strength: for Gribbs in the western and northeast neighborhoods, and for Austin in the central neighborhoods. Between these two cores is a regular transition zone; the proportion of the vote for Gribbs increases in a regular fashion away from Austin’s inner-city core.²⁹

²⁸ The Tauber Segregation Indices indicate that Atlanta is the most racially segregated of the three cities with a 1960 index of 93.6, followed by Detroit (84.5) and Los Angeles (81.6). K. E. Tauber, “Residential Segregation,” Scientific American, Vol. 213 (1965), pp. 12–19.

²⁹ Based on visual comparison, the percentage of the vote obtained by Austin lagged five to ten percentage points behind the proportion of the tract population that was black.

Unlike the large contiguous area that gave more than ninety percent to Austin, the basis of Gribbs’ strength was scattered throughout the white neighborhoods of Detroit (Fig. 2). Many of these precincts have large Polish-American populations and the strong vote for Gribbs, who is of Polish descent, is partly a reflection of ethnic-based voting. If the precincts greater than eighty percent for Gribbs are included, almost all census tracts more than ninety percent white are enclosed by the two isopleths. The major exceptions are those areas near the central business district where the white population is predominantly single or childless couples. Unlike the strong bloc-vote that characterized black voting, the preferences for Gribbs lagged significantly behind the white proportion of the local population and Austin picked up some support, however little, all over the city.

The correspondence between the black population distribution in Detroit and the ninety percent isopleth for Young is remarkable (Fig. 3). Many tracts more than half black but less
than three-quarters black gave Young massive support. This apparent support for Young by some whites can be explained by ghetto population expansion between 1970 and 1973. Areas which had had substantial white populations had become all black in this three-year period. The percentage of the vote for Young can be used as a surrogate for the location of the black population. In Detroit, the ninety percent isopleth incorporates only those tracts fifty to seventy-five percent black that comprise the leading edge of the black ghetto and not those tracts separate from the main black population concentrations, leading to further support for the above thesis.

Unlike 1969, the white candidate received over ninety percent support in large contiguous sections of northwest, northeast, and southeast Detroit (Fig. 3). This vote isopleth does not coincide with the edge of ninety percent white concentrations. The nonconcurrence can be explained by population movements since 1970, especially in northwest Detroit which is experiencing black immigration.

LOS ANGELES, 1969 AND 1973

Unlike the rather clear lines of the voting surface in Detroit, the spatial pattern of the 1969 vote in Los Angeles is complex (Fig. 4). Bloc-voting is evident in south-central Los Angeles as the ninety percent Bradley isopleth encloses not only tracts that are more than nine-tenths black but many precincts in the seventy-five to ninety percent black zone. This pattern is contrary to the lag effect (the difference between the percentage of the population black and the percentage of the total vote for black candidates) that is usually found in black neighborhoods. The same concentric rings of decreasing Bradley support are evident also in the black enclave, Pacoima, in the San Fernando Valley. The tendency for a stronger pro-Bradley vote at the center of the black ghetto is analogous to ethnic-based voting, where it has been noted that ethnic support for the local candidate is greater in the core of the neighborhood.  

A sharp contrast to the bloc-voting by the black population of Los Angeles is the electoral preference of the white population. As McPhail indicated, Bradley received significant support from the upper- and middle-income white areas of the western part of Los Angeles. In these precincts, Bradley received almost half of the votes cast (Fig. 4). Yorty's main support, indicated by the eighty percent isopleth, was in the extremities of the city. These communities are similar in their lower-middle class white socioeconomic composition. In his campaign,

31 McPhail, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 750.
32 Bradley did significantly better in these white neighborhoods where the median educational level was over 13.5 years.
33 A survey of Los Angeles voters showed that the variable, Troubled American Beliefs (defined as strong patriotic feelings, as well as law and order threats from left-wingers) was a strong predictor of the 1969 Yorty vote. For people who ranked high on the Troubled American Beliefs score, sixty-seven percent still voted for Yorty even when they considered him to be incompetent. Yorty was supported by seventy-seven percent of blue-collar workers; sixty-four percent of the clerical, managerial, and sales group; and fifty-one percent of white-collar professionals. On the other hand, Bradley received strong voter support from whites twenty-one to twenty-five years of age; see V. Jeffries and H. E. Ransford, “Ideology, Social Structure and the Yorty-Bradley Mayors Election.” *Social Problems*, Vol. 19 (1972), pp. 358–73.
Yorty directed his appeal at this portion of the electorate and the eighty percent support he received here indicates that he was successful. The constituents who chose Yorty were scattered throughout the city, with the noticeable exception of south-central Los Angeles. The sixty percent isopleth is evidence of this dispersed support (Fig. 4). All of the San Fernando Valley (except Pacoima), the Mexican neighborhoods of east Los Angeles, the Venice-Mar Vista-Westchester region in the southwestern corner, and that portion of the city south of Watts showed strong support for the incumbent.

The Spanish-speaking population of Los Angeles is large (18.42 percent in 1970) and constitutes a growing political force in the city. Their registration and turnout rates are below the average for the city, diluting this electoral potential.34 Tracts, predominantly in east Los Angeles, that included a majority of the population as Spanish-speaking were mapped. Yorty received between sixty and seventy percent of this group's vote. Competition between blacks and Spanish-speaking populations in Los Angeles prevents the possibility of an electoral coalition. In terms of electoral success, the Spanish-speaking population lags far behind the black minority, whom they outnumber slightly. As has been shown by Grabler, Moore, and Guzman, the Mexican-American popula-

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tion rejects the notion of a political coalition with blacks.85

A comparison of the isopleth overlays for the black population of Los Angeles in 1969 and 1973 indicates the expansion of the area in the south-central part of the city enclosed by the ninety percent (for Bradley) isopleth. This partly is a reflection of the expansion of the black ghetto but also is an indication of the decline in Yorty's popularity. The drop-off in Bradley strength is extremely sharp to the south but more gradual to the northwest, reflecting the decrease in the black population (Fig. 5). Bradley also picked up strong support in outlying areas where he did not do well in 1969. The bloc-vote by blacks in 1969 persisted but Bradley also increased his proportion of the white vote, especially in middle-class white precincts.

Since Yorty lost so much support between 1969 and 1973, it is not possible to isolate precincts where he got a large proportion of the total vote. He did, however, manage to maintain his strength in six locations scattered through the city (Fig. 5). These cores are indistinguishable in socioeconomic or racial characteristics from other precincts that gave Yorty a majority of the votes; they are the core of his support. The fifty percent isopleth follows the line of the Santa Monica Mountains, similar to the sixty percent isopleth in 1969, and it also incorporates the precincts south of Watts. The decline in Yorty preferences was evident in all white neighborhoods. He could not afford to

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85 Grabler, Moore and Guzman, op. cit., footnote 34, pp. 567–69.
ing areas, but he still managed to win a majority of the vote of this group—the only clear majority he won in any of the three main racial groups.

ATLANTA, 1969 AND 1973

Although a black candidate, Tate, was eliminated in the 1969 primary, black voters continued to demonstrate the bloc-voting that had been characteristic of their electoral participation in Atlanta. In the runoff, the correlation between the proportion of the vote for Massell and the proportion of the registrants who were black was $r = +.978$ ($r^2 = .956$). Massell’s victory was based on the support of almost all black voters and about one-quarter of the white voters (Fig. 6). All census tracts (except one on the west side) over ninety percent black gave the winner more than eighty percent of the votes cast in their precincts. Other areas that were more than three-quarters black did not reach this level of support for Massell but did give him over half of the votes cast there. In Atlanta the mayoral choice traditionally was between a moderate white and one whose racial views were anathema to blacks. In this situation, the choice for blacks was clear. Cook projected a moderate image but to little avail in the black areas which gave Massell 92.2 percent of their vote.

In 1969 three-quarters of the white population of Atlanta supported the losing mayoral candidate, Cook. Previous differences between the choices of middle- and upper-class whites in the northern end of the city and low-income whites in the southern neighborhoods was not evident in the mayoral runoff (Fig. 6). Cook received about seventy percent of the total vote cast in both areas. For the first time, the “Atlanta Coalition” of middle-class whites and blacks was given a severe jolt. When the precincts in upper-income white census tracts (top quintile) and low-income white tracts (bottom quintile) are compared in their support of

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36 Rooks, op. cit., footnote 4, p. 19. Rooks also stated that most of those who had supported Tate in the primary switched to Massell in the runoff. The proportion of the black vote won by Massell jumped from 44.2 percent in the primary to 92.2 percent in the runoff.

37 Rooks, op. cit., footnote 4, p. 23.

If the 1969 Atlanta mayoral election signaled the breakup of the "Atlanta Coalition," the 1973 mayoral election sounded its death knell. The city's voters split along racial lines in their candidate preferences. For the first time, the white population voted as a bloc on the side of the losing candidate, Massell. Jackson was the recipient of a bloc vote by blacks, who had supported Massell overwhelmingly in 1969. This dramatic shift in electoral allegiance illustrates clearly the disruption of established voting patterns caused by the entry of a black candidate into the electoral arena.

As in 1969, the vote of the Atlanta black electorate in 1973 went overwhelmingly to one candidate (Fig. 7). Because of black population expansion, tracts with black minorities in 1970 had black majorities in 1973, and accordingly the ninety percent isopleth encloses these tracts as well as the older black neighborhoods. Only in the eastern part of the city does the isopleth fail to encompass the black majority census tracts, where a residual of Massell strength remained.

Only seven precincts gave more than ninety percent of the total vote to Massell. These precincts are scattered throughout the white neighborhoods of the city. In the middle-income white southwestern corner of the city Jackson managed to pick up between one-third and one-half of the votes cast, a reflection of his racial support from the black population (about ten to twenty percent of the total) in these precincts.

VOTER TURNOUT

The different turnout and registration rates between voting groups is an important but often neglected aspect of the American electoral system. An accepted measure of turnout is the percentage of the registered population that actually votes. Despite the fact that this measure can be computed easily, it neglects the voting age population that is not registered. A better measure would be the percentage of the voting age population (persons older than eighteen) who voted. Data on voting age populations are difficult to obtain for intercensal years.

In electoral contests where the blocs of voters are numerically similar, the differential turnout rate between the groups is critical. This also holds true for contests where a third candidate hopes to be successful by winning the votes left after his or her opponents split the

Cook, the average percentage for Cook was 74.49 in high-income precincts and 64.7 in low-income precincts. The injection of party questions into the campaign (Cook was a Republican) and the moderate racial stand by Cook helped this transfer of support away from the "Coalition candidate," Massell. The voting preferences of whites in Atlanta were split and allowed Massell to win handily.
majority vote. A major reason for the failure of black mayoral candidates in 1975 in Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Baltimore was the low turnout in black precincts. In both 1969 and 1973, black mayoral candidates in Detroit, Atlanta, and Los Angeles based their hopes of success on a high turnout in black neighborhoods assuming that they would benefit from a bloc vote in these precincts. It is hypothesized that a continued high turnout in black neighborhoods, in contrast to a decreased turnout in white neighborhoods, contributed significantly to the success of black mayoral candidates in 1973.

In Detroit and Los Angeles, the average turnout of the total electorate, as well as that of the constituent groups, dropped significantly (ten to thirteen percent) between 1969 and 1973 (Table 3). In Atlanta, however, the turnout rates increased dramatically between 1969 and 1973 signifying the entry of a black candidate into the mayoral runoff. Black candidates can produce a sudden increase in the electoral participation of blacks and whites, as happened in Detroit and Los Angeles in 1969. In that year, the city-wide turnout rates jumped about fifteen percentage points above the norm of mayoral elections in Detroit and twenty-five points in Los Angeles.

No precinct in Detroit increased its turnout rate from 1969 to 1973. The salience of the 1973 race was reduced from the high level of 1969 in all neighborhoods of the city. The greatest reductions in turnout (more than twenty-five percent decrease) took place in the white neighborhoods of northwest Detroit, along the eastern boundary of the city and north of downtown. In black precincts, the most common change was a moderate decrease of between ten and twenty percent. While fewer people voted in 1973, they exhibited a more extreme voting choice. It was in those precincts that provided the extreme votes (over ninety percent for Young and over ninety percent for Nichols) that the voter turnout showed the sharpest declines from 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>90%+ Black</th>
<th>90%+ White</th>
<th>90%+ Spanish-speaking</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of precincts</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>461</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>60.89</td>
<td>70.59</td>
<td>68.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard dev.</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of precincts</td>
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<td>52.89</td>
<td>50.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard dev.</td>
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<td>Los Angeles</td>
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<td>1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of precincts</td>
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<td>154</td>
<td>996</td>
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<td>Mean</td>
<td>74.36</td>
<td>83.66</td>
<td>73.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard dev.</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>5.99</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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<td>No. of precincts</td>
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<td>71.77</td>
<td>63.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard dev.</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>7.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of precincts</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>54.05</td>
<td>53.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard dev.</td>
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<td>9.00</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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<td>No. of precincts</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>57.98</td>
<td>63.74</td>
<td>57.64</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard dev.</td>
<td>8.64</td>
<td>7.59</td>
<td>10.35</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by authors.

In Los Angeles, only 100 precincts showed an increased turnout from 1969. The largest contiguous group of precincts with increased turnout appeared in the Westwood-West Los Angeles area, a neighborhood with a large number of college-age voters who cast their ballots for the first time. Bradley benefited from this change in the electoral law. At the other extreme, precincts which experienced turnout declines of greater than twenty percent were in the cores of the candidates' strength. Declines in turnout of ten to fifteen percent were scattered throughout the city. Zero to ten percent losses were found in the wealthier neighborhoods along the Santa Monica mountains and in the newer middle-class black neighborhoods.

Unlike Detroit and Los Angeles, Atlanta's voters went to the polls in record numbers in 1973, the first time a black candidate reached the runoff. Not unexpectedly, the biggest increases in turnout, the result of Jackson's can-

didacy, appeared in black neighborhoods. This statement is particularly true for middle-income black precincts, while the turnout in some low-income black precincts actually decreased from 1969, similar to the pattern in Detroit and Los Angeles.

CONCLUSIONS

A recent survey indicated that over 130 black mayors now hold office; the majority of these officials are elected from small cities (two-thirds are from towns of less than 10,000), dominantly in the South, and are elected from constituencies ranging from 100 to 0.2 percent black. One-third of these mayors live in towns more than ninety percent black and two-thirds were elected in towns where the population is more than one-half black. The three cities whose mayoral elections are reviewed here are the largest cities that have elected black mayors. The number of black mayors can be expected to grow but this growth probably will not take place in a regular manner. In November 1975, black candidates entered mayoral races in Cleveland, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Miami, and Gary. Only in Gary was a black candidate successful. In the other four cities, a relatively low turnout of black voters hurt whatever chances the black candidates had. This was especially true of Philadelphia (black voter turnout 50.4 percent; white voter turnout 71.2 percent), Baltimore, and Cleveland.

The defeat of a black candidate in the initial attempt at the mayoral office seems to be almost a prerequisite for later success. The initial attempt is important in politicizing the black electorate, establishing a campaign organization, and increasing black registration levels. Unsuccessful races were made by Stokes in Cleveland, Bradley in Los Angeles, and other black candidates in Detroit and Atlanta before eventual successes.

Stone has suggested nine preconditions for black candidates to be successful: 1) they must be considered as serious candidates by the black community; 2) the black community must believe that a black has a chance to win; 3) the black community must unite in a solid bloc vote; 4) the black candidate must have strong organization, good campaign techniques, and plenty of money; 5) the black candidate must campaign for the white vote as assiduously as for the black vote; 6) the black candidate must be a member of the majority party; 7) no other black candidate of significance should enter the race; 8) there must be a minimum of one-third black voters in the city; and 9) the media in the city must either endorse the black candidate or at least remain neutral. Tryman states that conditions 1, 2, 3, and 8 were met by the successful black candidates in Newark, Cleveland, and Gary. Stokes in Cleveland particularly benefited from the fifth condition.

In the five mayoral elections involving black candidates under analysis in this paper, conditions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 were met in all five races. Condition 8 was met in Detroit and Atlanta but not in Los Angeles, while condition 5 balanced the black candidate’s advantage in Los Angeles because of Bradley’s strenuous efforts to court the white vote. The black candidates were endorsed by major newspapers in Detroit (1969 and 1973), Los Angeles (1969 and 1973), and Atlanta (1973); the white candidate was endorsed in no election where the candidates were of different races.

To Stone’s nine preconditions for black success may be added two more, based on the analysis in this paper. First, the serious attempt to capture the mayoralty by a black candidate must have taken place before and, second, the turnout of black voters must be greater than that of white voters. The turnout rate of black voters necessary to elect a black candidate will vary with the proportion of the total electorate that is black, assuming the continuance of

41 Stone, op. cit., footnote 39, p. 10. In Baltimore, the black candidate was hurt by her membership in the minority party (the Republicans are out-registered seven to one in the city) and an especially low turnout in black neighborhoods. See Cramer, op. cit., footnote 39, p. 1. In Miami, a virtually unknown black candidate lost by more than five to one. Less than ten percent of the registered black population cast ballots, compared to twenty-five percent of Anglos and forty percent of the Latin population. See Jacobs, op. cit., footnote 39, p. 2-D. In Cleveland, because of a growing black electorate, a viable majority-party candidate and a precedent of electing a black mayor, it appeared as if this city might elect a black mayor in 1975; an exceptionally high turnout by white voters killed this possibility. See “Elections ‘75: A Mixed Bag,” *Newsweek*, November 17, 1975, pp. 50–53.
43 Tryman, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 357.
bloc-voting by blacks. In nonpartisan contests, the candidates are often from the same party so that whatever advantage might accrue to the black candidate from being a member of the majority party is thereby eliminated. The real test of the accuracy of these eleven conditions (nine suggested by Stone and two suggested in this paper) is whether the outcome of racially divided elections can be predicted before the polling day.

The success of black candidates in 1973 in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Atlanta was the result of a combination of factors. Metropolitan residential trends led to a growth in the number of blacks registered to vote and a decline of the white electorate between 1969 and 1973. Although overall turnout in 1973 was down from the peaks of 1969, except in Atlanta, the black turnout was significantly greater than the white turnout rate. Black candidates benefited from a solid bloc-vote in all of the elections; when this was combined with a share of the white vote, it provided the victory margin. While bloc-voting has been decried by some commentators as often leading to the election of unqualified candidates, Johnson has argued that blacks, as the Irish, Italians, and Poles have done in the past, "should put aside their differences within the race and unite behind the men who will look selfishly at the black man's interest."

Predictions in American politics are always hazardous. If present population trends continue in American metropolitan areas, more large cities will elect black mayors. The particular timing of their election depends largely on the eleven factors listed above. The basic reason behind black electoral success so far, however, has been a united electoral front by the black population. It is possible that splits along ideological, social class, or party lines will divide the black electorate in the future and allow a white candidate to win on a white bloc vote. In the foreseeable future, bloc voting will remain the dominant method of voting when the candidates are racially different.

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